Chinese Maritime Militia on the Move in Disputed Spratly Islands
2020-03-24
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Annotated map showing the path of five Chinese maritime militia ships passing through the Union Banks in the Spratly islands during the first three weeks of March, 2020. RFA |
China Ups Ante in South China Sea With New Place Names, Administrative Districts
2020-04-20
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/southchinasea-names-04202020180723.html
China has upped the ante amid rising tensions in the South China Sea by declaring two new administrative districts for the contested region and releasing a new map naming all the islands and reefs it claims.
The provocative moves come as Beijing faces diplomatic pushback from some of its Southeast Asian neighbors against its sweeping assertion of sovereignty across the resource-rich sea.
It also takes place as the China’s Coast Guard and maritime militia pressure other claimants, even as they grapple with the global coronavirus pandemic. Most recently, China has deployed a survey vessel and escort ships near an oil field off the coast of Malaysia.
China’s announcement on the administrative measures came this weekend. The State Council, China’s top administrative body, approved the creation of two new municipal districts: Nansha District, which is based at Fiery Cross Reef, an artificial island built by China that it says will oversee all of the Spratly Islands and their surrounding waters; and Xisha District, based on Woody Island, which will oversee the Paracel Islands.
It follows the July 2012 declaration of Sansha City on Woody Island as China’s administrative center for the region. The two new districts cover a vast but largely uninhabited area. They are incorporated under Sansha, which itself has only 1,800 permanent residents.
China’s Global Television Network on Saturday described Sansha as a prefecture-level city that compromises only 20 square kilometers of land area but oversees “nearly two million square kilometers.”
The declaration comes despite unresolved territorial disputes across that area, and efforts by China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to forge a binding code of conduct.
Vietnam, which claims both the Paracels and the Spratlys, immediately condemned the announcement of the two new districts by China, calling it a serious violation of its sovereignty.
Pooja Bhatt, author of Nine-Dash Line: Deciphering the South China Sea Conundrum, said China’s move was intended to cement its territorial claims, which were undermined by a Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict from 2016. That verdict found that most of the land features it occupies in the South China Sea were actually rocks originally, due to lack of human habitation and economic activity. By inhabiting them now, China in time seeks to have these features regarded as islands entitled to territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, she said.
“Second, having administrative units can justify the presence of military and defense installations for protection purposes,” Bhatt said. “Furthermore the establishment of these cities increases the area of operation over the vast maritime domain in the South China Sea.”
China has constructed airstrips and military infrastructure at a number of the artificial islands it has built in the South China Sea in recent years, including at Fiery Cross Reef, where commercial satellite imagery provider ImageSat International recently spotted military aircraft.
On April 6, the U.S. State Department had mentioned the landing of military aircraft at Fiery Cross. In that statement, the U.S. accused China of exploiting nations’ distraction over COVID-19 to expand its “unlawful claims” in the South China Sea.
Also on the weekend, in a move calculated to demonstrate Chinese jurisdiction of the new districts, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Natural Resources released a new map naming each feature in the South China Sea it claims – an exhaustive list that was last updated in 1983.
The move by China to assert jurisdiction comes after a dueling series of diplomatic notes by China and rival claimants that were submitted to the United Nations. Malaysia’s initial submission claiming a part of the seabed in December sparked a protest from China, which in turn sparked further protests against China’s claim from the Philippines and Vietnam.
China issued its latest statement on Friday, and adopted a notably more aggressive tone towards Vietnam.
“China always opposes the invasion and illegal occupation by Viet Nam of some islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Qundao, and the activities infringing upon China’s rights and interests in the waters under China’s jurisdiction,” its submission to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) read. Nansha Qundao refers to the Spratly Islands.
“China resolutely demands that Viet Nam withdraw all the crews and facilities from the islands and reefs it has invaded and illegally occupied,” the note added.
Bhatt believes the continental shelf dispute and China’s new districts will figure prominently in the year’s discussions between China and ASEAN. Vietnam is currently protesting Chinese actions the loudest and may be best-placed to press the issue further as the current chair of the 10-nation ASEAN bloc, she said.
US Watching if Beijing Declares Air Defense Zone in South China Sea
2020-06-24
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| General Charles Q. Brown, Jr. testifies on his nomination to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington, May 7, 2020. |
The United States is closely watching reports that Beijing is planning to declare a so-called Air Defense Identification Zone in the skies above the disputed South China Sea, the American air force commander in the Pacific told reporters Wednesday.
A Chinese move to claim an ADIZ in the sea region could have a negative impact on the ability of nations to fly, sail and operate in a free and open Indo-Pacific “wherever international law allows,” Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. said during a special teleconference briefing from Hawaii.
“It really goes against the rules-based international order, and that’s concerning not only for PACAF and the United States, but I would say many of the nations in the region,” Brown said, referring to a potential Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea, while he fielded questions from reporters across the region about a range of issues related to his Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) command.
“And this kind of impinges upon some of the international airspace, and it impacts not just the PACAF, but all the nations in the region,” he added. “And so, it’s important for us to pay attention to something like this.”
The air force commander said he was also “concerned by increasing opportunistic activity by the PRC [People’s Republic of China] to coerce its neighbors and press its unlawful maritime claims while the region and the world is focused on addressing the COVID pandemic.”
“We are committed to upholding the rules-based international order to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific that protects the sovereignty of every nation, ensures the peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion, and promotes free, fair, and reciprocal trade, and preserves freedom of navigation and overflight,” Brown added.
His comments came amid news reports that two U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier strike groups were sailing together in the Philippine Sea – on the doorstep of the South China Sea – and had launched dual flight drills.
Beijing: ‘Every country has the right’
Recent reports have pointed to the possibility that Beijing is planning to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea.
On Monday, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked to confirm a report that China was “getting more likely” to establish such an aerial zone in the strategic and potentially mineral-rich waterway.
“I’m not sure what the source of this report is, but I’d like to stress that every country has the right to establish an ADIZ and to decide whether to establish an ADIZ based on the intensity of the threats it faces in air defense security,” spokesman Zhao Lijian said, referring to a report in The Economist.
“In the light of the air security threats China faces above relevant waters of the South China Sea, China will carefully and prudently study the relevant issue taking into account all factors,” he added.
An ADIZ is a zone where all civilian aircraft must identify themselves and announce their location. In such a zone, civilian aircraft are tracked and identified before further entering into a country’s airspace, although an ADIZ does not restrict travel in and out of its limits, nor does it usually apply to military aircraft.
In practice, an ADIZ in the South China Sea would likely mean that civilian planes would need to report their presence to Chinese air traffic control, and could potentially be intercepted if they didn’t. However, China has not yet taken such action in an ADIZ it established seven years ago above the East China Sea, farther north.
Experts have said that enforcing such a zone, which would cover a vast area of the South China Sea, would present huge logistical challenges for the Chinese air force and could provoke a diplomatic backlash.
Other nations maintain airstrips on islands they occupy in the contested region. In the Spratly Islands, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan are among countries that have built runways on territories they occupy.
China, for its part, has for years been expanding its territorial claims in the sea and has installed weapons systems and established military outposts, while deploying maritime militia vessels to the South China Sea.
The maritime region is claimed in whole or in part by China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan.
Indonesia urges firmness by ASEAN
Meanwhile in Jakarta on Wednesday, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi urged members of the ASEAN bloc to take a firm stance regarding Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Retno was speaking after taking part in an online meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It took place two days before ASEAN leaders are to meet in an online summit Friday.
“Regarding the Nine-Dash Line claim in the South China Sea, Indonesia conveyed that ASEAN needs to show solidity regarding respect for the international legal principles including UNCLOS 1982 and all its mechanisms,” Indonesia’s top diplomat said in a statement.
Retno was referring to a boundary on Chinese maps that delineates the extent of Beijing’s claims in the sea and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
She also urged major powers to contribute to peace and disability in the sea region.
“Collaboration and cooperation must continue to be prioritized, not rivalry,” Retno said.
Indonesia is not among the countries with contending territorial claims in the South China Sea but tensions arose between Jakarta and Beijing in early 2020 and 2016 over the presence of Chinese fishing boats in waters off Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.
Last week, Retno said there was “no reason to negotiate” with China as she reaffirmed Jakarta’s stance that it has “no overlapping claims with China” in the maritime region.
Her earlier comments came days after Indonesia sent another diplomatic letter on the topic to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, in response to one submitted by China to the U.N. chief 10 days earlier.
In its letter, Beijing had invited Jakarta to negotiate what it called “overlapping claims of maritime rights and interests” in the South China Sea.
Reported by BenarNews, an RFA-afiliated news service.
China Resumes Dredging at Woody Island in the Paracels
2020-06-26
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| Satellite imagery of Woody Island’s northwest, showing dredging visible by the discoloration of the water and new sand structures built up nearby, with smaller artificial jetty-like structures are visible further down the coast, to the east, June 25, 2020. |
China is dredging in a bay at Woody Island, its biggest settlement in the South China Sea, likely to expand the artificial island’s northwest corner, satellite imagery shows.
This development in the disputed Paracel island chain, in the northern part of the South China Sea, comes amid mounting concern in Southeast Asia over China’s assertion of its sweeping territorial claims.
In an unusual move Friday, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, pointedly called for maintaining free airspace over the South China Sea in reaction to reports that Beijing’s plans to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone over the region.
Woody Island, where the dredging appears to have been underway for several weeks, includes Sansha City, China’s main administrative center in the Paracels -- an archipelago of rocks and reefs disputed between China, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
Commercial satellite imagery between April 17 and June 25 shows the shallow fringing reef off Woody Island’s northwest coast, right next to the smaller of the island’s two harbors, has had a chunk dug out of its center. Also visible are a web of new land bridges that could be a foundation for more land reclamation, to expand the island.
Cranes or heavy machinery can be spotted working in the same spot on May 8. Based on Radio Free Asia and BenarNews’ review of the imagery, sand was likely dredged out of Woody Island’s shallows to create this new structure. The coastline nearest the foundation has been also been reinforced with what looks like a sea wall, and several smaller artificial jetty-like structures have been built at points along the coast to the east.
Woody Island often hosts ships of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and China’s maritime militia before they deploy elsewhere, harassing shipping of other South China Sea claimants. Satellite imagery taken on Friday shows three CCG ships in the island’s harbor, along with what looks like a barge carrying material or supplies.
China undertook a massive land reclamation campaign between 2014 and 2016 to create new artificial islands in the South China Sea, destroying the natural environment and militarizing the occupied rocks and reefs shortly thereafter.
Virtually all of China’s occupied features in the South China Sea have had parts dredged up to make way for new settlements and military outposts. But the four biggest bases China maintains in the South China Sea, Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Woody Island, are virtually unrecognizable since land reclamation was finished in 2017, granting them deep-water harbors, airstrips, and living facilities. But small-scale dredging has continued, as this latest satellite imagery shows.
The new dredging on Woody Island comes at a sensitive time. Last month, Indonesia joined with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia in denouncing China’s sweeping assertion of sovereignty over the entirety of the South China Sea in a series of notes to the United Nations. Indonesia cited a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that struck down the legal basis of most of China’s claims to the disputed waters, definitively stating none of China’s ‘islands’ could generate exclusive economic zones and were only rocks.
More recently, China has tried to intimidate Vietnam, another claimant in the South China Sea, out of exploring for oil within its waters with an international partner by sending a government-operated survey vessel into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone on June 17.
Vietnam was the chair of Friday’s virtual summit of ASEAN leaders. All the claimants to the South China Sea were taking part, save for China and Taiwan.
“While the world is fighting against COVID-19 pandemic, there are irresponsible actions, violating international law, effecting to security environment and stability in some regions, including the ASEAN region,” Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said in his opening remarks, in a tacit reference to China.
The 10-member ASEAN bloc has long struggled to reach a consensus on issues related to the South China Sea, so Friday’s joint statement implicitly criticizing Beijing’s reported plans for an ADIZ was an unusually pointed expression of concern over rising tensions.
On Sunday, China adopted a revision to its law governing the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary branch of its armed services that has been formally placed under the Central Military Commission alongside the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN).
The reform may signal that China wants to beef up the security forces it can draw on to police the South China Sea. The amended law now tasks the PAP with “maritime rights enforcement” and allows it to participate in joint exercises with the People’s Liberation Army. The China Coast Guard is a constituent part of the PAP.
This week, navies of several governments have been on maneuvers in the South China Sea – which is widely viewed as an effort to push back against China’s assertive behavior.
Japan performed a bilateral training drill with Singapore on Monday, and a bilateral exercise with the United States in the same area on Tuesday. The U.S. and Taiwan both sent maritime patrol aircraft south of Taiwan on Wednesday, seemingly tracking Chinese submarine movements in the area after a submarine was detected by Japan in the East China Sea last week.
AFP
Japan city to rename area of islands disputed with China
Tokyo (AFP) - A local council in southern Japan voted Monday to rename an area including islands disputed with China and Taiwan, a move Beijing denounced as illegal and a "serious provocation".
The local assembly of Ishigaki city approved a plan to change the name of the area covering the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands -- known by Taiwan and China as the Diaoyus -- from "Tonoshiro" to "Tonoshiro Senkaku".
Local media said another part of Ishigaki is also known as Tonoshiro, and the name change was cast as a bid to avoid confusion.
But the uninhabited islands are at the centre of a festering row between Tokyo and Beijing and the move by the small local council -- which does not carry national governmental weight -- sparked anger in both Taiwan and mainland China.
"The passing of the so-called administration designation bill by Japan is a serious provocation to China's territorial sovereignty," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said in response to a question on the issue.
"It is illegal and invalid, and cannot change the fact that the Diaoyu islands belong to China," Zhao added, saying Beijing had lodged "solemn representations to Japan through diplomatic channels and reserves the right to make further responses".
Taiwan says the islands are part of its territory, and also protested the move.
"The sovereignty of Diaoyu islands belongs to our country and any move attempting to alter this fact is invalid," the foreign ministry said in a statement.
It said it had expressed "regret and stern protest" to Tokyo.
Japan's chief government spokesman declined to comment on the Ishigaki council move, but Tokyo has long complained about China's routine dispatch of its coast guard ships to waters surrounding the islands.
Relations between Japan and China deteriorated in 2012 when Tokyo "nationalised" some of the disputed islets and tensions have flared up periodically over the region.
burs-nf/sah/je
Business
More F-35 Stealth Fighters Are Headed to South Korea
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As tensions continue to rise on the Korean peninsula – with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) sending tanks and troops to the DMZ – the government in Seoul could rest easy in knowing that its air force will be bolstered by early next year with 40 additional F-35A stealth fighters. South Korea already received 13 F-35A fighters in 2019.
Lockheed Martin Corp.'s LMT business unit won a $183 million modification contract for the F-35 Lightning II, and work-related as part of the deal is expected to be completed by January of next year, according to a report from Zacks Equity Research. The deal calls for Lockheed to offer additional operation, security and technical services to support the program and work will be executed at the company's facilities in Fort Worth, Texas.
The recent contract modification follows the $675 million deal that the U.S. State Department approved in April, as part of the Pentagon's foreign military sales program. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the deal would fund support and services for South Korea's F-35 aircraft, engines, weapons and related equipment. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of program support will also be provided.
DSCA said in a statement that the "proposed sale would support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United states by meeting legitimate security and defense needs of one of its closest allies in the INDOPACOM Theater. The Republic of Korea is one of the major political and economic powers in East Asia and the Western Pacific and a key partner of the United States in ensuring peace and stability in the region."
South Korea, which has become one of Asia's economic tigers and is far more technologically advanced than its northern rival, has also developed a robust domestic arms industry – but it has also remained a key partner in the F-35 program.
By 2021, South Korea is also expected to have the third-biggest stealth fighting operation in Asia.
The F-35 currently dominates the combat aircraft market as it combines advance stealth capabilities with fighter speed and agility. And while it has been estimated that the cost of the program could exceed $1.5 trillion dollars, the program has been seen as the one of the most lethal but also cost-effective fighter programs today.
As financial analysts have also noted F-35 contracts such as this one with South Korea should be seen as a win for the Pentagon and U.S. allies. These bring the overall cost of the aircraft down, while production of the jets is only expected to continue. The U.S. military has a current inventory target of 2,456 aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
In May, an F-35A Lightning II assigned to the 58th Fighter Squadron crashed upon landing at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. It was only the third such crash involving the Joint Strike Fighter – which had an otherwise excellent safety record. Aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin reported that the fleet of F-35s hit 250,000 flight hours this past March.
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.
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World
Taiwan jets 'drive away' intruding Chinese fighter plane, third intrusion in days
World
A History of the 2025 Sino–American War in the South China Sea
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Editor’s note: This article is adapted from Michael R. Auslin’s book Asia’s New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the Indo-Pacific (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2020). |
More than two decades after the fact, the reasons why the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) avoided total war, let alone a nuclear exchange, during their armed conflict in the autumn of 2025 remain a source of dispute. What is clearer is why the Sino–American Littoral War broke out in the first place, and the course it took. Years of worsening U.S.–China relations, supercharged by the 2020 COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic that originated in Wuhan, China, and long fueled by endemic Chinese cyberattacks on American businesses and individuals, military jockeying in the South China Sea, and Beijing’s influence and propaganda campaigns, had created a deep reservoir of ill will and distrust of the other in each country.
When a series of accidents propelled Washington and Beijing into war, both sides were taken by surprise, but each saw the risk differently. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) feared the domestic repercussions of losing a war but had long convinced itself that Americans were a weak and uncommitted people who would not endanger their comfortable lifestyle. As for American leaders, they were naturally risk-averse and unconvinced they could maintain a major military campaign so far from home against the world’s second-most-powerful military. Each, therefore, tripped into war without a full plan for how to dominate and win. The result of the conflict — the establishment of three geopolitical blocs in East Asia — continues to this day. The resulting cold war between the United States and China became the defining feature of geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific in the middle of the 21st century.
The Gray Rhino: September 8–9, 2025
The Littoral War began with a series of accidental encounters in the
skies and waters near Scarborough Shoal, in the South China Sea. Beijing
had effectively taken control of the shoal, long a point of contention
between China and the Philippines, in 2012. After Philippines president
Rodrigo Duterte, who had steadily moved Manila toward China during the
late 2010s, was impeached and removed from office, the Philippines’ new
president steadily moved to reassert Manila’s claim to the shoal, and by
the summer of 2025 sent coastal-patrol boats into waters near the
contested territory. When armed People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia
(PAFMM) vessels pushed out the Philippine forces in early July, Manila
appealed to Washington under its security treaty for assistance.
Prior Philippine requests for U.S. help in dealing with China had been largely shunted aside by Washington, even during the Trump administration. However, new U.S. president Gavin Newsom, who had been dogged during the 2024 campaign by allegations that Chinese cyber operations had benefited his candidacy, saw the Philippine request as an opportunity to show his willingness to take a hard line against Beijing. Newsom increased U.S. Air Force flights over the contested territory, using air bases made available by Manila, and sent the carrier USS Gerald Ford, along with escort vessels, on a short transit. On two occasions in late July, U.S. and Chinese ships came close to running into each other due to aggressive maneuvering by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and a U.S. Navy FA-18 operating from the Gerald Ford was forced to take emergency evasive action to avoid colliding with a PLANAF J-15. Despite the increasing tensions, the U.S. Navy ships returned to Japan at the beginning of August, yet no diplomatic attempts were made to alter the trajectory of events. The fact that both sides knew some type of armed encounter was increasingly possible, if not probable, yet seemed to ignore the risk, led pundits to call the events surrounding the clash an example of a “gray rhino,” unlike the complete surprise represented by a “black swan” occurrence. Ironically, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping himself had warned about the dangers of “gray rhinos” back in 2018 and 2019.
In response to the brief uptick in U.S. Navy freedom-of-navigation operations near other Chinese-claimed territory in the Spratly and Paracel island chains, Beijing decided to fortify Scarborough Shoal, building airstrips and naval facilities as it had done in the Spratlys. As Scarborough lay only 140 miles from Manila, China’s announcement set off alarm bells in the Philippines. As Chinese naval construction ships approached Scarborough on September 4, dozens of small Philippine boats, many of them private, attempted to block them. On the second day of the maritime encounter, a Chinese frigate rammed a Philippine fishing boat, sinking it, with the loss of two Philippine fishermen. As news spread over the next several days, dozens more Philippine vessels, including the country’s entire coast guard, confronted the Chinese. Though no further ship collisions occurred, worldwide broadcast of video of the maritime confrontation further inflamed tensions.
At this point, on Saturday, September 6, U.S. Indo–Pacific Command, acting directly under orders from U.S. secretary of defense Michele Flournoy, dispatched one guided-missile destroyer, the USS Curtis Wilbur, and the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Charleston (LCS-18) to the waters off Scarborough, and ordered the USS John C. Stennis aircraft carrier to head from its home port in Bremerton, Wash., to Pearl Harbor. In order not to inflame the high tensions, however, the White House and Pentagon decided not to send the Gerald Ford to the area. Instead, another U.S. guided-missile destroyer, USS Stethem (DDG 63), and a mine-countermeasures ship, the USS Patriot (MCM 7), were ordered to transit the Taiwan Strait. The next day, Beijing announced an air-defense identification zone over the entire South China Sea, demanding that all non-Chinese aircraft submit their flight plans to Chinese military authorities and receive clearance to proceed. While the U.S. Air Force and Navy immediately rejected China’s authority over the South China Sea, Chinese army and navy aerial patrols increased, and international civilian airliners complied with Beijing’s demands.
On Monday, September 8, at approximately 18:30 local time (10:30 Greenwich time; 00:30 Hawaii time; 05:30 Eastern time), a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance flight out of Japan over the Spratlys was intercepted by a PLAAF J-20 taking off from Fiery Cross Reef, in the same chain. After warning off the EP-3, the J-20 attempted a barrel roll over the American plane. The Chinese pilot sheared off most of the EP-3’s tail and left rear stabilizer; the Chinese plane lost a wing and went into an unrecoverable spin into the sea. The EP-3 also could not recover and plunged into the sea, killing all 22 Americans aboard. Tragically, the EP-3 was not even supposed to be flying, as the U.S. Navy had intended to replace the fleet with unmanned surveillance drones by 2020, but cost overruns and delays in the drone program led to occasional use of a limited number of aging manned aircraft in the region, especially when real-time interpretation of data was required.
Roughly 30 minutes later, before word of the EP-3’s downing had reached U.S. Indo–Pacific Command in Hawaii, let alone Washington or Beijing, 13 nautical miles northwest of Scarborough Shoal, the Bertholf (WMSL-750), a U.S. Coast Guard cutter returning from a training mission along with the Japan Coast Guard Kunigami-class patrol vessel Motobu, out of Naha in Okinawa, was approached by a cutter-class armed Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ship. After broadcasting warnings for the Bertholf and the Motobu to leave the area, the Chinese ship attempted to maneuver in front of the American ship, to turn its bow. The CCG captain miscalculated and struck the Bertholf amidships, caving in the mess and one of its enlisted crew compartments. The Bertholf began taking on water and attempted to turn east toward the Philippines while emergency crews attempted to keep the ship afloat. The CCG ship immediately left the scene without rendering assistance. Six US sailors later were declared missing and presumed dead in the collision, while three Chinese CCG sailors were swept overboard and lost at sea.
Being the closest U.S. naval vessel to the downed EP-3 surveillance pland, the Curtis Wilbur raced toward the site of its crash, while the Charleston moved to assist the Bertholf. Nighttime darkness caused confusion for rescue and patrol operations on both sides. Two PLAN ships returned to the scene of the maritime collision to search for the lost Chinese seamen, coming in close quarters with the Motobu — which was helping in rescue operations to stabilize the American vessel — as well as with the littoral combat ship Charleston, which arrived several hours later. Mechanical trouble kept the Bertholf from making way under her own power, and she began to drift back toward PLAN vessels. In the darkness, U.S. ships and the Japanese attempted to disengage with the Chinese vessels, while continually warning the other side to stand down so rescue operations could continue.
After several close encounters, one Type 052D Luyang III class PLAN destroyer, the Taiyuan, activated its fire-control radar and locked on the Motobu. The captain of the thousand-ton Japanese patrol ship, knowing he could not survive a direct hit from the PLAN destroyer, radioed repeated demands that the radar be turned off. When no Chinese response was forthcoming, and with rescue operations ongoing, the Motobu’s commander fired one round from his Bushmaster II 30 mm chain gun across the bow of the Taiyuan. In response, a nearby Chinese frigate, thinking it was under attack from the Japanese Coast Guard ship, fired a torpedo in the direction of the Motobu. In the congested seas, however, the torpedo hit the Charleston, which was transiting between the Chinese and Japanese ships, ripping a hole below the waterline. The lightly armored littoral combat ship, with a complement of 50 officers and seamen, foundered in just 25 minutes, with an unknown loss of life, at 01:30 (17:30 Greenwich time; 07:30 Hawaii time; 10:30 Eastern time) on Tuesday, September 9. U.S. surveillance drones flying over the melee recorded parts of the encounter and flashed images back to U.S. commanders in the region.
With radio and electronic traffic flashing between Honolulu and Washington, America’s military leaders in the Pacific began to mobilize the U.S. fleet in Hawaii and Japan to steam into the South China Sea, and launched F-35 fighters from Okinawa to begin forcing Chinese air-force planes out of the skies. After more than a decade of rising tension and distrust between China and the United States, a series of accidents threw the two antagonists against each other. The Littoral War had begun.
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HIMARS Could Be A Game-changer In The Philippines Fight Against China
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Here's What You Need To Remember: “Absent an abrupt change in foreign policy outlook by President Duterte, it is unlikely the Philippines would acquire HIMARS in the near future,” says Brian Harding, an Asian security expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “In addition to the price tag, Duterte would likely find HIMARS to be too provocative vis-à-vis China.”
The United States and the Philippines have been discussing whether the Filipino military should buy the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), a multiple rocket launcher used by the United States and other nations, according to the South China Morning Post.
“If deployed, the long-range, precision-guided rockets fired by the system would be able to strike Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the Spratly chain,” the newspaper said. HIMARS is a lighter, more mobile six-barreled version of the U.S. Army’s M270 multiple rocket launch system (MLRS). It can shoot rockets out to 70 kilometers (43 miles) and GPS-guided ballistic missiles out to 300 kilometers (186 miles).
However, funding from the cash-strapped Philippines is a hurdle. “The two sides have been unable to reach a deal because HIMARS could be too expensive for Manila given its tight defense budget,” said the newspaper.
Exactly how much does HIMARS cost? Manufacturer Lockheed Martin refused to give cost estimates, instead referring queries to the U.S. Army’s Aviation and Missile Command, which didn’t respond to questions from TNI. The cost of HIMARS is split between the launcher itself and separate contracts for various munitions including guided and unguided rockets, the longer-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles, and weapons under development such as extended-range rockets and the Precision Strike Missile.
Some estimates put the cost of a HIMARS guided rocket at $100,000 to $200,000 apiece, or an ATACMS at more than $700,000 apiece. Another clue is that Poland recently signed a $414 million contract for eighteen launchers plus support and training. With the 2019 Philippines defense budget at only $3.4 billion, a big HIMARS purchase would be a strain.
Yet HIMARS is still a cheaper option than, say, a $1.4 million Tomahawk cruise missile. And the Philippines had already had a taste of HIMARS. The weapon was deployed there by U.S. Marines in 2016 during the joint U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercises. Collin Koh Swee Lean, a Singaporean defense analyst, told the South China Morning Post that “there were two possible locations for the system: Palawan province in the Philippines and Thitu, or Zhongye in Chinese—the largest island held by Manila in the disputed Spratly chain. From Palawan, HIMARS could launch a missile at its maximum range to hit China’s man-made island at Mischief Reef, Koh said. But Thitu island would also be vulnerable to PLA air and missile strikes because it is only about 22 kilometers (14 miles) from China-occupied Subi Reef, and within striking range of missiles originating from the Paracel Islands and Hainan.”
The cheaper price tag of HIMARS compared to other weapons does make it attractive. “The idea of purchasing HIMARS systems may be one of the few viable options in response to China's artificial islands and continuing and increasingly provocative actions in the SCS [South China Sea],” says Jay Batongbacal, director of the Philippines-based Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea.
Yet Batongbacal does not see a sale any time soon. “The Philippines is probably not yet in a position to make a purchase,” he told The National Interest. “It is also not likely to arm its own possessions significantly, for fear of Chinese reaction.”
American experts agree. “Absent an abrupt change in foreign policy outlook by President Duterte, it is unlikely the Philippines would acquire HIMARS in the near future,” says Brian Harding, an Asian security expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “In addition to the price tag, Duterte would likely find HIMARS to be too provocative vis-à-vis China.”
But Harding believes this could change. “Just as Duterte has dramatically reoriented Philippine foreign policy, there could again be an abrupt change with a new president in 2022. A new president could also seek to accelerate the implementation of the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which could potentially provide an avenue for the United States to deploy systems such as HIMARS in the Philippines.”
Indeed, perhaps the more interesting possibility isn’t Philippines-owned rockets, but American-operated rockets on Philippines soil. “I think observers shouldn’t just think about capabilities that the Philippines could acquire on its own,” Harding warns. “EDCA provides a vehicle for the United States to deploy its own platforms on a rotational basis, which could be a way to potentially move high-end capabilities into the region, if agreed to by leaders.”
Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. This first appeared earlier in the year.
Image: Wikipedia.
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