Thứ Ba, 23 tháng 6, 2020

(Cuộc Chạy Ðua Vũ Trang) 06/22/2020 (Popular Mechanics) Radiation Leak in Europe Points to a Possible Russian Weapons Test. (The National Interest) Revealed: The Pentagon’s Pacific Plans for the B-21 Stealth Bomber. (Defense News) Smith wants $3.6B plan to counter China, and way more study. (Defense Bews) Senate panel OKs $6 billion military fund to confront China. (The National Interest) The U.S. Navy Just Landed Another Littoral Combat Ship. (The National Interest) Did Russia Just Send a Submarine Through the Bosphorus? (Defense News) US Navy announces intent to ink $10B in contracts for first 2 Columbia subs. (AFP) China warns risk of naval incident with US on the rise

(Cuộc Chạy Ðua Vũ Trang) 06/07/2020

THE ARMS RACE (Reuters video) China puts final satellite for Beidou into orbit. (AP) Japan PM to bolster defense after scrapping missile system. (CBS NEWS) (Video) U.S. "not going to allow Russia and China to continue" increasing nuclear stockpiles, top negotiator says(Business Insider) The US wants to kill part of an 8,000 mile-long undersea cable linking Hong Kong with LA over China spying fears. (The National Interest) Will China Have Global Naval Dominance by 2030? (Reuters) U.S. to sidestep arms pact to sell armed drones. (The National Interest) China Finishes Its Second Large Amphibious Assault Ship. (Reuters) U.S. Senate panel authorizes $9.1 billion for 95 F-35 jets made by Lockheed. (Defense News) Senate panel OKs $6 billion military fund to confront China. (The National Interest) Two of America's Most Powerful Aircraft Carriers Have Just Joined Forces. (The National Interest) China Just Added Two New Nuclear Missile Submarines to Its Fleet. (Bloomberg) A U.S.-China Cold War Could Be Good for Investors, After All

https://quandiemvietnam.blogspot.com/2020/06/the-arms-race-cu-o-c-ch-y-ua-vu-trang.html

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World

Radiation Leak in Europe Points to a Possible Russian Weapons Test

Popular Mechanics June 29, 2020, 2:15 PM PDT

Photo credit: Russian Defence Ministry - Getty Images
Photo credit: Russian Defence Ministry - Getty Images

From Popular Mechanics

  • Radiation monitoring stations across northern Europe have detected above normal—but still safe—levels of radioactivity.

  • One of the radioactive isotopes detected, Iodine 131, is generated by nuclear fission.

  • Russia has denied being the source of the radioactivity, but the country had similar leaks in 2017 and 2019. The radiation may be due to the testing of a new nuclear-powered cruise missile.

Radiation detectors across northern Europe have picked up a short-lived, non-dangerous release of radioactivity experts believe came from Russia. Authorities believe the leak, which was first detected in early June, is coming from western Russia. One possibility is that the test is in some way related to a new nuclear-powered cruise missile, which caused an accident in 2019 and several deaths.

The Associated Press reports that officials in Finland, Norway, and Sweden detected man-made radionuclides—that is, radionuclides that do not naturally occur in nature. According to the Barents Observer, Iodine 131 was detected by air monitoring stations at Svanhovd and Viksjøfjell, Norway, as well as a nuclear weapons monitoring facility at Svalbard. Analysis by the Dutch National Institute for Public Health indicates the source of the radiation is western Russia.

Iodine 131 is a radioisotope created as a result of nuclear fission, which is why scientists believe the radiation release is the result of an accident at a nuclear facility. According to the CDC, exposure to large amounts of Iodine 131 can cause burns to the eyes and skin. Iodine 131 ingested into the human body accumulates in the thyroid gland, causing thyroid cancer. Iodine 131 has a half-life of eight days, meaning it can disappear from the environment relatively quickly.

The amount of Iodine 131 released is considered “tiny” and not dangerous.

Finnish authorities also reportedly detected small levels of cobalt, ruthenium and cesium in mid-June. In late June, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, an international organization that monitors the globe for signs of nuclear weapons tests, detected radioactive isotopes across southern Sweden.

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Business

Revealed: The Pentagon’s Pacific Plans for the B-21 Stealth Bomber

Kris Osborn

https://www.yahoo.com/news/revealed-pentagon-pacific-plans-b-143000586.html

Click here to read the full article.

The Pentagon plans to deploy its emerging B-21 stealth bomber in the Pacific as part of a decided effort to ensure technical superiority, sustain deterrence, and, if needed, hold potential adversaries at risk.

The plan, articulated by Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs David Helvey, incorporates the integration of surveillance assets, submarines and what the Pentagon envisions as a new generation of stealth technology contained in the B-21.

“We're making investments to ensure that we maintain operational readiness and strengthen the conventional capabilities that we have that are our enduring advantage such as submarines, the new B-21 Stealth bomber, the P-8 aircraft,” Helvey told reporters June 18, according to a Pentagon transcript.

Helvey discussed the anticipated operation of the B-21 in the context of increased U.S.-allied training operations, coordinated strategic policies and a specific focus upon the “deterrence of any actors that would look to undermine or threaten our shared interests,” as he put it.

Operating a B-21 in the Pacific, conducting patrols such as those now increasingly being performed by B-2s, B-52s and B1-bs in the Pacific theater, would present a new series of interwoven complexities for potential adversaries.

Given that the B-21 is largely a “black” program, very few details are known about its technical characteristics, however, developers have emphasized that it incorporates a new generation of stealth technology, bringing an ability to hold “any target, anywhere in the world . . . at risk.”

Slated to be operational in just the next few years, the B-21 could not come at a better time, given the rapid advances known to be occurring with Chinese surface-to-air defenses. While Russian S-400s and emerging S-500s have long been believed to be among the most advanced and concerning, there is now growing consensus that China’s technological progress in this area is also quickly gaining ground.

The most cutting edge air defenses increasingly draw upon faster computer processing, digital networking between otherwise separate “nodes,” and multi-frequency radar technologies. A 2017 assessment in Deagle.com of the HQ-9 specifically cites that the Chinese air defenses are in part based upon the U.S. Patriot and Russian S-300 Systems. The newer HQ-9B is cited to be able to hit ranges out to three hundred kilometers.

“The HQ-9 has a track-via-missile terminal guidance system and proximity fuze taken from the Patriot and cold-launch and aerodynamics from tube-launched S-300 missiles,” the Deagle.com report states.

Despite the technological progress of air defenses, retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, maintains an “imperative for stealth,” explaining that the most advanced stealth bombers will remain very difficult to hit.

“Even if a radar can detect, it now has to track, and when it transfers that data to engage it will have to shoot a missile using much smaller radar than that used for detection. Also, fusing of the interceptor weapon can be affected by low observability technology,” Deptula previously told the National Interest. “Bi-static radar can help detect low observable aircraft. However, to intercept a stealth aircraft requires the transfer of detection from a large acquisition radar to a much smaller interceptor radar either on an aircraft or a missile that can track—or maintain continuous “lock-on” of the low observable aircraft

The B-21 image released by the USAF depicts a design that does not use vertical flight control surfaces like tails. Without vertical surfaces to reflect radar from side aspects, the new bomber will have an RCS (Radar Cross Section) that reduces returns not only from the front and rear but also from the sides, making detection from any angle a challenge, the Mitchell Institute writes.

On the topic of RCS, an interesting essay called “Radar and Laser Cross-Section Engineering,” from the Aerospace Research Central, cites the emergence of new coating technologies, including “radar-absorbing materials and artificial metamaterials.” (Text written by David Jenn, an author from the Naval Postgraduate School).

Newer methods of infrared or thermal signature reduction are connected to engine and exhaust placement. Internally configured engines, coupled with exhaust pipes on the top of an aircraft can massively lower the heat emissions from an aircraft, such as the structure of the current B-2.

All of these emerging technical factors continue to inform a growing consensus regarding future war threats—that the B-21 may quite possibly be the only platform that will be able to penetrate certain enemy weapons and advanced air defenses for decades to come.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Click here to read the full article.

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Defense News

Smith wants $3.6B plan to counter China, and way more study

Joe Gould

https://www.yahoo.com/news/smith-wants-3-6b-plan-023312569.html

WASHINGTON ― Congressional defense leaders now have at least three competing plans to push back on China in the Pacific. Which will they choose?

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., introduced his own $3.6 billion Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative plan Thursday―a response to two plans, each called the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative―that would spend more and be more prescriptive about how the Pentagon would spend that money.

“Our goal in this was to send a signal to our partners and allies that we have an enduring commitment to the region and that collectively we want to help address the full spectrum of security threats that our partners and allies in the region face,” a committee aide said in a conference call with reporters Thursday.

Among other things, Smith’s plan identifies $3.6 billion in base budget already part of the president’s budget request, and it requires the Pentagon produce a raft of analysis before Congress beefs up the U.S. presence in the Pacific.

The language is part of the HASC draft of the annual defense policy bill, due to be marked up in committee on July 1.

Smith’s plan and the others represent Congress’s efforts to sharpen the Pentagon’s spending and focus in the region, even as Defense Secretary Mark Esper has said China is his department’s top adversary. Each was inspired by the multiyear European Deterrence Initiative, which has consumed $22 billion since its inception after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

HASC’s top Republican, Rep. Mac Thornberry, of Texas, has proposed an Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative that spends $6 billion―all in FY21―on specific priorities that include air and missile defense systems as well as new military construction in partner countries.

Thornberry will offer amendments during the markup to get the bill closer to his plan, according to a memo he released Thursday. Smith’s plan lacks “several important elements,” and the amendments will be “focused on specific authorities and investments needed to strengthen greater cooperation with allies and partners,” the memo said.

Smith’s plan would require another strategy from the defense secretary and chief of Indo-Pacific Command for all the forces, equipment and facilities and they would need to reassure allies, with a detailed budget, timeline and list of locations for proposed assets. Budget justification materials would be required in fiscal 2022 and each year after.

Responding to a requirement in the FY20 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command previously provided Congress with a plan for $20 billion in spending through FY26 so that the combatant command can fulfill the National Defense Strategy and maintain an edge over China.

The idea with the new legislation, a HASC aide said, was to further establish a basis for the initiative and get the Defense Department into regular talks with Congress to describe how the military was meeting Congress’s objectives and spending what Congress has provided, the HASC aide said.

Congress will have to internally negotiate the final dollar amount for any such fund and what those funds would buy. Once approved by the full House, its version of the NDAA would be reconciled with the Senate’s version―due on the Senate floor next week―which also contains its own Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative.

The the Senate Armed Services Committee-approved plan authorizes $1.4 billion in 2021 (which is $188.6 million more than the president’s budget request) and $5.5 billion in 2022. It also emphasizes investment in an array of specific enabling capabilities and infrastructure.

Its transparency measures aren’t as comprehensive as the HASC bill, but it requires the Pentagon provide detailed information in its annual budget request, including projections for spending over five years.

Compared with the SASC bill, Smith did not propose additional funding as SASC did, nor did he include off-budget wartime funds, a HASC aide said.

“So there’ll be some differences to work out as we go through this,” the aide said, “but we think there’s a bipartisan consensus to try to get it done.”

Inhofe, in a floor speech Thursday, touted the SASC bill’s goal of countering Russia and China, which has “antagonized and harassed Taiwanese, Malaysian, Vietnamese, and Indonesian vessels in the South China Sea.”

“The Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act is all about sending a message to China and Russia,” Inhofe said. “It says, ‘There is no way you can defeat us — so don’t even try.’”

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Business

Senate panel OKs $6 billion military fund to confront China

Joe Gould

https://www.yahoo.com/news/senate-panel-oks-6-billion-165555677.html

WASHINGTON ― Plans for a Senate-crafted version of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a new military fund to boost deterrence against China in the Pacific, is one step closer to becoming law.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved nearly $6 billion for the fund in its version of the annual defense policy bill, the panel announced Thursday. It authorizes $1.4 billion in fiscal 2021, which would be $188.6 million above the administration’s budget request, and $5.5 billion for fiscal 2022. The bill also directs the defense secretary to create a spending plan for all of the funds.

“The best way to protect U.S. security and prosperity in Asia is to maintain a credible balance of military power, but, after years of underfunding, America’s ability to do so is at risk,” the committee’s summary stated. “The FY21 [National Defense Authorization Act] establishes the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) to send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that America is deeply committed to defending our interests in the Indo-Pacific.

“PDI will enhance budgetary transparency and oversight, focus resources on key military capability gaps, reassure U.S. allies and partners, and bolster the credibility of American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”

Though not all details of the fund were immediately made public, SASC Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., and ranking member Jack Reed, D-R.I., previously said they would sponsor a measure to enable U.S. military operations in the region, beyond supporting new weapons platforms.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper has said China is his department’s top adversary, but Congress has worked to sharpen the Pentagon’s spending and focus in the region. The PDI would follow the form of the multiyear European Deterrence Initiative, which has consumed $22 billion since its inception after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

Congress will have to internally negotiate the final dollar amount for PDI and what those funds would buy, but House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., and ranking member Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, have expressed support for the idea. Though the Senate’s approach differs, Thornberry has also proposed spending $6 billion―all in FY21―on priorities that include air and missile defense systems as well as new military construction in partner countries; Smith hasn’t released his own plan.

Once approved by the full Senate, its version of the NDAA would be reconciled with the House’s version, which the HASC is expected to make public late this month before it goes through markup July 1 and advances to the House floor.

With an eye on China beyond the PDI, the SASC bill also encourages the Air Force to establish an operating location in the Indo-Pacific region for F-35A fighter jets and to allocate “sufficient resources and prioritize the protection of air bases that might be under attack from current or emerging cruise missiles and advanced hypersonic missiles, specifically from China."

There are also a number of provisions aimed at safeguarding America’s technology and industrial base from Chinese intellectual property theft and “economic aggression,” according to the summary. The bill would also require reports from the Pentagon on how to mitigate the risks from vendors like Chinese telecom firms Huawei and ZTE when basing U.S. troops overseas.

The SASC summary said its proposed PDI would:

  • Increase lethality of the joint force in the Pacific, including by improving active and passive defense against theater cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles for bases, operating locations and other critical infrastructure.

  • Enhance the design and posture of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region by transitioning from large, centralized and unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient and adaptive basing; increasing the number of capabilities of expeditionary airfields and ports; enhancing pre-positioning of forward stocks of fuel, munitions, equipment and materiel; and improving distributed logistics and maintenance capabilities in the region to ensure the sustainment of logistics under persistent multidomain attack.

  • Strengthen alliances and partnerships to increase capabilities, improve interoperability and information sharing, and support information operations capabilities with a focus on countering malign influence.

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U.S.

The U.S. Navy Just Landed Another Littoral Combat Ship

Peter Suciu

Click here to read the full article.

In the world of professional football there had long been a rivalry between the NFLs (formerly) San Diego (now Los Angeles) Chargers and the Kansas City Chiefs, but the city that is known as "the birthplace of California" is now the home port for the USS Kansas City (LCS 22), the twenty-first Independence-variant littoral combat ship to be commissioned into the U.S. Navy. The warship arrived in its new homeport at the end of last month.

“I am extremely proud of all the hard work the crew has done to complete the sail around and prepare us to officially join the fleet on commissioning day,” said Cmdr. RJ Zamberlan, Kansas City’s commanding officer when the ship arrived in San Diego. “We are honored and excited to represent the Navy, the nation, and our namesake, as well as fulfill the ships motto, United We Stand, Divided We Fall.’”

LCS 22 was designed and built by Austal USA in collaboration with General Dynamics in Mobile, Alabama. Prior to its departure from Mobile, the ship’s crew conducted a twenty-one-day restriction in movement (ROM) in accordance with the U.S. Navy pre-deployment guidelines.

Last Saturday, the Navy commissioned Kansas City administratively via naval message, due to public health safety and restrictions of large public gatherings related to the novel coronavirus pandemic and transitioned the ship to normal operations.

“This Independence-variant littoral combat ship will continue our proud naval legacy and embody the spirit of the people of Kansas City,” said Secretary of the Navy Kenneth J. Braithwaite. “I am confident the crew of the USS Kansas City will extend the reach and capability of our force and confront the challenges of today’s complex world with our core values of honor, courage and commitment.”

USS Kansas City is the second ship to be named for Kansas City, the largest city in Missouri—however, the name was originally assigned to a heavy cruiser that was under construction during World War II. Construction was canceled after one month due to the end of the war. The name Kansas City was then assigned to the Wichita-class replenishment oiler AOR-3 in 1967, and that ship saw service in the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm before being decommissioned in 1994.

USS Kansas City will be homeported in San Diego with her sister ships, which include the USS Independence (LCS 2), USS Coronado (LCS 4), USS Jackson (LCS 6), USS Montgomery (LCS 8), USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), USS Omaha (LCS 12), USS Manchester (LCS 14), USS Tulsa (LCS 16), USS Charleston (LCS 18), and USS Cincinnati (LCS 20).

Mission-Focused, But Problematic

The LCS is a fast, agile, mission-focused platform that is designed to operate in near-shore environments, but also capable of conducting open-ocean tasks and addressing twenty-first-century coastal threats including submarines, mines and swarming small craft. The LCS is also capable of supporting forward presence, maritime security, sea control and deterrence.

However, the Navy has dealt with issues with the first four of its LCS vessels, and earlier this year the Navy’s budget director suggested it would cheaper to decommission the vessels than to upgrade and repair the warships. After spending $30 billion over a period of around two decades, the U.S. Navy has managed to acquire just thirty-five of the thirty-thousand-ton-displacement vessels.

One issue is that the LCS warships aren’t as crucial for inshore naval warfare as one suggested. The “program has fulfilled little if any of its early promise yet could provide value in the future if put to creative tactical use.”

While the modular design of the ship was hyped up, it lacked its striking potential once its over-the-horizon anti-ship missile that constituted its main battery for surface warfare was canceled. Instead, the Navy substituted Longbow Hellfire missiles, which while lethal had an effective range of just 6.84 miles—something that was seen as a problem as anti-ship missiles can now strike targets from hundreds of miles.

Efforts to upgrade the vessels have included installing the Naval Strike Missile, a thirteen-foot-long, sea-skimming missile that would become the LCS’s most powerful weapon. In addition, the Navy has explored ways that its Fire Scout drones could be employed on the LCS. The Fire Scout drone is an indispensable part of the ship's surface, countermine and anti-submarine warfare missions; it is equipped with advanced mine-hunting sensors, aerial surface scanners and target-locating Electro-Optical/Infra-Red cameras.

With these upgrades it is hoped that the Navy can right the course for the LCS—but already it has canceled twenty future LCSs in place of twenty new missile frigates.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Wikimedia Commons / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kevin C. Leitner

Click here to read the full article.


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World

Did Russia Just Send a Submarine Through the Bosphorus?

Caleb Larson

Click here to read the full article.

In a Twitter post, a respected Turkish ship spotter showed evidence that a Russian Kilo-class submarine allegedly passed through the Bosphorus, in violation of the Montreux Convention. At press time, we were unable to confirm the report independently, however, if true, the news would be very significant.

The Montreux Convention, officially known as The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, was signed in 1936 and strictly regulates naval traffic through the Bosphorus, a narrow passage that separates Greece from Turkey and connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Although merchant vessels enjoy unrestricted access to the Bosphorus and can pass without restriction, so-called vessels of war are subject to various restrictions, depending on their country of origin, where they were built or purchased, and their tonnage.

Regarding submarines specifically, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that, “only submarines belonging to riparian states can pass through the Turkish Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base in the Black Sea for the first time after their construction or purchase, or for the purpose of repair in dockyards outside the Black Sea.” This crafty submarine appears to be acting in violation of this clause.

According to the respected naval expert H I Sutton, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet does not have any nuclear-powered submarines, though it received several Project 636.3 Kilo Class submarines. These diesel-electric attack submarines can fire land-attack and anti-ship missiles in addition to their standard torpedo armament. While the Romanian Navy also has one Kilo-class submarine, it reportedly hasn’t sailed for years and therefore is likely not the same Kilo submarine as the one in this incident.

Sutton explained the implications of this latest maneuver, writing that,

Russia has been unhappy with the details of the agreement in the past, but has adhered to the terms in respect of submarines. Despite this Black Sea Fleet submarines have been deployed to the Mediterranean. They even fired cruise missiles into Syria. But they got there via a different route. Those submarines deployed to Syria before they were delivered from their shipyards, to the Black Sea. They thus passed through “for the first time after their construction.” This latest move cannot be explained this way.”

If Moscow did violate the treaty, what are the implications of this new Russian boldness?

If the Montreux Convention continues to be flouted, Russia could potentially move submarines—and other surface warships—through the Bosphorus with impunity, and potentially strengthening their position in either the Mediterranean or the Black Sea.

The Mediterranean is a place of particular interest to Russia. Now, with confirmed reports of Russian activity in Libya, Russian interest in the Mediterranean makes sense and could serve to strengthen their position and defend their interests along Europe’s southern border.

Likewise, if the Montreux Convention is dead, then there could be an incentive for other countries to sail their own warships or submarines into the Black Sea to monitor or challenge Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Watch this developing situation closely.

Caleb Larson is a defense writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

Image: Reuters

Click here to read the full article.


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U.S.

US Navy announces intent to ink $10B in contracts for first 2 Columbia subs

David Larter


WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is poised to ink almost $10.4 billion in contracts with General Dynamics Electric Boat to procure the first two Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, which carry more than a dozen nuclear missiles on constant deterrent patrols.

The announcement, released by the Defense Department Monday afternoon, detailed an award of $869 million to Electric Boat to complete design work on the subs as part of a contract modification. The announcement also establishes the Navy’s intent to award an additional $9.5 billion for the first two hulls, which will happen once Congress officially approves the two-ship buy and appropriates the money.

“The intent would be to award that option as soon as possible after the FY21 appropriation to ensure we keep this No. 1 priority on track,” said James Geurts, the Navy’s assistant secretary for research, development and acquisition. “That will allow us to begin full-rate construction of the first ship, begin advanced construction on the second ship, with the intent of beginning construction of the second ship in 2024.”

Nuclear deterrent still the US Navy’s top priority, no matter the consequences, top officer says

The first ship is slated for a 2028 deliver and to go on its first patrol in 2031. The total buy is planned for 12 submarines.

In a statement Rep. Joe Courntey, D-Conn., who represents the Electric Boat’s district, praised the announcement, saying it was years in the making.

“This award is the culmination of nearly a decade’s worth of preparation for this milestone moment for our region and our nation,” Courntey said. “The replacement of our sea-based strategic deterrent comes only once every other generation, and this work is already fueling unprecedented growth in the workforce in Groton and transformation of the shipyard.”

The Columbia-class subs are the Navy’s top acquisition priority, and a monstrously expensive one at that. All in, the program will cost roughly $109 billion, according to a recent Congressional Research Service report, and the service faces an enormous challenge in balancing the rest of the fleet’s priorities with the Columbia bill.

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World

China warns risk of naval incident with US on the rise

The United States runs regular operations in the South China Sea (AFP Photo/Catherine LAI)

The United States runs regular operations in the South China Sea

The United States runs regular operations in the South China Sea (AFP Photo/Catherine LAI)
The US military is deploying "unprecedented" numbers to the Asia-Pacific region, raising the risk of an incident with China's navy, a senior Chinese official said Tuesday.
Tensions between the two superpowers have soared on multiple fronts since President Donald Trump took office in 2017, with both countries flexing their diplomatic and military muscle.
The United States' regular "freedom of navigation" operations in the South China Sea -- where China and neighbouring countries have competing claims -- angers Beijing, and China's navy usually warns off the US ships.
For its part, Beijing has infuriated other nations by building artificial islands with military installations in parts of the sea.
"The US military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region is unprecedented," said Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute of South China Sea Studies, a government think tank.
"The possibility of a military incident or an accidental shot fired is rising," Wu said.
"If a crisis were to erupt, the repercussions on bilateral relations would be catastrophic."
Wu spoke at the presentation of a report by his institute on the US military presence in the region.
The report said the US has deployed 375,000 soldiers and 60 percent of its warships in the Indo-Pacific region. Three US aircraft carriers have been sent to the region.
During former president Barack Obama's eight years in office, the US navy conducted four freedom of navigation operations while there have been 22 of them under Trump, Wu said.
The two militaries "Should step up communication" in order "to prevent strategic misunderstanding and miscalculation", according to the report.
High-level military meetings should resume, a direct phone line should be opened and joint naval manoeuvres should be done, it says.
The report says China does not regard the United States are a potential rival or "envisage a new cold or hot war with the US".
The document warns that "deteriorating military relations would substantially increase the possibility of a dangerous incident, a conflict or even a crisis."

Thứ Bảy, 20 tháng 6, 2020

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1969-1976 - VIETNAM. Part 11: Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winston Lord, NSC Staff Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassador of the Republic of Vietnam to the United States Ambassador

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1969-1976 - VIETNAM OCTOBER 1972 - JANUARY 1973. DOCUMENT EXCERPTS (Preface)

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1969-1976
VIETNAM OCTOBER 1972 - JANUARY 1973
(FOREIGN RELATIONS of THE UNITED STATES, 1969-1976 Vol. IX, Vol. X)
Documents Excerpts for the Strategic Studies for The Republic of Vietnam

Part 1: “We believe that peace is at hand", Letter From President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu, Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Preface.
Part 8:  Memorandum of Conversation1 Saigon, December 19, 1972.
Part 9 Memorandum of Conversation Saigon, December 19, 1972 (Continued)
Extracted from Foreign Relations of the US 1969-1976 Volume IX, Page 305


Part 11: Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winston Lord, NSC Staff Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassador of the Republic of Vietnam to the United States Ambassador


243.  Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, January 3, 1973, 11:30 a. m. –12:20 p. m. PARTICIPANTS Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winston Lord, NSC Staff Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassador of the Republic of Vietnam to the United States Ambassador
Phuong: I am sorry to disturb you. Thank you for seeing me.
Dr. Kissinger: Your Government has managed to enrage the President almost beyond belief.
Ambassador Phuong: Why?
Dr. Kissinger: For sending your Congressmen to lobby here. Ambassador Phuong: I . . .
Dr. Kissinger: Not you.
Ambassador Phuong: They can hear views on their own.
Dr. Kissinger: We don’t object to that, but rather the other effects. The only reason the funds have not been cut off is because of White House efforts. We have been holding the fort with people like Mansfield and Fulbright. Your people will drive Congress into open opposition. Ambassador Phuong: I don’t think Saigon believes that the funds would be cut by the White House. I have explained this to them.
December 30, 1972–January 27, 1973 883
Dr. Kissinger: But our ability to control our Congress will be reduced by your Congressmen.
Ambassador Phuong: It helps us to explain the situation. President Thieu understands fully that the funds would not be cut by the White House, but by the Congress. That is why he wants to send Congressmen here.
Dr. Kissinger: It will have the opposite effect. How many are coming? Ambassador Phuong: I don’t know. I only know that Tran Van Do and Bui Diem will be here in a couple of days.
Dr. Kissinger: Who will they see?
Ambassador Phuong: I have no idea yet. Mr. Do is a former Foreign Minister, and he should call on Secretary Rogers. He is also a very good friend of Senator Aiken and will have a private meeting with Aiken. We will make the arrangements.
Dr. Kissinger: And Bui Diem will be here too?
Ambassador Phuong: Yes. I don’t know who he would like to see.
Dr. Kissinger: I tell you, it is impossible to disassociate the President from your President, but you have almost managed to do it. And Nha has put a pack of lies out of the Palace. For example, there are two stories. One, that when I was in Saigon I said that I had succeeded in Moscow and succeeded in Peking and there was no reason I shouldn’t succeed in Vietnam. This was in Time Magazine. 2You know that’s a lie. I know it came from Nha. You know it’s a lie.
Ambassador Phuong: I hadn’t heard about this.
Dr. Kissinger: You know. You were there.
Ambassador Phuong: You did not say it.
Dr. Kissinger: Another story was that I continually interrupted your President at the NSC meeting.
Ambassador Phuong: At the one I attended the President asked your views and you explained. I was there on the 19th and 20th of October.
Dr. Kissinger: Those are the times of the NSC. You know that those were both lies, and we have the transcripts of those meetings. My intention is to build up President Thieu, not knock him down. I am not an opponent. If there are more stories—no matter who inspires them—
884 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX against the White House, we will start attacking. The party is over. We have taken everything we are going to take. Ambassador Phuong: Let’s be more precise. First, you say that Nha told the newspapers that you said that you had been successful in Moscow and Peking and therefore you would be in Saigon?
Dr. Kissinger: I read it in Time in the last issue.
Ambassador Phuong: Secondly, that you treated the President badly and that you continually interrupted and infuriated him. I know that’s not true at the two meetings that I was there with you.
Dr. Kissinger: It was not true at the other meetings. I have great respect for President Thieu. For four years he has kept the war going. We must keep him in office. I want, and I think it is essential that he stay. We may have different opinions on whether the agreement is good or bad, but as far as I am concerned he is the only possible leader. All this is beside the point. You are almost giving us no choice. If this keeps up we have no choice. There is no excuse. I have read stories from Nha in the Vietnamese press and have heard them from newsmen. I know the source. They have appeared in the Daily News and in Time. I know these came directly from Nha. That is a fact. Others he leaked out. He must grow up. This is not a contest between Nha and me.
Ambassador Phuong: I am sorry. I didn’t see these stories, and I will check on them and report to Saigon. Dr. Kissinger: I am deadly serious. We have staked our whole domestic position. If we had wanted in October to put you down the drain we would not have to do the things we are doing. Ambassador Phuong: With regard to our Congressmen here . . .
Dr. Kissinger: You are infuriating the President.
Ambassador Phuong: I think that it will be helpful rather than have any opposite effect.
Dr. Kissinger: They must not go and attack the President’s policies.
Ambassador Phuong: They will explain why we still object to the agreement. Dr. Kissinger: You know what the President said. If we get a few more modifications he will agree to the agreement. Ambassador Phuong: We know.
Dr. Kissinger: General Haig told your President what we would do then.
Ambassador Phuong: You saw the letter of President Thieu. 4Dr. Kissinger: We are not going to answer it.
December 30, 1972–January 27, 1973 885
Ambassador Phuong: Why?
Dr. Kissinger: Because we have explained our position a hundred times, and we always get the same answer.
Ambassador Phuong: It is very difficult. I personally feel the presence of North Vietnamese troops is very important.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we raised this for three months. There could have been a settlement. We held out for your issues. There were no strictly American issues. First there is the DMZ, and secondly there is the method of signing the agreement. We have not told anyone about these. We would be scared about it, the reaction.
Ambassador Phuong: Why not just say we don’t want to mention the PRG in the agreement?
Dr. Kissinger: I happen to agree with you, except the American people won’t understand. They don’t even know what the PRG is. We have done this, and we won’t yield, but we cannot keep our prisoners in North Vietnam because of the issue of the mention of the PRG. I have told you a thousand times and it does no good. Mr. Nha is the only one with access. If we had signed the agreement in November and sprung it on the American public we could have defended you a hundred times better than now. We will raise the North Vietnamese troops, but I will tell you the answer. If we had not raised this issue, we could have settled in November.
Ambassador Phuong: The letter from President Thieu to President Nixon stated very clearly that he is willing to accept the political provisions.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand.
Ambassador Phuong: But the North Vietnamese troops remain critical. I was in Saigon. You left Paris on the 13th [of October] and I was in Saigon on the 14th. When General Haig came, Thieu had a meeting with the NSC and the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House and the Chief Justice. And we discussed President Nixon’s letter5in a small circle. President Thieu analyzed the whole situation. The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice all agreed that we could manage the political provisions at present. It was difficult for us to do anything without something on the North Vietnamese troops.
Dr. Kissinger: Two things. One is personal. You should never keep a senior official waiting for four hours. Ambassador Phuong: You?
886  Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX
Dr. Kissinger: General Haig and me. I have been in many countries, and I have never seen that happen anywhere.
Ambassador Phuong: I know the whole story about the 21st of October. 6
Dr. Kissinger: General Haig had a meeting at 11:30 and was finally called at 3:30. 7 He had to change his whole schedule. Ambassador Phuong: As for General Haig, the letter from the President which we gave to General Haig was not ready because the discussion was lasting from 9:00 o’clock on. Dr. Kissinger: If only someone had called, but he was kept waiting. And I had to wait from 4:00 o’clock to 9:00 p. m. for a meeting.
Ambassador Phuong: That was on the 21st?
Dr. Kissinger: I think so. Ambassador Phuong: That evening he said that he would see you the next morning. He saw you at 8:00 o’clock before you went to Phnom Penh. Dr. Kissinger: I was not told until 8:30, and I was leaving the next morning.
Ambassador Phuong: The President told the Embassy. Only an hour after that did we know that you were leaving.
Dr. Kissinger: It’s a minor point. Next time there should be more attention paid to feelings.
Ambassador Phuong: I will send these comments to Saigon. In the case of General Haig I want to confirm that the President did not yet have his letter ready to give to General Haig.
Dr. Kissinger: If you had told me in October about one rather than 68 objections the chances were a thousand times better of succeeding rather than scattering our influence across every nitpick of Mr. Duc.
Ambassador Phuong: One single point about North Vietnamese troops can involve many changes.
Dr. Kissinger: I have been telling you since October that I am not your problem.
Ambassador Phuong: I fully realize that.
Dr. Kissinger: But you keep up your vendetta. I am the one that can save South Vietnam. First now, and then after an agreement. If we settle the two issues next week.
Ambassador Phuong: The DMZ and the signing?
December 30, 1972–January 27, 1973 887
Dr. Kissinger: . . . we will agree.
Ambassador Phuong: No matter what happens on North Vietnamese troops, even if there is no mention of one for one or return to their native places, if these are dropped, if they accept the two issues you raise, you will agree?
Dr. Kissinger: We will give them a unilateral statement on North Vietnam troops, the one we gave you.
Ambassador Phuong: It was given to me by General Haig.
Dr. Kissinger: If they agree to the procedure for signing . . .
Ambassador Phuong: How about the Preamble? If it states the concurrence of the GVN you must get our agreement first. You just can’t put it in if we do not agree. Then we would have to publicly deny it.
Dr. Kissinger: We have reached the point where we are willing to face those consequences. If that happens you know what will happen here. So this is the situation. You are going to wreck the whole domestic structure if you keep going. We believed, and we still believe, that we can make the agreement work with our cooperation. They will not keep many of the provisions and you will not keep many of the provisions. Therefore it will wind up the way you want it, a military ceasefire. I don’t think many of the provisions will be implemented, do you? The blindness in Saigon—how long can they keep this going?
Ambassador Phuong: I conveyed this to Saigon.
Dr. Kissinger: Look at the situation here. If we had reached an agreement before Congress had returned, we could support you indefinitely. Even so, if we can reach them before Congress really is in operation we can maintain economic, military and political support for you, for many years, and probably indefinitely. All these fine points in my view are irrelevant. Under the alternative the North Vietnamese troops stay in your country anyway.
Ambassador Phuong: President Thieu realizes this.
Dr. Kissinger: Therefore the only question is under what circumstances is it best to deal with these conditions? We are under no illusions. They are a bunch of SOBs. They are the worst I have ever met. It is a pleasure to bomb them. I don’t trust those guys. You know what is happening in the American press and the TV commentators and news magazines and newspapers, day after day. That’s the problem. I predicted this in October. How long can we keep the Russians and Chinese quiet? What if the Russians and Chinese start a big offensive of propaganda against us? I know in Saigon that they think I’m so clever that they then think up the surest way not to accept the agreement. We have reached a point where we will not go to Saigon anymore. We will send others.
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Phần 11: Henry A. Kissinger, Trợ lý Tổng thống về các vấn đề an ninh quốc gia Winston Lord, Nhân viên NSC Trần Kim Phượng, Đại sứ Việt Nam Cộng hòa tại Đại sứ Hoa Kỳ
Bản dịch Việt ngữ và ghi chú của Hoàng Hoa 2020/06/27

243. Bản ghi nhớ Hội thoại1 Washington, ngày 3 tháng 1 năm 1973, 11: 30 giờ sáng 12: 20 giờ chiều THAM GIA Henry A. Kissinger, Trợ lý Tổng thống về các vấn đề an ninh quốc gia Winston Lord, Nhân viên NSC Trần Kim Phượng, Đại sứ Việt Nam Cộng hòa tại Hoa Kỳ
Phượng: Tôi xin lỗi đã làm phiền ông. Cảm ơn ông đã gặp tôi.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Chính phủ của ông đã tìm cách chọc giận Tổng thống gần như vượt quá niềm tin.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tại sao?
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Vì đã cử các Dân biểu của ông tới tìm kiếm sự giúp đỡ ở đây.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi. . .
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Không phải ông.
Đại sứ Phượng: Họ có thể tự mình nghe quan điểm.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Chúng tôi không phản đối điều đó, mà là các hiệu ứng khác. Lý do duy nhất khiến các quỹ không bị cắt là vì những nỗ lực của Nhà Trắng. Chúng tôi đã giữ pháo đài với những người như Mansfield và Fulbright. Nhân dân của ông sẽ đẩy Quốc hội vào phe đối lập mở.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi không nghĩ Sài Gòn tin rằng các quỹ sẽ bị Nhà Trắng cắt. Tôi đã giải thích điều này với họ.
Ngày 30 tháng 12 năm 1972, ngày 27 tháng 1 năm 1973 883
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Nhưng khả năng kiểm soát Quốc hội của chúng tôi sẽ bị giảm bởi các Dân biểu của ông.
Đại sứ Phượng: Nó giúp chúng tôi giải thích tình hình. Tổng thống Thiệu hiểu đầy đủ rằng các khoản tiền sẽ không bị Nhà Trắng cắt, mà bởi Quốc hội. Đó là lý do tại sao ông muốn gửi các Dân biểu ở đây.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Nó sẽ có tác dụng ngược lại. Có bao nhiêu người đang đến?
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi không biết. Tôi chỉ biết rằng Trần Văn Đỗ và Bùi Diễm sẽ đến đây trong vài ngày nữa.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Họ sẽ gặp ai?
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi chưa có ý kiến gì. Ông Do là cựu Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao, và ông nên kêu gọi Bộ trưởng Rogers. Ông cũng là một người ông rất tốt của Thượng nghị sĩ Aiken và sẽ có một cuộc gặp riêng với Aiken. Chúng tôi sẽ sắp xếp.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Và Bùi Diễm cũng sẽ ở đây?
Đại sứ Phượng: Vâng. Tôi không biết ông ấy muốn gặp ai.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi nói với ông, không thể tách Tổng thống (TT R. Nixon) khỏi Tổng thống của ông, nhưng ông gần như đã xoay sở để làm điều đó. Và Nhã đã đặt ra toàn những chuyện. Ví dụ, có hai câu chuyện. Một, khi tôi ở Sài Gòn tôi đã nói rằng tôi đã thành công ở Moscow và đã thành công ở Bắc Kinh và không có lý do gì tôi sẽ không thành công ở Việt Nam. Đây là trên Tạp chí Time. 2 Ông biết đó là lời nói dối. Tôi biết nó đến từ Nhã. Ông biết đó là một lời nói dối.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi chưa nghe về điều này.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Ông biết đấy. Ông đã ở đó.
Đại sứ Phượng: Ông đã không nói điều đó.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Một câu chuyện khác là tôi liên tục ngắt lời Tổng Thống của ông tại cuộc họp của NSC.
Đại sứ Phượng: Trong một lần tôi tham dự, Tổng Thống đã hỏi quan điểm của ông và ông đã giải thích. Tôi đã ở đó vào ngày 19 và 20 tháng 10.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Đó là thời gian của NSC. Ông biết rằng đó là cả hai lời nói dối, và chúng tôi có bản ghi của những cuộc họp đó. Ý định của tôi là xây dựng Tổng thống Thiệu, không đánh gục ông. Tôi không phải là một đối thủ. Nếu có nhiều câu chuyện khác, bất kể ai là người truyền cảm hứng cho họ.
884 Quan hệ đối ngoại, 1969 - 1976, Tập IX chống lại Nhà Trắng, chúng tôi sẽ bắt đầu tấn công. Bữa tiệc đã kết thúc. Chúng tôi đã lấy mọi thứ chúng tôi sẽ lấy.
Đại sứ Phượng: Hãy chính xác hơn. Đầu tiên, ông nói rằng Nhã nói với các tờ báo rằng ông nói rằng ông đã thành công ở Moscow và Bắc Kinh và do đó ông sẽ ở Sài Gòn?
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi đã đọc nó trong Time trong số báo trước.
Đại sứ Phượng: Thứ hai, rằng ông đối xử tệ với Tổng thống và rằng ông liên tục ngắt lời và chọc tức ông. Tôi biết điều đó không đúng trong hai cuộc họp mà tôi đã ở đó với ông.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Điều đó không đúng trong các cuộc họp khác. Tôi rất kính trọng Tổng thống Thiệu. Trong bốn năm, ông đã giữ được cuộc chiến tiếp tục. Chúng tôi phải giữ ông tại chức. Tôi muốn, và tôi nghĩ điều cần thiết là ông ấy ở lại. Chúng ta có thể có ý kiến khác nhau về việc thỏa thuận là tốt hay xấu, nhưng theo tôi nghĩ thì ông là nhà lãnh đạo duy nhất có thể. Tất cả điều này là bên cạnh quan điểm. Các ông gần như không cho chúng tôi lựa chọn. Nếu điều này tiếp tục, chúng tôi không có sự lựa chọn. Không có lý do bào chữa. Tôi đã đọc những câu chuyện từ Nhã trên báo chí Việt Nam và đã nghe chúng từ những người làm thông tin. Tôi biết nguồn tin. Họ đã xuất hiện trên tờ Daily News và Time. Tôi biết những thứ này đến trực tiếp từ Nhã. Đó là một thực tế. Những người khác ông ta rò rỉ ra ngoài. Ông ta phải truởng thành. Đây không phải là cuộc thi đấu giữa Nhã và tôi.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi xin lỗi. Tôi không thấy những câu chuyện này, và tôi sẽ kiểm tra chúng và báo cáo với Sài Gòn.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi thực sự nghiȇm chỉnh. Chúng tôi đã chấp nhận toàn bộ vị trí trong nước của chúng tôi. Nếu chúng tôi muốn vào tháng 10 để đưa các ông xuống cống, chúng tôi sẽ không phải làm những việc chúng tôi đang làm.
Đại sứ Phượng: Liên quan đến các Dân biểu của chúng tôi ở đây. . .
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Ông đang chọc giận Tổng thống.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi nghĩ rằng nó sẽ hữu ích chứ không có tác dụng ngược lại.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Họ không được đi và tấn công các chính sách của Tổng thống.
Đại sứ Phượng: Họ sẽ giải thích lý do tại sao chúng tôi vẫn phản đối thỏa thuận.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Ông biết những gì Tổng thống (R.N.) nói. Nếu chúng tôi nhận được thȇm một vài sửa đổi, ông ấy sẽ đồng ý với thỏa thuận.
Đại sứ Phượng: Chúng tôi biết.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tướng Haig nói với Tổng thống của ông những gì chúng ta sẽ làm sau đó.
Đại sứ Phượng: Ông đã thấy thư của Tổng Thống Thiệu. 4
Dr. Kissinger: Chúng tôi sẽ không trả lời nó.
Ngày 30/12/1972, ngày 27 tháng 1 năm 1973 885
Đại sứ Phượng: Tại sao?
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Bởi vì chúng tôi đã giải thích vị trí của mình hàng trăm lần và chúng tôi luôn nhận được câu trả lời tương tự.
Đại sứ Phượng: Rất khó. Cá nhân tôi cảm thấy sự hiện diện của quân đội Bắc Việt là rất quan trọng.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Vâng, chúng tôi đã nêu ra điều này trong ba tháng. Có thể đã có một sự giải quyết. Chúng tôi đã chịu đựng cho các vấn đề của các ông. Không có vấn đề nào nghiêm ngặt của Mỹ. Đầu tiên là DMZ, và thứ hai là phương thức ký kết thỏa thuận. Chúng tôi chưa nói với ai về những điều này. Chúng tôi sẽ sợ về nó, phản ứng.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tại sao không nói ngay rằng chúng tôi không muốn đề cập đến PRG trong thỏa thuận?
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi tình cờ đồng ý với ông, ngoại trừ người dân Mỹ sẽ không hiểu. Họ thậm chí không biết PRG là cái gì. Chúng tôi đã làm điều này, và chúng tôi sẽ không nhượng bộ, nhưng chúng tôi không thể giữ tù nhân của chúng tôi ở Bắc Việt Nam vì vấn đề đề cập đến PRG. Tôi đã nói với ông một ngàn lần và nó không tốt. Ông Nhã là người duy nhất đến (hiểu) được. Nếu chúng tôi đã ký thỏa thuận vào tháng 11 và đưa nó ra công chúng Mỹ, chúng tôi có thể bảo vệ ông tốt hơn gấp trăm lần so với bây giờ. Chúng tôi sẽ nâng cao quân đội Bắc Việt, nhưng tôi sẽ cho ông biết câu trả lời. Nếu chúng tôi không nêu ra vấn đề này, chúng tôi có thể đã giải quyết vào tháng 11.
Đại sứ Phượng: Bức thư của Tổng thống Thiệu gửi Tổng thống Nixon tuyên bố rất rõ ràng rằng ông sẵn sàng chấp nhận các điều khoản chính trị.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi hiểu.
Đại sứ Phượng: Nhưng quân đội Bắc Việt vẫn là nghiȇm trọng. Tôi đã ở Sài Gòn. Ông rời Paris vào ngày 13 [tháng 10] và tôi ở Sài Gòn vào ngày 14. Khi Tướng Haig đến, Thiệu có một cuộc họp với NSC và Chủ tịch Thượng viện và Chủ tịch Hạ viện và Chánh án. Và chúng tôi đã thảo luận về lá thư của Tổng thống Nixon trong một vòng tròn nhỏ. Tổng thống Thiệu phân tích toàn bộ tình hình. Chủ tịch Thượng viện, Chủ tịch Hạ viện, Chánh án đều đồng ý rằng chúng tôi có thể quản lý các điều khoản chính trị hiện nay. Thật khó cho chúng tôi để làm bất cứ điều gì mà không có gì với quân đội Bắc Việt.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Hai điều. Một là cá nhân. Ông không bao giờ nên giữ một quan chức cấp cao chờ đợi trong bốn giờ.
Đại sứ Phượng: Ông?
886 Quan hệ đối ngoại, 1969 - 1976, Tập IX
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tướng Haig và tôi. Tôi đã ở nhiều quốc gia, và tôi chưa bao giờ thấy điều đó xảy ra ở bất cứ đâu.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi biết toàn bộ câu chuyện về ngày 21 tháng 10. 6
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tướng Haig có cuộc họp lúc 11:30 và cuối cùng được gọi vào lúc 3:30. 7. Ông phải thay đổi hết lịch trình của mình.
Đại sứ Phượng: Về phần Tướng Haig, bức thư của Tổng Thống mà chúng tôi đã gửi cho Tướng Haig chưa sẵn sàng vì cuộc thảo luận kéo dài từ 9:00 sáng.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Nếu chỉ có ai đó đã gọi báo, nhưng ông ta buộc cứ chờ đợi. Và tôi đã phải chờ từ 4:00 đến 9:00 tối cho một cuộc họp.
Đại sứ Phượng: Đó là vào ngày 21?
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi nghĩ vậy.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tối hôm đó ông ấy nói rằng sẽ gặp ông vào sáng hôm sau. Ông ấy gặp ông lúc 8:00 giờ trước khi ông đi Phnom Penh.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi đã không được nói cho đến 8:30, và tôi đã ra đi vào sáng hôm sau.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tổng Thống đã nói với Đại sứ quán. Chỉ một giờ sau đó, chúng tôi mới biết rằng ông đã ra đi.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Đó là một điểm nhỏ. Lần sau nên chú ý nhiều hơn đến những cảm xúc.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi sẽ gửi những bình luận này đến Sài Gòn. Trong trường hợp của Tướng Haig, tôi muốn xác nhận rằng Tổng thống chưa có thư của ông ấy (TT Thiệu) sẵn sàng để gửi cho Tướng Haig.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Nếu ông đã nói với tôi vào tháng 10 về một thay vì 68 phản đối, cơ hội thành công sẽ tốt hơn gấp ngàn lần thay vì phân tán ảnh hưởng của chúng tôi trên mỗi chi tiết của ông Đức.
Đại sứ Phượng: Một điểm duy nhất về quân đội Bắc Việt có thể liên quan đến nhiều thay đổi.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Tôi đã nói với ông từ tháng 10 rằng tôi không phải là vấn đề của các ông.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi hoàn toàn nhận ra điều đó.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Nhưng các ông cố tiếp tục trả thù. Tôi là người có thể cứu Miền Nam Việt Nam. Đầu tiên bây giờ, và sau đó là một thỏa thuận. Nếu chúng tôi giải quyết hai vấn đề vào tuần tới.
Đại sứ Phượng: DMZ và việc ký kết?
Ngày 30 tháng 12 năm 1972, ngày 27 tháng 1 năm 1973 887
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: . . . chúng tôi sẽ đồng ý
Đại sứ Phượng: Cho dù bất kỳ vấn đề gì xảy ra về quân đội Bắc Việt, ngay cả khi không đề cập đến một cho một hay trở về quê hương của họ, nếu những điều này bị bỏ, nếu họ chấp nhận hai vấn đề ông nêu ra, ông sẽ đồng ý chứ?
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Chúng tôi sẽ cung cấp cho họ một tuyên bố đơn phương về quân đội Bắc Việt, thoả thuận mà chúng tôi đã đưa cho ông.
Đại sứ Phượng: Nó được trao cho tôi bởi Tướng Haig.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Nếu họ đồng ý với thủ tục ký . . .
Đại sứ Phượng: Thế còn lời mở đầu? Nếu nó nói lên sự đồng thuận của GVN ông phải có được thỏa thuận của chúng tôi trước. Ông không thể đặt nó vào nếu chúng tôi không đồng ý. Như thế, chúng tôi sẽ phải công khai từ chối nó.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Chúng tôi đã đến điểm chúng tôi sẵn sàng đối mặt với những hậu quả đó. Nếu điều đó xảy ra ông biết điều gì sẽ xảy ra ở đây. Vì vậy, đây là tình huống. Các ông sẽ phá hủy toàn bộ cấu trúc trong nước nếu các ông tiếp tục. Chúng tôi tin tưởng, và chúng tôi vẫn tin rằng chúng tôi có thể làm cho thỏa thuận hoạt động với sự hợp tác của chúng ta. Họ sẽ không giữ nhiều điều khoản và ông sẽ không giữ nhiều điều khoản. Vì vậy, nó sẽ kết thúc theo cách ông muốn, một lệnh ngừng bắn quân sự. Tôi không nghĩ rằng nhiều điều khoản sẽ được thực hiện, phải không? Sự mù quáng ở Sài Gòn -- họ có thể duy trì việc này trong bao lâu?
Đại sứ Phượng: Tôi đã chuyển điều này đến Sài Gòn.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Hãy nhìn vào tình hình ở đây. Nếu chúng tôi đã đạt được thỏa thuận trước khi Quốc hội trở lại, chúng tôi có thể hỗ trợ ông vô thời hạn. Mặc dù vậy, nếu chúng tôi có thể tiếp cận họ trước khi Quốc hội thực sự hoạt động, chúng tôi có thể duy trì hỗ trợ kinh tế, quân sự và chính trị cho ông, trong nhiều năm và có thể là vô thời hạn. Tất cả những điểm tốt này trong quan điểm của tôi là không liên quan. Theo một trong sự chọn lựa nào quân đội Bắc Việt vẫn ở lại đất nước của ông.
Đại sứ Phượng: Tổng Thống Thiệu nhận ra điều này.
Tiến sĩ Kissinger: Vì vậy, câu hỏi duy nhất là trong hoàn cảnh nào là tốt nhất để đối phó với các điều kiện này? Chúng tôi không nuôi ảo tưởng. Họ (CSBV) là một bọn SOBs. Họ là những kẻ tồi tệ nhất tôi từng gặp. Đó là một niềm vui để đánh bom họ. Tôi không tin tưởng những kẻ đó. Ông biết những gì đang xảy ra trên báo chí Mỹ và các nhà bình luận truyền hình và các tạp chí tin tức và báo chí, ngày qua ngày. Đó chính là vấn đề. Tôi đã dự đoán điều này vào tháng Mười. Bao lâu chúng ta có thể giữ cho người Nga và người Trung Quốc im lặng? Điều gì sẽ xảy ra nếu người Nga và Trung Quốc bắt đầu một cuộc tấn công lớn về tuyên truyền chống lại chúng ta? Tôi biết ở Sài Gòn rằng họ nghĩ tôi khéo léo đến mức họ nghĩ cách chắc chắn nhất là không chấp nhận thỏa thuận. Chúng tôi đã đến một điểm mà chúng tôi sẽ không đến Sài Gòn nữa. Chúng tôi sẽ gửi những người khác.
Notes:
GVN: Government State of Vietnam (The Republic of Vietnam)
NSC: National Security Council (Hội Ðồng An Ninh Quốc Gia)
PRG: Provisional Revolutionary Government (Chính Phủ Cách Mạng Lâm Thời - Mật Trận Giải Phóng)
DMZ: Demilitarized Zone
SOBs: Sons of Bitches. Bunch of SOBs (bọn chó đẻ)
Preamble: The Title, The Foreword of the Agreement.
Lý do nếu Agreement được ký tháng 10 thì TT R. Nixon kịp báo cáo và trình lȇn Quốc Hội kịp cho cuộc bầu cử tháng 11 1972. Và dĩ nhiȇn theo sự lạc quan chính vì sự hiện diện của quân đội Bắc Việt, TT Nixon và H. Kissinger có thể xin viện trợ cho miền Nam dễ dàng hơn. Sự đình trệ ký kết thỏa ước cũng do chính Hà Nội đã gởi một tin nhắn bí mật quan trọng cho Lȇ Ðức Thọ để từ đó sự bế tắc của cuộc họp dẫn đến cuộc ném bom chưa từng có trȇn bầu trời Hà Nội. Cuộc gặp giữa ÐS Trần Kim Phượng và Cố Vấn ANQG của TT Nixon là ông H. Kissinger diễn ra ngày 3 tháng 1, 1973 sau kết thúc cuộc hành quân Linebacker 2 đánh bom Hà Nội ngày 30/12/1972. Lúc này, tình thế nghiȇm trọng nhưng dường như Miền Nam Việt Nam chưa hề có dấu hiệu một tổ chức giống như ban tham mưu liȇn lạc giữa các chỉ huy quân sự các Vùng. Tòan bộ quyền lực dường như nằm trọn trong tay TT Thiệu và Bí Thư Hoàng Ðức Nhã. H. Kissinger thật sự rất đáng được nể phục. Sự hiểu biết, nhận định của ông về tình thế ở Sàigòn cho ta thấy sự bối rối, lo sợ, nhưng quan trọng nhất khi TT Thiệu gởi những thành viȇn Quốc Hội đến Mỹ để vận động (lobby) xin viện trợ lại làm mích lòng TT R. Nixon và làm yếu đi vị trí của TT R. Nixon trước Quốc Hội Mỹ. Sau cùng thì bản thỏa ước Paris 1973 cũng không có gì mới mà vẫn là bản Dự thảo vào tháng Mười. Như vậy Hà Nội đã hứng chịu đau điếng cơn bão lửa của hành quân Linebacker 2 và Miền Nam Việt Nam sau cùng cũng chẳng được Quốc Hội Mỹ chấp nhận viện trợ.
TT R. Nixon đã từ chức Tổng Thống ngày 9 tháng 8 1974. Bốn tháng sau 12/1974 quân Bắc Việt da beo ẩn nấp từ rừng sâu miền Nam Việt Nam và Ðông Dương đã tập trung ít nhất 3 Sư đòan tấn công chiếm Phước Long thuộc quân khu 3 VNCH. Miền Nam Việt Nam rơi vào tay quân Bắc Việt ngày 30/4/1975 và không thể kiểm chứng được sự trả đũa của TT R. Nixon và H. Kissinger trước sự phản bội ký kết thoả ước Paris 1973 của CSBV vì TT R. Nixon đã không còn quyền lực nữa.
Bản dịch Việt ngữ và ghi chú Notes của Hoàng Hoa 2020/06/27

(Vietnam Review) Hoa Kỳ và Thế giới. Sự kiện quan trọng hôm nay Saturday June 20, 2020

Kính gởi quý vị:

Hoa Kỳ và Thế giới. Sự kiện quan trọng hôm nay Saturday June 20, 2020

Vào 7 giờ tối giờ Miền Trung Hoa Kỳ/ 8 giờ tối giờ Miền Ðông Hoa Kỳ/5 giờ chiều giờ miền Tây Hoa Kỳ sẽ có cuộc khai mạc tập hợp phát biểu vận động tái tranh cử của Tổng Thống Trump tại Oklahoma. Ðịa điểm và Thời gian chính xác như sau:

How to watch Trump's rally in Tulsa today:

  • What: President Trump holds a campaign rally in Tulsa 
  • Date: Saturday, June 20, 2020
  • Time: 7 p.m. CT/8 p.m. ET
  • Location: BOK Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma
  • Online stream: Watch live on CBSN in the video player above or on your mobile streaming device

 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-rally-tulsa-today-2020-campaign-bok-center-live-stream-updates-2020-06-20/

VNR Vietnam Review sẽ có những nhận định quan trọng về chính sách của Tổng Thống Hoa Kỳ Donald Trump trong thời gian sắp tới; đặc biệt nhất các vấn đề Biển Ðông, Châu Á Thái Bình Dương.

Trân trọng,

VNR

 

Thứ Sáu, 19 tháng 6, 2020

(ASIA PACIFIC) (Reuters) Taiwan to re-open consulate on strategically-located U.S. island of Guam. (Reuters) Fierce presidential election erupts in Pacific amid China-Taiwan tussle

 ASIA PACIFIC
Timeline Links:May 24, 2020

ASIA PACIFIC (AFP) Taiwan to swap office with breakaway state Somaliland. (Fox Business) China wields currency as weapon with Trump tensions rising. (The Telegraph) Why the UK has no teeth when it comes to China and Hong Kong. (National Review) The End of Hong Kong? (SCMP) Hong Kong warned WTO challenge to potential US trade sanctions could be 'counterproductive'. (AP) China says US action on Hong Kong ‘doomed to fail’. (Reuters) Taiwan pledges help for fleeing Hong Kongers, riles China. (Reuters Videos) Police fire teargas in Hong Kong's biggest lockdown-era protests.

https://quandiemvietnam.blogspot.com/2020/05/asia-pacific-reuters-videos-police-fire.html

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World

Taiwan to re-open consulate on strategically-located U.S. island of Guam

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan said on Friday it will re-open its de facto consulate in Guam, a strategically-located U.S. island with a large U.S. military base in the Pacific, a part of the world where China is stepping up its diplomatic reach.

China is challenging U.S. influence in the Pacific, a region that the United States has considered its back yard since World War Two. Last year, China whittled away at Taiwan's allies in the Pacific by winning over Kiribati and the Solomon Islands.

Taiwan's Foreign Ministry said the re-opening of its Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Guam, after its closure in 2017 for budget reasons, was a response to closer Taiwan-U.S. relations and the strategic importance of the Pacific region.

"Reestablishing TECO in Guam will facilitate economic and trade cooperation and exchanges between Taiwan and the greater western Pacific region, deepen Taiwan's relations with its Pacific allies, and increase multilateral exchanges," the ministry said.

China considers Taiwan its own territory with no right to state-to-state ties. Four of Taiwan's remaining 15 diplomatic allies are in the Pacific - Palau, Nauru, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.

The small developing nations lie in highly strategic waters, and the United States and its friends like Australia have become increasingly concerned by China's moves to expand its footprint there.

Taipei and Washington have no formal diplomatic relations, but the United States is Taiwan's strongest supporter on the international stage, which is another source of tension between Washington and Beijing.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen went to Guam in 2017 on her way back from visiting the island's Pacific allies.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore)

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World

Fierce presidential election erupts in Pacific amid China-Taiwan tussle

Jonathan Barrett and Ben Blanchard
FILE PHOTO: Kiribati's government visits Beijing
FILE PHOTO: Kiribati's government visits Beijing
By Jonathan Barrett and Ben Blanchard
SYDNEY/TAIPEI (Reuters) - The presidential run-off in the Pacific island nation of Kiribati between a pro-Beijing leader and an opposition candidate sympathetic to Taiwan is the most aggressive campaign in the country's history, according to former president Anote Tong.
The vote, scheduled for June 22, could open the door for Taiwan to reclaim the strategic ally it lost to China last year, with the opposition campaigning on a platform critical of the diplomatic switch.
Kiribati, the site of a mothballed Chinese space tracking station in the central Pacific, has a finely balanced parliament with loyalties evenly split between President Taneti Maamau and ally-turned-rival Banuera Berina, who broke from the government last year citing concerns over the switch.
"Primarily, it has been about the Taiwan-China issue," said Tong. "In my experience, it's the most aggressive campaign that I've seen," describing a bidding war of uncosted policies and combative claims over whether or not Kiribati will benefit from relations with Beijing.
Tong, who said he had been impartial since retiring from politics in 2016, oversaw a shift in Kiribati's ties from China to Taiwan during his first term in 2003.
"There are some strong feelings against China particularly with the very active participation of the Chinese diplomatic mission during the campaign," said Tong.
China's embassy in Kiribati (pronounced Kiribas) said China does not interfere with the internal affairs of other countries.
China's foreign ministry in Beijing said there had been rich results since the nations resumed diplomatic relations last year.
"China is willing to work with the Kiribati government, on the basis of the one China principle, to promote the continuous development of Sino-Kiribati ties, to help with the well-being of both countries people," the ministry said.
Kiribati received more than $4.2 million from China for "livelihood projects" in the weeks leading up to the vote, according to a Kiribati government statement.
The offices of the candidates Maamau and Berina did not respond to requests for comment.
Diplomatic sources say both Washington and Canberra are watching the election closely, given concerns about China's increased role in the Pacific.
"We took the Pacific for granted too long and didn't pay enough attention, giving China its opportunity," a senior Western official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters, referring to Kiribati and the Solomon Island's decisions last year to recognise Beijing.
The U.S. embassy in Fiji, which oversees relations with Kiribati, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
BEIJING BUILDS CLOUT
Many Pacific island nations, long-aligned with the United States and its allies, have been forging closer ties with China in recent years amid a push by Beijing to increase its diplomatic and financial clout in the region.
China claims democratic Taiwan as its territory with no right to state-to-state ties.
Taiwan, which shares a robust yet unofficial relationship with the United States, now has only 15 formal allies left worldwide.
A member of the Kiribati parliament, who declined to be named because they were not authorised to speak to the media, said Kiribati would want to re-establish a working relationship with Taiwan if Berina wins.
"I believe Taiwan would be invited back; whether we take the next move of terminating relations with China remains to be seen," the member said.
Taiwan's government is also watching the election, but officials have cautioned against being overly optimistic a new president would move to quickly reinstate ties with the island.
Western intelligence agencies have privately expressed concern China has used and wants to use again Kiribati's space tracking station to watch U.S. missile and other weapons tests in the Pacific, security sources told Reuters.
China's Foreign Ministry told Reuters the station was only for "peaceful purposes", without elaborating.
(Reporting by Jonathan Barrett and Ben Blanchard; Additional reporting by Beijing newsroom; Editing by Lincoln Feast.)