Where Does Taiwan Stand on the South China Sea?
In January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). She will take office later this month. As the first president from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party in eight years, Tsai’s election represents a wildcard of sorts for the ROC’s ongoing claims in the South China Sea.
Whatever course she takes as president, her South China Sea policy will be governed by one central dilemma. This dilemma stems from the difficult reality that ROC possesses a similar position to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the disputed waters, while it still aims to pursue international standards of best practice. How has this dilemma shaped policy so far, and how is it likely to evolve?
The 1992 Consensus — ‘One China, respective interpretations’ — agreed to by the ROC and the PRC poses preconditions on the ROC’s foreign interactions. While both parties have worked towards ‘the gradual institutionalisation of the cross-strait relationship’, the ROC’s voice in the international community has had limited impact. It has been barred from participating in international and regional regimes and dialogues, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The ROC and PRC positions on the South China Sea have significant commonalities. Both claim the legitimacy of U-shaped lines, such as the so-called nine-dash line, and their sovereignty from a historical perspective. But in terms of their status in the international community and their interpretation of international standards, the two positions vary.
The ROC claims that ‘in terms of either historical, geographical or international legal perspective, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Shisha (Paracel) Islands, Chungsha (Macclesfield) Islands, Tungsha (Paratas) Islands, as well as their surrounding waters, their respective sea bed and subsoil belong to … the Republic of China’ as ‘an inherent part of the territory’. The ROC ‘does not recognise any claim to sovereignty over, or occupation of, these areas by other countries’.
The U-shaped nine-dash line constitutes the main part of the ROC’s historical claim over the South China Sea. In December 1946, a map issued by the ROC’s Department of Territories and Boundaries featured 11 discontinuous U-shaped lines. In 1948, the government declared its sovereignty and the right to maritime resources over the islands and reefs within the line. The PRC later recognized the line when it was established in 1949. The current shape of the nine-dash line was set down when the PRC government removed two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953.
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