Chủ Nhật, 7 tháng 6, 2020

THE ARMS RACE (Reuters video) China puts final satellite for Beidou into orbit. (AP) Japan PM to bolster defense after scrapping missile system. (CBS NEWS) (Video) U.S. "not going to allow Russia and China to continue" increasing nuclear stockpiles, top negotiator says(Business Insider) The US wants to kill part of an 8,000 mile-long undersea cable linking Hong Kong with LA over China spying fears. (The National Interest) Will China Have Global Naval Dominance by 2030? (Reuters) U.S. to sidestep arms pact to sell armed drones. (The National Interest) China Finishes Its Second Large Amphibious Assault Ship. (Reuters) U.S. Senate panel authorizes $9.1 billion for 95 F-35 jets made by Lockheed. (Defense News) Senate panel OKs $6 billion military fund to confront China. (The National Interest) Two of America's Most Powerful Aircraft Carriers Have Just Joined Forces. (The National Interest) China Just Added Two New Nuclear Missile Submarines to Its Fleet. (Bloomberg) A U.S.-China Cold War Could Be Good for Investors, After All

(Cuc Chy Ðua Vũ Trang)
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Timeline Index: Sept. 15, 2020

Timeline: 6/23/2020

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World

China puts final satellite for Beidou into orbit

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World

Japan PM to bolster defense after scrapping missile system

MARI YAMAGUCHI
Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaks during a press conference at the prime minister's official residence, Thursday, June 18, 2020, in Tokyo. Abe said Thursday that he regretted the arrest of his former justice minister and the minister's lawmaker wife over allegations they engaged in vote buying during last year's election, and that he takes the public criticism seriously. (Rodrigo Reyes Marin/Pool Photo via AP)

Japan Politics

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaks during a press conference at the prime minister's official residence, Thursday, June 18, 2020, in Tokyo. Abe said Thursday that he regretted the arrest of his former justice minister and the minister's lawmaker wife over allegations they engaged in vote buying during last year's election, and that he takes the public criticism seriously. (Rodrigo Reyes Marin/Pool Photo via AP)

TOKYO (AP) — Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Thursday that his country needs to bolster its security posture amid threats from North Korea and should consider acquiring preemptive strike capability after having to scrap the planned deployment of two new land-based missile defense systems.

Abe said he wants to redefine the meaning of deterrence in the face of the threat from North Korea and its advancement in missile technology.

“We should renew our discussion of adequate deterrence we need, considering North Korea’s missile technology that has advanced since the time we introduced our missile defense systems,” he said.

Abe said that should include the capability to conduct preemptive strikes within the limitations set by the country's pacifist constitution.

"The question is if we should stay within the boundary when enemy capability is dramatically advancing,” Abe said.

Abe has long pushed to amend Article 9 of Japan's post-World War II U.S.-drafted constitution, which renounced war and the use of force as a means of settling international disputes and has been interpreted as limiting the country's armed forces to acting only in self-defense. Abe in 2015 reinterpreted Article 9 to allow self-defense to also include right to fight back for its ally, the U.S. in case of enemy attack.

Abe's comments come just days after Japan's Defense Ministry announced that it would “stop the deployment process” of two land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense systems after it was found that the safety of one of the planned host communities could not be ensured without a hardware redesign that would be too time consuming and costly.

Defense officials had said the two Aegis Ashore units could cover Japan entirely. The country’s current missile defenses consist of Aegis-equipped destroyers at sea and Patriot missiles on land.

After being on the back burner in the ruling party for decades, the possibility of gaining preemptive strike capabilities and deploying cruise missiles were proposed to Abe's government by his party’s missile defense panel in 2017.

Abe had since largely avoided the highly divisive topic after seeing his support ratings plunge amid a series of political scandals.

Abe said Thursday that it's time to discuss it again as tensions escalate on the Korean Peninsula.

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Follow Mari Yamaguchi on Twitter at https://www.twitter.com/mariyamaguchi

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World

(Video) U.S. "not going to allow Russia and China to continue" increasing nuclear stockpiles, top negotiator says


The U.S. is set to sit down with Russia and possibly China on Monday to discuss limiting all three countries' nuclear stockpiles. CBS News foreign affairs analyst Pamela Falk spoke to Ambassador Robert Wood, the U.S. top arms control negotiator, about his growing concerns over Russia and China's nuclear arsenals.

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Business

The US wants to kill part of an 8,000 mile-long undersea cable linking Hong Kong with LA over China spying fears

insider@insider.com (Isobel Asher Hamilton)
Undersea cables provide internet all over the world.
Undersea cables provide internet all over the world.

Getty/ullstein bild/Contributor

  • In 2016 Google and Facebook announced a new high-speed undersea cable connecting Hong Kong and Los Angeles.

  • The cable is now laid, but a DOJ committee has advised the FCC deny approval for the Hong Kong section of the cable.

  • The committee is worried the cable could be tapped by the Chinese government.

  • Visit Business Insider's homepage for more stories.

The US government seems poised to stunt a multimillion undersea cable project by Google and Facebook.

The cable is part of the Pacific Light Cable Network and was announced in 2016. Google said at the time the cable would be 8,000 miles long and span the Pacific Ocean, linking Los Angeles with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It is designed to manage 120 terabytes of data per second, or 80 million HD videoconference calls between LA and Hong Kong, according to Google's statements in 2016.

A Depart of Justice committee called Team Telecom has now recommended to the FCC that the part of the cable connecting Hong Kong be rejected on security grounds.

The committee said it fears a cable to Hong Kong could be vulnerable to being tapped by the Chinese government, and is particularly concerned by the fact a large investor in the cable was a Hong Kong-based company called Dr. Peng Ltd which it says is the "fourth largest provider of telecommunications services in the PRC [People's Republic of China]."

More broadly it says the cable could help China make Hong Kong a pan-Asian Pacific telecommunications hub, meaning US data would be more likely to pass through Chinese infrastructure even if China wasn't its final destination.

The US government's fears were heightened is due to "the PRC government's recent actions to remove Hong Kong's autonomy and allow for the possibility that PRC intelligence and security services will operate openly in Hong Kong."

In May China introduced sweeping new legislation for Hong Kong, cracking down on dissent and taking away many of the region's semi-autonomous powers, sparking widespread protests.

Team Telecom said the portions connecting the US with Taiwan and the Philippines should be allowed to function.

Read the original article on Business Insider

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The National Interest

Will China Have Global Naval Dominance by 2030?

Peter Suciu
The National Interest

Click here to read the full article.

According to some dire predictions, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have naval dominance by 2030 and naval superiority by 2049. Such a foreboding prophecy comes from Captain James E. Fanell (Retired), former director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in a widely published account this past weekend.

In an op-ed, Captain Fanell wrote, “After 20 years of transformation, the PLA Navy operates around the world from the Baltic to the South Pacific and from the Arctic to the Antarctic… The PRC’s naval expansion is already well advanced. Since 2008, the PLA Navy has dispatched 35 naval escort task forces through the Indian Ocean and into the Gulf of Aden, and PLA Navy ships have visited over 60 nations.”

Fanell added that the PLAN no longer worries about warship shortages, and that great attention is now being paid to its aircraft carrier platform, while Beijing is also focusing on its Type 075 landing helicopter (LHA) amphibious assault vessels. The latter would be comparable to the U.S. Navy’s America-class LHA—and that platform would prove crucial should Beijing ever actually mount an invasion to reclaim Taiwan.

Perhaps most worrisome in Fanell’s forecast is that he assesses that the PLAN could consist of a surface force of more than 450 ships, along with a submarine force approaching 1109 submarines by just 2030. That is a 10 percent increase from his 2015 estimate, one he warned could even be on the low side. The goal for China is a global naval presence, first to the Indian Ocean and then beyond.

Some of that global reach has already become a reality, as the PLAN is engaged in enlarging its first overseas military base in Djibouti on the Red Sea. That base, which is located near the U.S. Naval Expeditionary Base, was built at a cost of $590 million in 2017. While Djibouti is one of Africa’s smaller nations it has become an important “strategic partner” to Beijing.

Fanell is not the only one to express concerns at the rate of the PLAN’s expansion.

Last month a Congressional Research Service Report, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Background and Issues for Congress, highlighted Beijing’s naval modernization efforts, which encompassed a wide array of platforms and weapon acquisition programs. According to the report, these include anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems.

The report also highlighted that there are several issues that Congress must take action on, including whether the U.S. Navy is responding appropriately to China’s naval modernization efforts and even if the planned size of the Navy will be appropriate to counter China.

While such concerns of Chinese naval acquisitions must be addressed by lawmakers in Washington, there are some factors to consider. First, such a building problem by Beijing still faces the very serious issue of corruption. As The National Interest previously reported, China’s naval modernization is far more complex than simple growth as the corruption among the shipbuilders will have lasting consequences for the PLAN. The more money that China invests in shipbuilding the more opportunities for corruption will emerge, so the question then becomes whether Beijing can offer the necessary transparency to fight that corruption.

Then there are the lessons from history.

The British Royal Navy adopted its so-called “two-power standard,” which required that it increase its naval strength. The standard called for the Royal Navy to maintain a number of battleships at least equal to the combined strength of the next two largest navies in the world, which then were France and Russia. This became a real problem when the Royal Navy built the HMS Dreadnought, which made all other battleships essentially obsolete. Overnight the British lost their advantage and that started a new round of warship building.

For China to gain naval dominance would require that it could launch and maintain more than the 11 aircraft carriers the United States Navy now operates, but would also need to keep pace with the carriers in service with the Royal Navy, France and Australia. As long as NATO exists it isn’t just the 11 U.S. carriers and potentially nine LHAs in the U.S. fleet, but all of those other carriers.

Fanell noted that an alliance with other partners is the United States’ best course of action. He wrote, “The best option to avert future conflict is for the U.S. and India to adopt a combined effort to significantly enhance our whole of government approach to strengthen and integrate our military capabilities to confront the PRC’s bad behavior, especially at sea.”

Perhaps, first letting China spend wildly on developing a navy should also be an option as well. Maintaining it—dealing with the corruption—and trying to create its own “multi-power standard” might just be more than Beijing bargained for.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters

Click here to read the full article.

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U.S.

U.S. to sidestep arms pact to sell armed drones

Reuters Videos
https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-sidestep-arms-pact-sell-152518184.html

The Trump administration will re-interpret a Cold War-era arms-control agreement in order to help American defense contractors sell military drones to more nations.

Three defense industry executives and a U.S. official told Reuters about the policy change, which has not previously been reported.

The change concerns the 33-year-old Missile Technology Control Regime - or MTCR - a pact created to curb arms proliferation, which counts 34 member nations.

Washington has long seen the MTCR's restrictions on cruise missile sales as applicable to large, weaponized drones.

And until now, only England, France and Australia have been allowed to buy armed drones from U.S. manufacturers, according to data collected by The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College in New York state.

But an arms industry executive told Reuters that Jordan, Romania, Saudi Arabia and UAE have shown interest in purchasing U.S. systems and will be among the first customers in line when the U.S. policy changes.

Reinterpreting the MTCR is part of a broader Trump administration effort to sell more weapons overseas.

A U.S. official and industry executives told Reuters the State Department is expected to approve the first drone sales under the new interpretation as soon as this summer,

The U.S. National Security Council is expected to support the policy change at a meeting next week and discuss a possible White House announcement.

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World

U.S.'s Pompeo to meet China's top diplomat in Hawaii seeking to ease tensions: media

Reuters
FILE PHOTO: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attends lunch with counterparts China, Britain, Russia and France, the permanent five veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council.
FILE PHOTO: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attends lunch with counterparts China, Britain, Russia and France, the permanent five veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will meet China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi in Hawaii, trying to ease tensions between the world's two largest economies over various issues, according to media reports.

Pompeo was planning the trip "quietly" and the arrangements were not yet finalized, Politico said.

Pompeo has been vocal in criticizing China on a range of issues from the origins of the coronavirus pandemic to its Hong Kong policy to the treatment of its ethnic and religious minorities,

The U.S. State Department and the Chinese embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Hong Kong's South China Morning Post newspaper cited an unidentified source as saying that Yang, a state councilor and member of the Communist Party Politburo, will represent the Chinese side for the meeting.

Relations between the countries have deteriorated in recent months, and U.S. President Donald Trump has said he could even sever relations.

Pompeo said last month that China could have prevented the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people around the world by being more transparent about the coronavirus and accused it of refusing to share information.

He also said Chinese plans to impose national security laws on Hong Kong would be the "death knell" for the former British colony's autonomy.



(Reporting by Mohammad Zargham, Additional reporting by Winni Zhou and Andrew Galbraith; Editing by Sonya Hepinstall and Kim Coghill)

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World

China Finishes Its Second Large Amphibious Assault Ship

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The Chinese Navy has now launched a second large amphibious assault ship engineered to carry weapons, helicopters, troops and landing craft into war, a move which further changes international power dynamics by strengthening China’s ability to launch expeditionary maritime attacks.

The ship is described at the second Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), somewhat analogous to the U.S. WASP-class. This Chinese amphibious assault ship reportedly displaces as much as 30,000 tons and is able to carry as many as 28 helicopters, a report from Naval News states. The report adds that the new People’s Liberation Army Navy LHD is likely powered by a diesel engine with 9,000kW, four Close In Weapons Systems and HQ-10 surface-to-air missiles. The new ship’s “aim is likely to increase the “vertical” amphibious assault capability with the very mountainous East Coast of Taiwan in mind,” the Naval News report writes. 

The addition of more LHDs certainly increases China’s maritime attack power, making it a formidable threat along the Taiwanese coastline. Photos of the ship show well-deck in back, capable of launching ship-to-shore transport craft similar to the U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion or newer Ship-to-Shore Connector. Such a configuration makes it appear somewhat similar to U.S. Navy WASP-class which, unlike the first two ships of the America-class, also operates with a well-deck from which to launch large-scale amphibious assaults. 

The Chinese LHD operates with a displacement of roughly 10,000-tons less than its U.S. counterpart. However, despite an apparently smaller size, it may operate with as many or more helicopters; if reports that the Chinese LHD can operate 28 helicopters are true, that would appear to be a larger number than the roughly 22 operated by U.S. LHDs. Regardless, it does not appear as though the Type 075s operate anything like the Short-Take-off-and-Landing F-35B stealth fighter which launches from U.S. LHDs. F-35Bs, combined with Harrier Jets and Ospreys are likely to push the number of aircraft operated by U.S. LHDs somewhat higher than that Type 075. The aviation centric first two America-class ships and the legacy WASP boats both now operate with F-35s.  Having the F-35 is likely to give U.S. LHDs a decided advantage over these emerging Chinese counterparts; not only does it bring the prospect of stealth and air support, but also brings new dimensions of ISR to maritime warfare. The possibility of establishing air supremacy during an amphibious assault with an F-35 or even merely fortifying an advance with 5th-generation air power, is reshaping amphibious attack strategy with unforeseen advantages. 

While threats to Taiwan may jump out as the first and most apparent area threatened by expanding Chinese amphibious forces, the South China Sea will also be increasingly vulnerable. In particular, when it comes to ship-to-shore transports, a Type 075 could dispatch groups of troops, weapons and even armored vehicles for attack, as well as large numbers of amphibious assault vehicles. Several of these ships operating in tandem would easily enable a Chinese amphibious assault to annex or overwhelm large areas of the disputed island areas. Also not likely to be lost on U.S. observers is that two capable LHDs of this kind massively increase China’s expeditionary capability, introducing new dimensions to the prospect of large-scale amphibious attacks against major-power target areas around the globe. 

Kris Osborn is the new Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Click here to read the full original article.

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Reuters

U.S. Senate panel authorizes $9.1 billion for 95 F-35 jets made by Lockheed

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee said on Thursday it had authorized $9.1 billion to procure 95 F-35 aircraft in its version of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, an annual bill setting policy for the Department of Defense.

The F-35 jet is made by Lockheed Martin Corp <LMT.N>.

The 95 F-35s authorized in the bill are 14 more than requested by President Donald Trump's administration.

The Senate committee also authorized the U.S. Air Force to keep six F-35s originally sold to Turkey.

The jets were never delivered to Turkish soil because of a disagreement over Ankara's purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system, which the Pentagon said was "incompatible" with the stealthy F-35 jets.

The United States kicked Turkey out of the F-35 program after its S-400 purchase.

(Reporting by Patricia Zengerle and Mike Stone; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama and Peter Cooney)

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World

Senate panel OKs $6 billion military fund to confront China

WASHINGTON ― Plans for a Senate-crafted version of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a new military fund to boost deterrence against China in the Pacific, is one step closer to becoming law.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved nearly $6 billion for the fund in its version of the annual defense policy bill, the panel announced Thursday. It authorizes $1.4 billion in fiscal 2021, which would be $188.6 million above the administration’s budget request, and $5.5 billion for fiscal 2022. The bill also directs the defense secretary to create a spending plan for all of the funds.

“The best way to protect U.S. security and prosperity in Asia is to maintain a credible balance of military power, but, after years of underfunding, America’s ability to do so is at risk,” the committee’s summary stated. “The FY21 [National Defense Authorization Act] establishes the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) to send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that America is deeply committed to defending our interests in the Indo-Pacific.

“PDI will enhance budgetary transparency and oversight, focus resources on key military capability gaps, reassure U.S. allies and partners, and bolster the credibility of American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”

Though not all details of the fund were immediately made public, SASC Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., and ranking member Jack Reed, D-R.I., previously said they would sponsor a measure to enable U.S. military operations in the region, beyond supporting new weapons platforms.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper has said China is his department’s top adversary, but said Congress has worked to sharpen the Pentagon’s spending and focus in the region. The PDI would follow the form of the multiyear European Deterrence Initiative, which has consumed $22 billion since its inception after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

Congress will have to internally negotiate the final dollar amount for PDI and what those funds would buy, but House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., and ranking member Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, have expressed support for the idea. Though the Senate’s approach differs, Thornberry has also proposed spending $6 billion―all in FY21―on priorities that include air and missile defense systems as well as new military construction in partner countries; Smith hasn’t released his own plan.

Once approved by the full Senate, its version of the NDAA would be reconciled with the House’s version, which the HASC is expected to make public late this month before it goes through markup July 1 and advances to the House floor.

With an eye on China beyond the PDI, the SASC bill also encourages the Air Force to establish an operating location in the Indo-Pacific region for F-35A fighter jets and to allocate “sufficient resources and prioritize the protection of air bases that might be under attack from current or emerging cruise missiles and advanced hypersonic missiles, specifically from China."

There are also a number of provisions aimed at safeguarding America’s technology and industrial base from Chinese intellectual property theft and “economic aggression,” according to the summary. The bill would also require reports from the Pentagon on how to mitigate the risks from vendors like Chinese telecom firms Huawei and ZTE when basing U.S. troops overseas.

The SASC summary said its proposed PDI would:

  • Increase lethality of the joint force in the Pacific, including by improving active and passive defense against theater cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles for bases, operating locations and other critical infrastructure.

  • Enhance the design and posture of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region by transitioning from large, centralized and unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient and adaptive basing; increasing the number of capabilities of expeditionary airfields and ports; enhancing pre-positioning of forward stocks of fuel, munitions, equipment and materiel; and improving distributed logistics and maintenance capabilities in the region to ensure the sustainment of logistics under persistent multidomain attack.

  • Strengthen alliances and partnerships to increase capabilities, improve interoperability and information sharing, and support information operations capabilities with a focus on countering malign influence.

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Business

Two of America's Most Powerful Aircraft Carriers Have Just Joined Forces

Peter Suciu
The National Interest

Click here to read the full original article.

Recently, the United States Navy released photos of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 74) transiting the Atlantic Ocean. This marked the first time that the new Ford-class aircraft carrier has operated with a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier together while underway. The photos provided the best visual comparisons of the two carrier classes to date—highlighting many of the significant improvements that the new $13 billion USS Gerald R. Ford has to offer.

CVN-78 is the lead ship of Navy’s new Ford-class of flattops, and while the class design uses the basic Nimitz­­-class hull form, it incorporates several improvements. These include features that permit the ship to generate more aircraft sorties per day, more electrical power for supporting ship systems, and upgrades that require several hundred fewer sailors than the older Nimitz-class. This could reduce the 50-year life-cycle operating and support (O&S) costs for each of the new Ford-class carriers by about $4 billion, according to Navy estimates.

The U.S. Navy took delivery of the USS Gerald R. Ford in May 2017.

The Drive noted that among the most significant visual differences is the placement of the island superstructures on the two carriers. While the Nimitz-class superstructure has evolved substantially over time and does vary from ship-to-ship, the placement and even size of the island superstructure is quite different on the Ford. It was moved back about 140 feet to provide more deck space and to enhance the operational tempo. The island is both shorter in length, but about 20 feet taller than that of previous carrier class.

The shape of the island was also modified to house the AN/SPY-3 and AN/SPY-4 active electronically scanned array (AESA) Dual Band Radar, which has six separate arrays that provide 360-degree coverage around the ship. The old spinning 3D and 2D radars—which have been staples on earlier carriers—have been eliminated.

The Ford-class of carriers have just three aircraft elevators instead of four, but the placement and larger size will enhance operations. In addition, the Navy has said that the larger flight deck will help the ship reach its goal of being able to execute 25 percent more sorties than its predecessor.

Not so easily seen in the photos are the Ford’s new Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which will be used to launch all of the carrier’s aircraft. This has replaced the traditional steam catapults that have been commonplace with U.S. Navy carriers for decades.

The new warship is also equipped with two newly-designed reactors that provide 250 percent more electrical capacity than previous carriers, and from those improvements, the ship will be able to load weapons and launch aircraft faster than ever before.

The USS Gerald R. Ford recently completed tests to prove that it can launch and recover jets, and also completed its first ordnance movement from a lower deck magazine.

While the ships operated together for that Navy photo-op, it was announced last week that the USS Harry S. Truman would finally be returning home sometime this month, after remaining at sea following a deployment to the Middle East the past few months to protect the crew from exposure to the novel coronavirus. In April, the Navy announced that the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) would remain at sea off the East Coast of the United States to keep the crew healthy and to remain combat-ready to take on missions if needed.

That move was made after the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) was sidelined for almost two months in Guam after a significant portion of her crew was infected with COVID-19.

HSTCSG took part in the first-of-its-kind major exercise in the Atlantic last month in a drill known as Operation Eagle, which was conducted in partnership with North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters

Click here to read the full original article.

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World

China Just Added Two New Nuclear Missile Submarines to Its Fleet

Kris Osborn
The National Interest

Click here to read the full original article.

The Chinese have just added two new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines to their Navy, bringing the total number of so-called SSBNs in the force up to six. While the U.S. operates twice as many, the growing number of Chinese nuclear-deterrence submarines massively expands the ability of Beijing to hold the continental U.S. at substantial risk. 

Nuclear-armed submarines are intended to ensure a second-strike catastrophic response in the event of a nuclear attack, essentially ensuring complete destruction of the attacking country. They quietly and secretly patrol at great depths in undisclosed locations to function as a large deterrent force against a first-strike nuclear attack. 

As recently as May of 2020, two additional “Type 094 SSBNs, had entered service,” according to a Congressional Research Service Report called “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities.”  The newest type of SSBN, according to the Navy report, is armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the CRS report explains. They are also armed with Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes and mines. Perhaps of greater concern, the Chinese have already test-fired an emerging JL-3 nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missile with a reported range of more that 5,600 miles, according to a 2018 CSIS report. The missile is solid fueled.

China clearly appears to be expanding its nuclear-armed submarine reach on a global scale, as there have been several news reports of Chinese SSBNs seen in various hot-spots around the globe. 

The CRS report estimates that, by this year, the Chinese are operating 55 diesel-electric submarines and seven nuclear-powered submarines. 

Overall, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that China may operate as many as 70 submarines, according to the CRS assessment; in addition, the CRS report estimates that China will have as many as 8 SSBNs and 76 submarines overall by 2030. Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear, and according to the CRS’ reference to the Office of Naval Intelligence, “China’s submarine force continues to grow at a low rate, though with substantially more-capable submarines replacing older units. Current expansion at submarine production yards could allow higher future production numbers.”

While there is likely little known about the exact technological make-up of the emerging Chinese Jin-class SSBN, it may not rival the emerging U.S. Columbia-class submarines. The new, now-in-development Columbia class may be the quietest undersea boat ever to exist. It uses a quiet, efficient electric-drive and a differently configured X-shaped stern. 

What is known about the Chinese Jin-class is that it will be armed with an extremely lethal, 5,600 mile range nuclear armed ballistic missile, the JL-3. For instance, a 2018 CSIS report says the Chinese have already test fired the weapon which, by any estimation, could easily hold the continental U.S. at great risk. 

Kris Osborn is the new Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Click here to read the full original article.

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Business

A U.S.-China Cold War Could Be Good for Investors, After All

Christopher Anstey
Bloomberg
A U.S.-China Cold War Could Be Good for Investors, After All
A U.S.-China Cold War Could Be Good for Investors, After All

(Bloomberg) -- A stock analyst who gained attention for emphasizing the theme of inequality a decade-and-a-half ago is now promoting the idea that the U.S.-China showdown for economic supremacy could prove a boon for investors.

The escalation in U.S.-China tensions since President Donald Trump took office in 2017 has largely been viewed as a negative by traders. And headlines announcing fresh tariffs or other protectionist moves by either country have roiled equities on any given day -- though they didn’t prevent global shares from hitting record highs before the coronavirus crisis.

Ajay Kapur, head of Asia and global emerging-market strategy at Bank of America, says that the rivalry could have many benefits, particularly in driving investment and innovation. Stronger productivity gains would help propel investment returns in a variety of assets, he wrote with colleagues in a June 7 report.

“For equity investors, especially growth investors, the seeds of new military-civilian technologies that are germinating today will be irrigated by the full-blown great power rivalry, and blossom in unknown ways in the coming decades,” Kapur wrote with colleagues Ritesh Samadhiya and Aritra Baksi.

The team cited historical examples such as rivalry between the U.K. and Germany in the late 1890s to early 1900s, along with the U.S.-Soviet conflict, as periods when big rivalries acted as a spur for technological development.

Among the investment implications of a reduced emphasis on global supply chains and increasingly nationalistic strategic policies from the world’s top two economies, the Bank of America strategists highlighted the following:

“Technology is the biggest winner,” they wrote. Robotics, space research, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence along with semiconductor makers and chip designers are “logical” candidates.Asian equities in particular, with their “technology bias,” are likely winners, they argued.Government bond yields will be kept low, so aren’t likely to be good hedges for equity portfolios, they wrote. Cash could be a “temporary fix,” though gold and blockchain-based currencies could take a bigger diversification role, they wrote.Media firms will play a role in the communications war, and patriotic and nationalist-leaning ones could benefit, they wrote.Defense and financial-technology providers should be other beneficiaries, they concluded.

“Two competing great powers, using the government balance sheet and zero real interest rates from the savings glut” generated by the ultra-wealthy and high-savings societies such as Japan, Kapur and his colleagues wrote. Kapur in the mid-2000s used the term “plutonomy” to describe economies with increasing inequality.

Read more: Inequality Play Is Over, Says Analyst Who Coined ‘Plutonomy’

“Re-shoring, reinvigorating these domestic supply chains and creating domestic upstream suppliers in critical technologies is likely in both the U.S. and China,” the Bank of America team wrote. “Tomorrow’s iPhone, a substantial beneficiary of military research, is probably incubating in military-financed research labs or projects.”

For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com

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©2020 Bloomberg L.P.

Thứ Sáu, 5 tháng 6, 2020

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1969-1976. Letter from President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu. The text of Thieu’s letter to the President

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1969-1976
VIETNAM OCTOBER 1972 - JANUARY 1973
(FOREIGN RELATIONS of THE UNITED STATES, 1969-1976 Vol. IX, Vol. X)
Documents Excerpts for the Strategic Studies for The Republic of Vietnam
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Part 1: “We believe that peace is at hand", Letter From President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu, Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Preface.
Part 8:  Memorandum of Conversation1 Saigon, December 19, 1972.
Part 9 Memorandum of Conversation Saigon, December 19, 1972 (Continued)


The text of Thieu’s letter to the President is as follows: Dear Mr. President, General Haig has brought me your letter of December 17 and has explained to me your considered judgment of the state of the peace negotiations. From your letter and his presentation it appears to me that we are placed in a situation where I am faced with the choice either to join you in accepting the agreement under its present form or you will proceed in a separate course which will serve the US interests alone. Let me assure you first, Mr. President,  that I have an abiding gratitude toward you for what you have done for the cause of freedom in Viet Nam in the past four years. I have complete faith in the Nixon Doctrine, and believe that the Government and people of South Viet Nam have fully done their share to implement that doctrine for the defense and preservation of freedom. As a result, on the military field we have taken over the fighting and will replace all the US troops in a few months; on the political field we have joined the United States in all the peace initiatives that have been made, and we have constantly shown our generous and forth-coming attitude in actively cooperating throughout the negotiations conducted by the United States Government with the Communists in the past months. The objections which we raised to the unreasonable demands of the Communist aggressors are due to the fact that our survival is at stake and that the unjust conditions posed by the Communist aggressors go counter to the basic positions which our two governments have jointly taken for a long time, in this common struggle. As I have spelled out to you in my previous letters, through your emissaries and Ambassador Bunker, as well as through my personal emissary to you in Washington recently, we consider that for a settlement to be fair and honorable, and to be consistent with the purposes which we have set out together in this struggle, the agreement should embody these three major principles:1—The NVA has no right to be in South Viet Nam, and should to-tally withdraw to North Viet Nam concurrently with other non-South December 14–29, 1972  771Vietnamese forces, in accordance with our joint communique ́at Midway in July [June] 1969.2—There could not be clauses or wordings in the agreement which could be interpreted as the recognition of the PRG as a government parallel to the GVN in South Viet Nam.3—The composition and functions of the CNRC should not be those of a super-coalition government in disguise. In this context, I must say in all candor that it would be unfair to force the Government and people of South Viet Nam, by an ultimatum, either to accept the draft agreement under the sudden complete termination of assistance from our principal ally in the face of a ruthless enemy who continues to be aided by the entire Communist camp, and who has not abandoned his aggressive and expansionist designs. In all sincerity it seems to me that neither course of action will bring about the just and fair settlement of the war that we have been striving for, which could justify the enormous sacrifices that together our two countries have made for so long. We are aware however of your great desire to end this war even though the settlement conditions are imperfect. Therefore, with maximum goodwill and as the very last initiative, we are ready to accept the agreement as of December 12 provided that the so-called PRG can-not be considered as a parallel government to the GVN in South Viet Nam and that the question of the North Vietnamese troops in the South be resolved satisfactorily, that is those troops should withdraw totally from South Viet Nam within the same delay as for the allied troops un-der effective supervision. The political questions can thus be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties as stipulated in the agreement as of December 12, even though we feel that the clauses under their present form are to our great disadvantage. The withdrawal of the NVA however is indispensable because there can be no self-determination unless all the Communist aggressors leave South Viet Nam in fact as well in principle. We believe that the new great concessions which we take, as mentioned above, are important risks for peace which we assume. These concessions demonstrate beyond any shadow of a doubt the deep desire of the South Vietnamese people for a peaceful and honorable settlement. I must say that the South Vietnamese Government and people absolutely cannot go beyond these new important concessions, because otherwise it would be tantamount to surrender. I shall appreciate it deeply if the United States Government would side with us and present our new initiatives to the Communists with vigor and conviction. We believe that our new position deserves very serious consideration.
339-370/428-S/80004772   Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX If the Communist aggressors continue to be stubborn and reject this offer, international public opinion as well as domestic opinions in our respective countries will realize better who is the obstacle to peace. Sincerely, signed Thieu

Nội dung bức thư của Tổng Thống Thiệu gửi cho Tổng thống Nixon như sau:
Thưa Ngài Tổng thống, Tướng Haig đã mang đến cho tôi lá thư ngày 17 tháng 12 và đã giải thích cho tôi phán quyết của Ông về tình trạng của các cuộc đàm phán hòa bình. Từ thư của Ông và bài thuyết trình của Ông ấy, tôi thấy rằng chúng tôi đang ở trong tình huống tôi phải đối mặt với sự lựa chọn hoặc tham gia cùng Ông để chấp nhận thỏa thuận theo mẫu hiện tại hoặc Ông sẽ tiến hành một hướng đi riêng phục vụ lợi ích của Hoa Kỳ một mình. Hãy để tôi đảm bảo với Ông trước, thưa Tổng thống, rằng tôi có một lòng biết ơn sâu sắc đối với Ông vì những gì Ông đã làm cho sự nghiệp tự do ở Việt Nam trong bốn năm qua. Tôi hoàn toàn tin tưởng vào Học thuyết Nixon, và tin rằng Chính phủ và nhân dân Nam Việt Nam đã đóng góp phần của mình để thực hiện học thuyết đó để bảo vệ và giữ gìn tự do. Kết quả là, trên chiến trường quân sự, chúng tôi đã tiếp quản cuộc chiến và sẽ thay thế tất cả quân đội Hoa Kỳ trong vài tháng; trên lĩnh vực chính trị, chúng tôi đã tham gia Hoa Kỳ trong tất cả các sáng kiến hòa bình đã được thực hiện, và chúng tôi đã liên tục thể hiện thái độ rộng lượng và hướng tới của mình trong việc tích cực hợp tác trong suốt các cuộc đàm phán của Chính phủ Hoa Kỳ với Cộng sản trong những tháng qua. Sự phản đối mà chúng tôi đưa ra đối với những yêu cầu vô lý của những kẻ xâm lược Cộng sản là do sự sống còn của chúng tôi đang bị đe dọa và những điều kiện bất công được đặt ra bởi những kẻ xâm lược Cộng sản đi ngược lại những vị trí căn bản mà hai chính phủ của chúng ta đã cùng nhau thực hiện từ lâu, trong cuộc đấu tranh chung này. Như tôi đã viết cho Ông trong những lá thư trước đây của tôi, thông qua các sứ giả và Đại sứ Bunker của Ông, cũng như thông qua người phát ngôn cá nhân của tôi cho Ông ở Washington gần đây, chúng tôi cho rằng việc giải quyết là công bằng và danh dự, và phù hợp với những mục đích mà chúng ta đã cùng nhau đặt ra trong cuộc đấu tranh này, hiệp định nên thể hiện ba nguyên tắc chính sau:
1 Quân Bắc Việt không có quyền được ở lại Miền Nam Việt Nam, và phải rút về Bắc Việt Nam đồng thời với những lực lượng không thuộc miền Nam Việt Nam,
771 theo thông cáo chung của chúng ta at Midway vào tháng 7 [tháng 6] 1969.
2. Không thể có những mệnh đề hay từ ngữ trong bản thỏa ước được dịch nghĩa như sự chấp nhận PRG là một chính phủ song song với chính phủ Việt Nam ở Miền Nam Việt Nam.
3 Các thành phần và chức năng của CNRC không nên là của một chính phủ siêu liên minh được ngụy trang. Trong bối cảnh này, tôi phải nói một cách thẳng thắn rằng sẽ không công bằng khi bắt buộc Chính phủ và nhân dân Nam Việt Nam, bằng tối hậu thư, hoặc là chấp nhận bất ngờ một dự thảo thỏa thuận dưới sự chấm dứt hoàn toàn hỗ trợ từ đồng minh chính của chúng tôi.trước mắt một kẻ thù tàn nhẫn, những kẻ tiếp tục được hỗ trợ bởi toàn bộ phe Cộng sản, và những kẻ đã không từ bỏ các thiết kế xâm lược và bành trướng của chúng. Bằng tất cả sự chân thành đối với tôi dường như không có đường hướng hành động nào sẽ mang lại sự giải quyết công bằng và hợp lý cho cuộc chiến mà chúng tôi đang tranh đấu, có thể minh chứng cho những hy sinh to lớn mà hai nước chúng ta đã làm từ lâu. Tuy nhiên, chúng tôi biết rằng Ông rất muốn kết thúc cuộc chiến này mặc dù điều kiện giải quyết không hoàn hảo. Do đó, với thiện chí tối đa và là sáng kiến cuối cùng, chúng tôi sẵn sàng chấp nhận thỏa thuận vào ngày 12 tháng 12 với điều kiện cái gọi là PRG không thể được coi là một chính phủ song song với chính phủ Việt Nam tại Miền Nam Việt Nam và vấn đề của quân đội Bắc Việt ở miền Nam Việt Nam được giải quyết thỏa đáng, tức là những đội quân đó phải rút hoàn toàn khỏi miền Nam Việt Nam trong cùng một thời hạn rút quân như đối với quân đội đồng minh dưới sự giám sát hiệu quả. Do đó, các vấn đề chính trị có thể được hai bên miền Nam giải quyết theo quy định trong thỏa thuận vào ngày 12 tháng 12, mặc dù chúng tôi cảm thấy rằng các điều khoản dưới hình thức hiện tại của chúng là bất lợi lớn cho chúng tôi. Tuy nhiên, việc rút NVA là không thể thiếu vì không thể có quyền tự quyết trừ khi tất cả những kẻ xâm lược Cộng sản rời khỏi Nam Việt Nam trên thực tế cũng như về nguyên tắc. Chúng tôi tin rằng những nhượng bộ lớn mới mà chúng tôi thực hiện, như đã đề cập ở trên, là những rủi ro quan trọng cho hòa bình mà chúng tôi giả định. Những nhượng bộ này thể hiện vượt ra ngoài mọi nghi ngờ về mong muốn sâu sắc của người dân miền Nam đối với một sự dàn xếp hòa bình và danh dự. Tôi phải nói rằng Chính phủ và nhân dân miền Nam hoàn toàn không thể vượt quá những nhượng bộ quan trọng mới này, bởi vì nếu không thì sẽ tương đương với việc đầu hàng. Tôi sẽ đánh giá cao điều đó nếu Chính phủ Hoa Kỳ sẽ sát cánh cùng chúng tôi và trình bày những sáng kiến mới của chúng tôi cho những người Cộng sản với nghị lực và niềm tin mạnh mẽ. Chúng tôi tin rằng vị trí mới của chúng tôi xứng đáng được xem xét rất nghiêm trọng.
339-370 / 428-S / 80004772 Quan hệ đối ngoại, 1969-1976, Tập IX Nếu những kẻ xâm lược Cộng sản tiếp tục ngoan cố và từ chối lời đề nghị này, dư luận quốc tế cũng như các ý kiến người dân trong nước ta sẽ nhận ra tốt hơn ai là trở ngại cho hòa bình.
Trân trọng, đã ký Thiệu

Note by Hoàng Hoa
1.    Trong thư của TT Thiệu có dùng từ “conviction” (phán quyết tội nhân, niềm tin mạnh mẽ) đồng nghĩa (đối với) “Judgement” (phán quyết) khi TT Nixon nói với TT Thiệu về sự quyết định cuối cùng là nếu TT Thiệu không hợp tác với TT Nixon thì TT Nixon sẽ đơn phương quyết định. Nghĩa là TT Nixon hàm ý “nhắc nhở” (hăm dọa) TT Thiệu rằng TT Nixon sẽ đơn phương quyết định, còn TT Thiệu thì nói TT Nixon nȇn “convict” (conviction=judgement= niềm tin) hành động phán quyết đó cho người Cộng sản. TT Thiệu có nói “tối hậu thư” (ultimatum) ý nói về sự “hăm doạ” của TT Nixon trong thư của TT Nixon.
2.    Bức thư của TT Nixon viết từ Washington ngày 17/12/1972 trước một ngày đánh bomb trừng phạt Bắc Việt 18/12/1972, nhưng TT Nixon muốn gởi thư tay nhờ Tướng Haig trao tận tay TT Thiệu, TT Nixon biết rằng thư sẽ đến tay TT Thiệu 20/12/1972 sau khi cuộc đánh bom Bắc Việt. Ý TT Nixon muốn giữ bí mật không qua đường cable, và trân trọng thông báo TT Thiệu, như TT Nixon nói bức thư này không phải là tham khảo ý kiến của TT Thiệu mà hàm ý một phán quyết (judgement) đối với vấn đề, nhưng cũng là một tối hậu thư (ultimatum).
3.    PRG: Provisionary Republic Government (Chính Phủ Lâm Thời Cộng Hòa MNVN), danh xưng của Mặt Trận Giải Phóng (National Liberation Front) do CSBV thành lập năm 1960.
4.    CNRC: Council of the National Reconciliatory and Concord (Hội Ðồng Hòa Giải Hòa Hợp Quốc Gia).
5.    The Communique at Midway Island. June 8, 1969. Video.


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724   Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX
189.  Letter from President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu1

Washington, December 17, 1972.
Dear Mr. President:
I have again asked General Haig to visit you in Saigon. He will in-form you of my final considered personal judgment of the state of the ceasefire negotiations and of the prospects we now face. Over the last two months—through my personal letters, through my extensive personal discussions with your emissary, through communications via Dr. Kissinger, General Haig, and Ambassador Bunker, and through daily consultations in Paris—I have kept you scrupulously informed of the progress of the negotiations. I have sought to convey to you my best judgment of what is in our mutual interest. I have given you every opportunity to join with me in bringing peace with honor to the people of South Vietnam. General Haig’s mission now represents my final effort to point out to you the necessity for joint action and to convey my irrevocable intention to proceed, preferably with your cooperation but, if necessary, alone. Recent events do not alter my conclusion. Although our negotiations with Hanoi have encountered certain obstacles, I want you to have no misunderstanding with regard to three basic issues: First, we may still be on the verge of reaching an acceptable agreement at any time. Second, Hanoi’s current stalling is prompted to a great degree by their desire to exploit the public dissension between us. As Hanoi obviously realizes, this works to your grave disadvantage. Third, as I have informed Hanoi, if they meet our minimum remaining requirements, I have every intention of proceeding rapidly to a settlement. You are also aware of certain military actions which will have been initiated prior to General Haig’s arrival. As he will explain to you, these actions are meant to convey to the enemy my determination to bring the conflict to a rapid end—as well as to show what I am prepared to do in case of violation of the agreement. I do not want you to be left, under any circumstances, with the mistaken impression that these actions December 14–29, 1972   725 signal a willingness or intent to continue U.S. military involvement if Hanoi meets the requirements for a settlement which I have set. If the present lack of collaboration between us continues, and if you decide not to join us in proceeding now to a settlement, it can only result in a fundamental change in the character of our relationship. I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster—to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative. I have asked General Haig to obtain your answer to this absolutely final offer on my part for us to work together in seeking a settlement along the lines I have approved or to go our separate ways. Let me emphasize in conclusion that General Haig is not coming to Saigon for the purpose of negotiating with you. The time has come for us to present a united front in negotiating with our enemies, and you must decide now whether you desire to continue to work together or whether you want me to seek a settlement with the enemy which serves U.S. interests alone.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon

Washington, ngày 17 tháng 12 năm 1972.
Thưa Ngài Tổng thống:
Tôi lại yêu cầu Tướng Haig đến thăm ông ở Sài Gòn. Ông ấy sẽ thông báo cho ông về phán đoán cá nhân cuối cùng của tôi về tình trạng của các cuộc đàm phán ngừng bắn và về triển vọng mà chúng ta hiện đang đối mặt. Trong hai tháng qua, qua các lá thư cá nhân của tôi, qua các cuộc thảo luận cá nhân rộng rãi của tôi với đặc sứ của ông, qua các liên lạc qua Tiến sĩ Kissinger, Tướng Haig và Đại sứ Bunker, và qua các cuộc tham khảo hàng ngày ở Paris, tôi đã thông báo cho ông về tiến trình của các cuộc đàm phán. Tôi đã tìm cách chuyển đến ông sự đánh giá tốt nhất của tôi về những gì thuộc về lợi ích chung của chúng ta. Tôi đã cho ông mọi cơ hội để tham gia cùng tôi trong việc mang lại hòa bình với danh dự cho người dân miền Nam Việt Nam. Nhiệm vụ của Tướng Haig hiện đại diện cho nỗ lực cuối cùng của tôi để chỉ ra cho ông sự cần thiết cho hành động chung và chuyển đến ý định không thể đảo ngược của tôi để tiến hành, tốt nhất là với sự hợp tác của ông, nhưng, nếu cần thiết, một mình. Các sự kiện gần đây không làm thay đổi kết luận của tôi. Mặc dù các cuộc đàm phán của chúng ta với Hà Nội đã gặp phải một số trở ngại, tôi muốn ông không có sự hiểu lầm đối với ba vấn đề căn bản: Thứ nhất, chúng ta vẫn có thể sắp đạt được thỏa thuận chấp nhận được bất cứ lúc nào. Thứ hai, sự khựng lại hiện tại của Hà Nội được thúc đẩy đến một mức độ lớn bởi tham vọng khai thác sự bất đồng công khai giữa chúng ta. Như Hà Nội rõ ràng nhận ra, điều này dẫn đến bất lợi nghiêm trọng của ông. Thứ ba, như tôi đã thông báo cho Hà Nội, nếu họ đáp ứng các yêu cầu tối thiểu còn lại của chúng tôi, tôi có mọi ý định tiến hành nhanh chóng đến cuộc dàn xếp. Ông cũng nhận thức được một số hành động quân sự đã được bắt đầu trước khi Tướng Haig đến. Như ông ấy sẽ giải thích cho ông, những hành động này mang ý nghĩa chuyển đến cho kẻ thù quyết tâm của tôi để đưa cuộc xung đột đến kết thúc nhanh chóng - cũng như cho thấy những gì tôi chuẩn bị làm trong trường hợp vi phạm thỏa thuận. Trong mọi trường hợp, tôi không muốn ông bị bỏ lại, với ấn tượng sai lầm rằng những hành động này báo hiệu sự sẵn sàng hoặc ý định tiếp tục sự tham gia của quân đội Hoa Kỳ nếu Hà Nội đáp ứng các yêu cầu cho một giải pháp mà tôi đã đặt ra. Nếu sự thiếu hợp tác hiện tại giữa chúng ta vẫn tiếp diễn và nếu ông quyết định không tham gia cùng chúng tôi ngay bây giờ để tiến hành giải quyết, điều đó chỉ có thể dẫn đến một sự thay đổi căn bản trong tính cách của mối quan hệ của chúng ta. Tôi tin chắc rằng việc ông từ chối tham gia với chúng tôi sẽ là một lời mời đến thảm họa - đến sự mất mát của tất cả những gì chúng ta đã cùng nhau chiến đấu trong hơn thập kỷ qua. Không thể tha thứ được vì bất cứ lý do gì bởi vì chúng ta sẽ mất đi một sự chọn lựa khác chính đáng và danh dự. Tôi đã yêu cầu Tướng Haig nhận được câu trả lời của ông cho lời đề nghị cuối cùng tuyệt đối này về phía tôi để chúng ta cùng nhau tìm kiếm một giải pháp theo các dòng tôi đã phê duyệt hoặc đi theo những cách riêng biệt. Hãy để tôi nhấn mạnh kết luận rằng Tướng Haig sẽ không đến Sài Gòn với mục đích đàm phán với ông. Đã đến lúc chúng ta trình bày một mặt trận thống nhất trong việc đàm phán với kẻ thù của chúng ta và ông phải quyết định ngay bây giờ liệu ông có muốn tiếp tục làm việc cùng nhau hay ông muốn tôi tìm cách giải quyết với kẻ thù chỉ phục vụ lợi ích của Hoa Kỳ. Tôi đã yêu cầu Tướng Haig có được câu trả lời của ông cho lời đề nghị hoàn toàn cuối cùng này về phía tôi để chúng tôi cùng nhau tìm kiếm một giải pháp theo các dòng tôi đã phê duyệt hoặc đi theo những cách riêng biệt. Hãy để tôi nhấn mạnh kết luận rằng Tướng Haig sẽ không đến Sài Gòn với mục đích đàm phán với ông. Đã đến lúc chúng ta trình bày một mặt trận thống nhất trong việc đàm phán với những kẻ thù của chúng ta và ông phải quyết định ngay bây giờ liệu ông có muốn tiếp tục làm việc cùng nhau hay ông muốn tôi tìm cách giải quyết với kẻ thù chỉ phục vụ lợi ích của Hoa Kỳ.
Trân trọng,
Richard Nixon



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At President Richard M. Nixon’s direction, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger held a press conference on Saturday, December 16, 1972, at 11:45 a.m.

December 14–29, 1972 709
182.  Editorial Note At President Richard M. Nixon’s direction, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger held a press conference on Saturday, December 16, 1972, at 11:45 a.m. “The aim of my briefing as I conceived it,” Kissinger later wrote, “was to place the blame [for the stalled negotiations] where it belonged—on Hanoi—and again to leave no doubt in Saigon of our determination to conclude the agreement.” (White House Years, page 1451)To this end, his remarks prior to the question-and-answer session focused on the peace he thought he had negotiated in October, what had happened since, and what the United States should do now. The part most relevant to his avowed aim occurred toward the end of his statement: “The major difficulty that we now face is that provisions that were settled in the agreement appear again in a different form in the protocols; that matters of technical implementation which were implicit in the agreement from the beginning have not been addressed and were not presented to us until the very last day [December 13] of a series of sessions that had been specifically designed to discuss them; and that as soon as one issue was settled, a new issue was raised. “It was very tempting for us to continue the process which is so close to everybody’s heart, implicit in the many meetings, of indicating great progress; but the President decided that we could not engage in a charade with the American people. “We now are in this curious position: Great progress has been made, even in the talks. The only thing that is lacking is one decision in Hanoi, to settle the remaining issues in terms that two weeks previously they had already agreed to. So we are not talking of an issue of principle that is totally unacceptable. Secondly, to complete the work that is required to bring the international machinery into being in the spirit that both sides have an interest of not ending the war in such a way that it is just the beginning of another round of conflict. So we are in a position where peace can be near but peace requires a decision. This is why we wanted to restate once more what our basic attitude is. “With respect to Saigon, we have sympathy and compassion for the anguish of their people and for the concerns of their government. But if we can get an agreement that the President considers just, we will proceed with it. “With respect to Hanoi, our basic objective was stated in the press conference of October 26. We want an end to the war that is something more than an armistice. We want to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to cooperation. But we will not make a
339-370/428-S/80004710   Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX settlement which is a disguised form of continued warfare and which brings about by indirection what we have always said we would not tolerate. “We have always stated that a fair solution cannot possibly give either side everything that it wants. We are not continuing a war in order to give total victory to our allies. We want to give them a reasonable opportunity to participate in a political structure, but we also will not make a settlement which is a disguised form of victory for the other side.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 8, 1973, pages 36–37; Kissinger’s opening statement and excerpts from the question-and-answer session were also printed in The Washington Post, December 17, 1972,page A9)About the press conference, Kissinger later observed: “I was asked to give a low-key briefing of the reasons for the recessing of the Paris talks; how to be low-key about such a dramatic event was no more apparent to me in Washington than it had been in Paris.” Nonetheless, as he recorded in his memoirs, “I had no objection to this assignment; in-deed, I volunteered for it.” (White House Years, page 1449)



Phần 4: Theo chỉ thị của Tổng thống Richard M. Nixon, Trợ lý của Tổng thống về các vấn đề an ninh quốc gia Henry A. Kissinger đã tổ chức một cuộc họp báo vào thứ Bảy, ngày 16/12/1972, lúc 11:45 sáng

182. Ghi chú của Biên tập Theo chỉ thị của Tổng thống Richard M. Nixon, Trợ lý của Tổng thống về các vấn đề an ninh quốc gia Henry A. Kissinger đã tổ chức một cuộc họp báo vào thứ Bảy, ngày 16/12/1972, lúc 11:45 sáng. “Mục đích của cuộc họp ngắn của tôi theo tôi nghĩ,” sau này, Kissinger đã viết, “đó là sự đổ lỗi [cho các cuộc đàm phán bị đình trệ] nơi nó thuộc về - Hà Nội - và một lần nữa không nghi ngờ gì ở Sài Gòn về quyết định của chúng tôi để kết thúc thỏa thuận.” (Những Năm Nhà Trắng, trang 1451) Cho đến cuối cùng, những nhận xét của ông trước phiên hỏi-và-trả lời tập trung vào nền hòa bình mà ông nghĩ rằng ông đã đàm phán vào tháng 10, những gì đã xảy ra kể từ đó và Hoa Kỳ nên làm gì bây giờ. Phần có liên quan nhất đến mục tiêu đã được thừa nhận của ông ta xảy ra vào cuối tuyên bố của ông: “Khó khăn chính mà chúng ta hiện đang đối diện là các điều khoản đã được giải quyết trong thỏa thuận lại xuất hiện dưới một hình thức khác trong các nghị quyết; rằng các vấn đề áp dụng kỹ thuật tiềm ẩn trong thỏa thuận ngay từ đầu đã không được giải quyết và không được trình bày cho chúng tôi cho đến tận ngày cuối cùng [13 tháng 12] của một loạt các phiên họp được thiết kế đặc biệt để thảo luận về chúng; và ngay khi một vấn đề được giải quyết, một vấn đề mới lại được đưa ra. “Ðó là một điều rất cám dỗ đã khiến chúng tôi tiếp tục quá trình rất gần gủi với trái tim của mọi người, tiềm ẩn trong nhiều cuộc họp, cho thấy sự tiến bộ vượt bậc; nhưng Tổng thống đã quyết định rằng chúng tôi không thể tham gia vào một trò đố chữ (charade) với người dân Mỹ. Bây giờ chúng tôi đang ở vị trí tò mò này: Đã có tiến bộ lớn, ngay cả trong các cuộc đàm phán. Điều duy nhất còn thiếu là một quyết định tại Hà Nội, để giải quyết các vấn đề còn lại theo điều kiện mà họ đã đồng ý hai tuần trước đây. Vì vậy, chúng tôi không nói về một vấn đề nguyên tắc mà hoàn toàn không thể chấp nhận được. Thứ hai, để hoàn thành công việc cần thiết để đưa bộ máy quốc tế thành hiện thực theo tinh thần mà cả hai bên đều cùng quan tâm là không kết thúc chiến tranh theo cách nó chỉ là khởi đầu của một vòng xung đột khác. Vì vậy, chúng ta đang ở trong một vị trí mà hòa bình có thể ở gần nhưng hòa bình đòi hỏi một quyết định. Đây là lý do tại sao chúng tôi muốn nhấn mạnh một lần nữa thái độ căn bản của chúng tôi là gì. “Đối với Sài Gòn, chúng tôi rất thông cảm và thương xót cho nỗi thống khổ của người dân và những lo ngại của chính phủ. Nhưng nếu chúng ta có thể có được một thỏa thuận mà Tổng thống xem xét là chính đáng, chúng ta sẽ tiến hành với nó. “Đối với Hà Nội, mục tiêu căn bản của chúng tôi đã được nêu trong cuộc họp báo ngày 26 tháng 10. Chúng tôi muốn một cuộc chấm dứt chiến tranh là một điều gì đó hơn là cuộc đình chiến. Chúng tôi muốn chuyển từ thù địch sang bình thường hóa và từ bình thường hóa sang hợp tác. Nhưng chúng tôi sẽ không làm
339-370 / 428-S / 80004710 Quan hệ đối ngoại, 1969-1976, tập IX, Giải quyết là một hình thức ngụy trang của chiến tranh tiếp tục và mang lại bằng cách gián tiếp điều mà chúng ta luôn nói rằng chúng ta sẽ không dung thứ. “Chúng tôi luôn tuyên bố rằng một giải pháp công bằng không thể cung cấp cho cả hai bên những gì nó muốn. Chúng tôi không tiếp tục một cuộc chiến để giành chiến thắng hoàn toàn cho các đồng minh của chúng tôi. Chúng tôi muốn cho họ một cơ hội hợp lý để tham gia vào một cấu trúc chính trị, nhưng chúng tôi cũng sẽ không thực hiện một thỏa thuận nào là một hình thức chiến thắng trá hình cho phía bên kia.” (Bản tin của Bộ Ngoại giao, ngày 8 tháng 1 năm 1973, trang 36-37; Tuyên bố mở đầu của Kissinger và đoạn trích từ phiên hỏi đáp cũng được in trên tờ Washington Post, ngày 17 tháng 12 năm 1972, trang A9) Về cuộc họp báo, Kissinger sau đó quan sát: Tôi đã được yêu cầu đưa ra một bản tóm tắt  về các lý do cho việc tạm dừng các cuộc đàm phán ở Paris; làm thế nào để giảm nhẹ (low-key) một biến cố kịch tính đến thế thì không rõ ràng (was no more apparent) đối với tôi ở Washington hơn là trước đó ở Paris. Tuy nhiên, như ông đã ghi lại trong hồi ký của mình, “tôi không phản đối nhiệm vụ này; thực tế, tôi tình nguyện cho nó.” (Những Năm Nhà Trắng, trang 1449)
Bản dịch Việt ngữ Hoàng Hoa
Note: “Đối với Sài Gòn, chúng tôi rất thông cảm và thương xót cho nỗi thống khổ của người dân và những lo ngại của chính phủ…”
Kissinger xem Sàigòn là một lãnh thổ, hay một quốc gia, chính quyền Miền Nam Việt Nam, SVN, nȇn Kissinger nói “their people,” người dân của chính quyền Miền Nam Việt Nam.


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