Thứ Tư, 2 tháng 3, 2011

"Cách mạng Hoa Lài" ám ảnh Việt Nam

2011-03-01
http://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/programs/ReadingBlogs/spontaneous-jasmine-revolution-haunts-vn-tq-03012011205755.html
Trong lúc cách mạng “Hoa Lài” phát xuất từ Tunisia tiếp tục làm chấn động Bắc Phi, Trung Đông và lan toả tới Á Châu thì tại VN đang xảy ra một loạt những vụ bắt bớ, sách nhiễu, hành hung nhiều nhà dân chủ.
AFP photo
Ngoại trưởng Mỹ Hillary Clinton phát biểu qua màn hình TV trong một phiên họp của Liên Hiệp Quốc tại Geneva tập trung vào việc đàn áp tại Libya hôm 28/2/2011.

Liệu có bùng nổ tại VN?

Chẳng hạn như trường hợp nhà bất đồng chính kiến Tạ Phong Tần, tức blogger Công Lý và Sự Thật kể lại công an bắt và hành hung chị một cách vô cớ và tàn ác:
" Tôi đâu có phạm tội gì đâu. Tôi nói rõ với nó là nó muốn bắt tôi thì cứ việc đem lệnh đến đọc tại nhà mà bắt, lập biên bản bắt đàng hoàng. Họ tống tôi vô trong tù, tôi kháng cự lại thì bọn nó ba bốn thằng đè, rồi nó kêu cả những thằng văn phòng nữa xúm vào đánh tôi,… lấy tay chém vào cổ tôi,… lôi kéo rồi đạp vô chân tôi,…đánh vào ngực tôi. Rồi cả cái xâu tràng hạt màu đen tôi hay đeo trên cổ có cái thánh giá trên đó có ảnh Chúa chịu nạn và cái tượng Đức Mẹ Maria - Đức Mẹ La Vang tôi đang đeo trên cổ thì… nó giựt nó ném xuống đất...”
Chế độ đã sợ hãi về viễn ảnh bùng nổ của quần chúng, của ngọn lửa cách mạng hoa lài trong việc bắt giữ bác sĩ Nguyễn Đan Quế
Trích một bài blog
Và trường hợp còn đang tiếp diễn hiện giờ có liên quan nhà dân chủ Nguyễn Đan Quế. BS Nguyễn Đan Quế lại bị CA bắt hôm thứ Bảy vừa rồi, bị sách nhiễu, hạch hỏi rồi được thả nhưng tiếp tục phải “làm việc” sau khi CA khám nhà của ông, tịch thu máy vi tính, điện thoại di động và tìm thấy khoảng 60.000 tài liệu gọi là có dấu hiệu “hoạt động nhằm lật đổ chính quyền”.
Diễn biến này không khỏi gây phản ứng mạnh mẽ trong công luận, nhất là giới bloggers. Blogger Dân Làm Báo hôm thứ Hai tuần này (02/28) có bài tựa đề “VN xài luật rừng trong vụ bắt giữ BS Nguyễn Đan Quế”, nêu lên thắc mắc rằng  “Lưu trữ hơn 60.000 tài liệu kích động, kêu gọi chống Nhà nước cùng “lời kêu gọi toàn dân” xuống đường biểu tình lật đổ chế độ…”. Với “tội phạm” như thế, khám xét bắt khẩn cấp như thế mà chưa đầy 48 giờ sau đã vội vàng thả ngay. Như vậy, theo bài blog:

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Một phụ nữ Tunisia dẫm chân lên hình Tổng thống Zine El Abidine Ben Ali hôm 18/1/2011. AFP photo
"Thế thì tại sao Ls. Cù Huy Hà Vũ, tài liệu không bằng 1 góc 60.000 tài liệu kích động của bác sĩ Quế mà đến bây giờ vẫn còn trong chốn lao tù? Tại sao Ls. Cù Huy Hà Vũ áp dụng đúng quy định hiến pháp và luật pháp khởi kiện, khởi tố người cầm đầu chính phủ – kẻ đã tuyên bố nếu không dẹp được tham nhũng sẽ từ chức, đã tuyên bố nhận trách nhiệm về con tàu đắm Vinashin và núi nợ cho nhân dân – thì vẫn còn bị giam?
Thế thì tại sao Blogger Điếu Cày Nguyễn Văn Hải vẫn bị tiếp tục ở tù vì lý do tán phát tài liệu chống đối nhà nước. Phải chăng một người đang ở tù như anh Điếu Cày có khả năng lưu trữ hơn 60.000 tài liệu kích động và có khả năng “kêu gọi toàn dân xuống đường biểu tình lật đổ chế độ” từ … trong tù giỏi hơn bác sĩ Nguyễn Đan Quế?
Thế thì tại sao Blogger/Luật gia Anh ba Saigòn Phan Thanh Hải vẫn bị tiếp tục giam cầm không một văn bản giải thích tội phạm và đến bây giờ đứa con chào đời vẫn chưa thấy được mặt cha? Và còn biết bao nhiêu bản án vô lý, bất công, rừng rú đang tròng lên đầu những công dân Việt Nam yêu nước bởi cái gọi là đảng và nhà nước của “nhân dân”? Câu trả lời là: chế độ đã sợ hãi về viễn ảnh bùng nổ của quần chúng, của ngọn lửa cách mạng hoa lài trong việc bắt giữ bác sĩ Nguyễn Đan Quế."
Mở đầu bài tựa đề “Làn sóng Cách Mạng Hoa Lài” vừa được blog Dân chủ-Nhân quyền Cho VN phổ biến, tác giả Phạm Thiên Thơ phân tích hành động giới cầm quyền VN ráo riết trù dập những nhà bất đồng chính kiến trong nước hiện giờ chứng tỏ họ “lo sợ thật sự trước làn sóng Cách Mạng Hoa Lài”.
"Nhiều nguồn tin cho biết những tiếng nói yêu tự do dân chủ trong nước đang bị trù dập như LS Lê Trần Luật, Nhà báo tự do Tạ Phong Tần, KS Đỗ Nam Hải… Điều này thật sự cho thấy đảng Cộng sản VN đang lo sợ làn sóng cách mạng Hoa Lài khởi đầu từ Tunisia đã lan đến một số nước Bắc Phi, Trung Đông và đã giật sập một số nhà cầm quyền độc tài, làm cho những ai có tật hay giật mình như CSVN phải lo sợ đến phiên mình, nên họ gấp rút tung ra chiến dịch trấn áp gắt gao các nhà Dân chủ đối kháng trong nước có uy tín như HT Thích Quảng Độ, LM Nguyễn Văn Lý, BS Nguyễn Dan Quế… Điều này chứng tỏ Cộng sản đang lo sợ thật sự trước làn sóng cách mạng Hoa Lài."

“Những cú bất ngờ của Lịch sử”


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Đại sứ Michael Michalak trong một lần đến thăm BS NGuyễn Đan Quế . RFA file
Blog Hoàng Quang vừa phổ biến bài của nhà báo Nguyễn Minh Cần từ Mascơva đề cập tới “Mười bài học từ Cao Trào Cách Mạng Tunisia và Ai Cập”, mà bài học đầu tiên trong đó là
“Lịch Sử bao giờ cũng cho ta những cú bất ngờ”. Có lẽ chính vì “những cú bất ngờ ấy” – diễn ra từ xưa tới nay – khiến giới cầm quyền VN “thật sự lo sợ” khi “Hương Lài” đang lan toả đáng ngại tới Á Châu chăng ?
Qua Blog Hoàng Quang, nhà báo tự do Nguyễn Minh Cần phân tích “những cú bất ngờ của Lịch sử” ngay trong bài học đầu tiên như sau:
"…Thật thế ! Không cần phải đi xa hàng thế kỷ trước để đưa ra dẫn chứng, chỉ cần nêu ra những thí dụ trong vài chục năm gần đây thôi cũng đủ rõ. Có ai ngờ được rằng cái “đế quốc” cộng sản khổng lồ là Liên Bang Xô Viết, với 10 triệu đảng viên cộng sản, 20 triệu đoàn viên thanh niên cộng sản, 6 triệu quân tinh nhuệ, hàng triệu quân nội địa của bộ nội vụ, với bộ máy mật vụ KGB cực kỳ nhạy bén, với đủ các loại vũ trang cực kỳ tối tân, kể cả vũ khí hạt nhân cực mạnh… mà có thể sụp đổ nhẹ nhàng trước cuộc đấu tranh của quần chúng nhân dân hồi năm 91 thế kỷ trước? Có ai ngờ được rằng bức tường Berlin kiên cố như vậy đứng vững hàng chục năm trời mà sụp đổ chỉ trong một đêm? Có ai ngờ được rằng cuộc cách mạng nhung diễn tiến nhẹ nhàng đến thế trên đất nước Tiệp Khắc, Hungaria, Ba Lan, v.v…?
Khi mà Lịch sử đã chơi cho một “cú” bất ngờ thì mọi chỗ dựa của chế độ toàn trị sẽ tê liệt trước sức mạnh của quần chúng cách mạng…
Ông Nguyễn Minh Cần
Có ai ngờ được rằng nước Đức đã thống nhất hòa bình một cách êm dịu, trong lúc đó Cộng hòa Dân chủ Đức thì tiêu biến? Không ai ngờ được hết ! Và lần này cũng vậy, không ai ngờ vụ anh Mohamed Bouazizi, một chàng trai 26 tuổi, có học mà thất nghiệp phải đi bán hàng rong hoa quả để kiếm sống, vì quá uất ức khi chiếc xe hàng của anh bị cảnh sát tịch thu, anh đã tự thiêu ngày 17.12.2010, và ngọn lửa của cây đuốc sống đó đã biến thành một cơn bão lửa cách mạng thiêu trụi chế độ độc tài toàn trị thâm căn cố đế ở Tunisia, rồi lan sang tận Egypt làm sụp đổ cả “triều đại” Mubarak.
Vậy thì bài học đầu tiên là: chớ thấy chế độ độc tài toàn trị bề ngoài trông có vẻ nhất trí, thống nhất, mạnh mẽ, hùng cường dường như không gì lay chuyển nổi, với quân đội hùng hậu, công an mật vụ dày đặc, hung dữ, xảo quyệt, đảng, đoàn đông đảo làm hậu thuẫn vững vàng cho chế độ, v.v… mà sợ hãi ! Khi mà Lịch sử đã chơi cho một “cú” bất ngờ thì mọi chỗ dựa của chế độ toàn trị sẽ tê liệt trước sức mạnh của quần chúng cách mạng… Lẽ huyền bí của Lịch sử khó mà tiên đoán được !

Ngày càng lan rộng

Nhưng điều đáng nói ở đây là Cách Mạng Hoa Lài ấy – và những cuộc cách mạng khác hiện đang diễn ra - không giống như lâu nay, mà các biến cố đó diễn ra theo kiểu mới. Bài tựa đề “Cách Mạng Hoa Lài: Một kiểu cách mạng "Cuộc cách mạng lật đổ Tổng thống Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ở Tunisia và Tổng thống Hosni Mubarak ở Ai Cập trong mấy ngày đầu tháng 2 khiến cả thế giới sửng sốt. Sửng sốt, trước hết, vì sự bất ngờ; sau đó, vì tốc độ nhanh chóng ngoài sức tưởng tượng; và cuối cùng, vì những đặc điểm mới mẻ và có phần lạ lùng của chúng."

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Quảng trường lịch sử Thiên An Môn cũng không thiếu bóng cảnh sát. AFP
Theo bài blog vừa nói, trong khi vô số cuộc cách mạng của Thế kỷ 20, từ cách mạng vô sản, cách mạng giành độc lập của các quốc gia thuộc địa cho tới cách mạng phi-vô sản đều có một số đặc điểm chung là: Gắn liền với 1 đảng chính trị; gắn liền với 1 ý thức hệ; đảng chính trị ấy được tổ chức chặt chẽ, trải qua nhiều thách thức, đặt dưới sự lãnh đạo của cá nhân CS nổi bật như Lenin, Mao Trạch Đông, Hồ Chí Minh, Fidel Castro…hay những cá nhân giải thể CS như Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa…, thì phong trào cách mạng hiện giờ - từ “Hoa Lài” lan toả tới Ai Cập, những xứ Bắc Phi,Trung Đông khác rồi có dấu hiệu lan toả tới Á Châu, có những đặc điểm khác hẳn: Cách mạng thật sự tự phát của quần chúng do bị chế độ độc tài áp bức quá lâu, không gắn liền với ý thức hệ, không cương lĩnh, không thuộc guồng máy tổ chức nào cả. Bài blog lưu ý về sự lan toả của Cách mạng Hoa Lài:
"Chức năng điều hợp, vậy thôi. Chứ không phải là những nhà lãnh đạo. Đó là những cuộc nổi dậy của dân chúng, hoàn toàn có tính chất tự phát. Mở đầu cuộc cách mạng ở Tunisia không phải là một buổi ra mắt chính trị với những tuyên ngôn, tuyên cáo, thề nguyền, quyết tâm thư ồn ào. Mà chỉ là cái chết của một thanh niên 27 tuổi nghèo khó tên Mohamed Bouazizi.
Bán hàng ngoài đường, bị cảnh sát sách nhiễu và nhục mạ, anh tự thiêu để phản đối vào ngày 17 tháng 12 năm 2010. Chính ngọn lửa thiêu cháy anh cũng sẽ thiêu cháy cả chế độ độc tài của Tổng thống Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, khiến nhà độc tài này phải từ bỏ quyền hành từng nắm giữ trong cả 23 năm và chạy trốn vào ngày 14 tháng 1, đúng 10 ngày sau khi Mohamed Bouazizi chết vì các vết bỏng quá nặng."
Ngoài việc các cuộc cách mạng ở Tunisia và Ai Cập mang tính tự phát của quần chúng, không gắn liền với một ý thức hệ, cương lĩnh hay tổ chức nào cả, một yếu tố quan trọng góp phần thành công mà những cuộc cách mạng trước kia không có. Đó là:
Cuộc cách mạng khiến cả thế giới sửng sốt, trước hết, vì sự bất ngờ; sau đó, vì tốc độ nhanh chóng ngoài sức tưởng tượng; và cuối cùng, vì những đặc điểm mới mẻ và có phần lạ lùng của chúng.
Trích một bài blog
"... Những mạng truyền thông xã hội, từ facebook đến twitter, điện thoại di động, v.v…Chính việc làm ấy đã giúp người dân Ai Cập, đặc biệt giới trẻ, nhận thức được sức mạnh của kỹ thuật truyền thông hiện đại. Và họ đã sử dụng facebook như một thứ vũ khí hữu hiệu trong việc tập hợp lực lượng trong cuộc nổi dậy vừa qua. Đóng vai trò có khi còn quan trọng hơn facebook là điện thoại di động…Những đặc điểm vừa kể theo nhiều nhà nghiên cứu sẽ là những đặc điểm chung của các cuộc cách mạng thế kỷ 21…Chúng cũng giúp giải đáp nhiều thắc mắc từng dày vò những người Việt Nam hay ưu tư đến tự do, dân chủ và tiền đồ của đất nước..."
Riêng Blog Dân Làm Báo không quên nhấn mạnh tới một yếu tố quyết định, tạo điều kiện cho “Hương Lài” – một ngày nào đó – có thể lan toả trọn vẹn ở VN:
"Cách mạng tại Tunisia, Ai Cập tháng trước, tại Libya hôm nay hay có thể Việt Nam, Trung Quốc sáng mai không phải từ Twitter mà có, không phải do Twitter mà ra nhưng bằng lòng can đảm của những con người yêu nước, yêu tự do, dân chủ."

Lo ngại cho blogger Việt Nam

Hai tổ chức quốc tế quan tâm đến blogger Anh Ba Sài Gòn (trái) và Điếu Cày
Tổ chức nhân quyền Human Rights Watch (HRW) ở Hoa Kỳ kêu gọi chính phủ Việt Nam trả tự do cho ông Nguyễn Văn Hải (tức blogger Điếu Cày) và Phan Thanh Hải (blogger Anh Ba Sài Gòn).
Việc bắt giam blogger Anh Ba Sài Gòn diễn ra hôm 18/10, trong khi blogger Điếu Cày, dù đã hết hạn tù vì tội "trốn thuế", nhưng lại bị giam tiếp theo tội "tuyên truyền chống nhà nước".
Ông Phil Robertson, phó giám đốc phân ban châu Á của Human Rights Watch, phê phán: "Chính quyền Việt Nam không biết xấu hổ khi tạo dựng cáo buộc và biện minh cho việc giam giữ những người chỉ trích ôn hòa như Điếu Cày."
"Cuộc truy quét trước thềm Đại hội Đảng đang vào cao trào, đặt vào tầm ngắm những người chỉ trích chính phủ."
Theo Human Rights Watch, hai thành viên khác của CLB Nhà báo Tự do - Tạ Phong Tần và Uyên Vũ - đã bị công an giám sát chặt chẽ tại tư gia. Một nhà hoạt động khác, Đỗ Nam Hải, bị tạm giữ vào hôm 19/10 trước khi được thả.
Ông Robertson kêu gọi: "Chính phủ cần ghi nhận vai trò quan trọng của các blogger độc lập trong xã hội thay vì sách nhiễu và bỏ tù họ."
Trong khi đó, cũng vào hôm 22/10, Ủy ban Bảo vệ các Nhà báo (CPJ), đặt trụ sở ở New York, ra thông cáo bày tỏ lo ngại rằng chính quyền Việt Nam đang đàn áp nhiều blogger.
Bài của CPJ nhắc đến trường hợp của blogger Anh Ba Sài Gòn và Điếu Cày.
CPJ cũng bày tỏ lo ngại về vụ bắt giữ ông Phan Hà Bình, là Phó Tổng thư ký tòa soạn báo Tiền Phong –khu vực phía Nam, bút danh Hà Phan.
Truyền thông trong nước cho biết hôm 20/10, Viện KSND Tối cao đã phê chuẩn Quyết định khởi tố bị can và Lệnh bắt tạm giam đối với ông Phan Hà Bình để điều tra về hành vi “cưỡng đoạt tài sản”, theo Điều 135 Bộ luật Hình sự.
Ông Bình bị cáo buộc là bị công an bắt quả tang khi nhận 220 triệu đồng của một doanh nghiệp tại một nhà hàng hôm 13/10 tại TP. HCM.
Nhưng CPJ thì lo ngại rằng trước đây chính phủ Việt Nam "đã dùng những cáo buộc tương tự để bịt miệng giới truyền thông tiết lộ thông tin tiêu cực về những doanh nghiệp có nhiều quan hệ".
Nhiều người bị bắt
Cả hai tổ chức HRW và CPJ cũng nhắc đến trường hợp giảng viên Phạm Minh Hoàng, mang hai quốc tịch Việt Nam và Pháp, bị bắt hôm 13/08 theo Điều 79 Bộ luật Hình sự.
Ông Hoàng, và vợ, bị cáo buộc là thành viên của đảng Việt Tân mà Việt Nam xem là tổ chức khủng bố.
HRW cho biết vào ngày 26/10, ba nhà hoạt động - Đỗ Thị Minh Hạnh, Nguyễn Hoàng Quốc Hùng (cùng ở tỉnh Bình Dương) và Đoàn Huy Chương (tỉnh Đồng Nai) - sẽ bị đem ra xét xử vì tội "phá rối an ninh".
Cáo trạng nói ba người này nhận tiền của ông Trần Ngọc Thành (đứng đầu "Ủy ban bảo vệ người lao động Việt Nam" ở Ba Lan) để tổ chức rải truyền đơn "tuyên truyền xuyên tạc chống Nhà nước cộng hòa XHCN Việt Nam".
Họ bị bắt hồi tháng Hai năm nay, và bị cáo buộc "xúi giục" công nhân của một công ty giày da tỉnh Trà Vinh tổ chức đình công.
Còn theo Ủy ban bảo vệ người lao động Việt Nam, những người này đã tham gia giúp người dân đi khiếu kiện, trong khi ông Đoàn Huy Chương năm 2006 thành lập “Hiệp Hội Đoàn Kết Công Nông Việt Nam” và từng bị tù trước khi được thả năm 2008.
Hội nghị của Asean sẽ diễn ra ở Hà Nội ngày 28/10.
HRW kêu gọi các nước tham gia hội nghị này yêu cầu Việt Nam trả tự do cho blogger và những nhà hoạt động theo tinh thần nhân quyền ghi trong Hiến chương Asean.

Thành lập Bộ Tư lệnh Vùng 2 hải quân

Nhà giàn DK1 tại vùng biển gần quần đảo Trường Sa
Nhà giàn DK1 tại vùng biển gần quần đảo Trường Sa.
Lực lượng hải quân bảo vệ vùng biển dài hơn 300 cây số từ Bình Thuận đến Bạc Liêu vừa được nâng cấp thành Bộ Tư lệnh Vùng 2.
Trước đó vùng thềm lục địa nhiều tài nguyên dầu khí này được đặt dưới sự bảo vệ của Vùng 2 hải quân, mới thành lập ngày 28/9/2009.
Quyết định nâng cấp Vùng 2 thành Bộ Tư lệnh Vùng 2 cho thấy Việt Nam bắt đầu quan tâm đến việc đảm bảo tự do giao thông cho tàu biển quốc tế tại tuyến đường có tầm quan trọng chiến lược.
Cạnh đó là đảm bảo an ninh cho các nhà giàn (DK1) được dựng lên giữa biển, với nhiều mục đích sử dụng.
Phía Việt Nam gọi DK1 là cụm Kinh tế-Khoa học-Dịch vụ thuộc thềm lục địa phía Nam.
Đa số nhà giàn DK1 nằm ỏ vùng giáp danh giữa thềm lục địa Việt Nam với quần đảo Trường Sa.
Việt Nam đã xây tổng cộng 21 nhà giàn DK1, thông tin trên mạng hoangsa.org, nơi tập hợp những người nghiên cứu độc lập, cho hay.
15 nhà giàn đang được sử dụng, với 8 nhà giàn có bãi đỗ trực thăng trên nóc.
Các địa điểm này không đóng quân, chúng ở gần với các đảo thuộc quần đảo Trường Sa, hiện do Việt Nam kiểm soát.
Trụ sở của Bộ Tư lệnh Vùng 2 được đặt tại huyện Nhơn Trạch, tỉnh Đồng Nai.
Nhiệm vụ
Chưa thấy Việt Nam loan báo về thành phần nhân sự của Bộ Tư lệnh Vùng 2.
Còn cơ cấu chỉ huy của Vùng 2 hải quân trước đó gồm Đại tá Nguyễn Văn Tuyến, Chỉ huy trưởng, và Đại tá Mai Tiến Tuyên, Chính ủy vùng.
Nhiệm vụ của Vùng 2 hải quân đã được Đại tá Mai Tiến Tuyên nhắc tới, trong cuộc nói chuyện với báo giới năm 2009 như sau:
“Vùng 2 sẽ thực hiện các nhiệm vụ như bảo vệ, đảm bảo an toàn trên biển cho nhân dân và đường hàng hải quốc tế đi qua khu vực biển Đông".
Lực lượng Vùng 2 hải quân cũng sẽ tham gia tìm kiếm, cứu hộ, cứu nạn, hỗ trợ ngư dân khi gặp bão hoặc gặp nạn trên biển.
Việc chăm lo đời sống cho những người lính túc trực trên các nhà giàn DK1 cũng được Chỉ huy trưởng Vùng 2 nhắc đến.
Đảo Đá Nam thuộc quần đảo Trường Sa
Đảo Đá Nam thuộc quần đảo Trường Sa, hiện do Việt Nam nắm giữ.
Đó là cung cấp các phương tiện nghe nhìn, lắp trạm bắt sóng điện thoại thí điểm trên một số nhà giàn để lính hải quân có điều kiện liên lạc với gia đình, người thân ở đất liền.
Các vùng tuần tra
Hải quân Việt Nam có 42.000 quân, địa bàn tuần tra và bảo vệ trải dài trên 5 vùng biển chính, từ Vịnh Bắc Bộ đến đảo Phú Quốc (Kiên Giang).
Theo phân công, Bộ Tư lệnh Vùng 2 hải quân sẽ đảm đương bảo vệ chủ quyền vùng biển từ Nam Bình Thuận đến Bạc Liêu, và thềm lục địa phía Nam.
Quan trọng hàng đầu, báo trong nước đưa tin, là vùng đặt các nhà giàn dùng để khai thác kinh tế, nghiên cứu khoa học và phát triển dịch vụ.
Phương thức hoạt động của hải quân đã được lãnh đạo Quốc hội nhắc tới trong buổi lễ kỷ niệm ngày thành lập Hải quân Việt Nam gần đây.
“Nhiệm vụ của Hải quân là quản lý và kiểm soát chặt chẽ các vùng biển, đảo thuộc chủ quyền quốc gia của Việt Nam, giữ gìn an ninh, chống lại mọi hành vi vi phạm chủ quyền, quyền chủ quyền, quyền tài phán và lợi ích quốc gia của Việt Nam,” ông Nguyễn Phú Trọng, khi ấy đang là chủ tịch Quốc hội, nói.
Người đứng đầu Quốc hội Việt Nam, nay kiêm thêm chức Tổng bí thư Đảng, chỉ thị Quân chủng Hải quân chuẩn bị tinh thần tác chiến, nếu tình huống đòi hỏi thì “sẵn sàng hiệp đồng chiến đấu với các lực lượng khác nhằm đánh bại mọi cuộc tiến công trên hướng biển".
BREGA, Libya (Reuters) – Forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi attacked the oil export terminal of Brega in the first sign of a counter-offensive by Libya's leader in the rebel-controlled east, which rebels said they had repulsed.
Sanousi Jadran, a rebel volunteer fighter, said Gaddafi's forces backed by foreign mercenaries had hit the town early in the morning.
"They bombarded us with heavy weapons including air strikes," he told Reuters. "You see the Israeli attacks on Palestinians? This was worse."
At a news conference in Benghazi, the rebel National Libyan Council called for U.N.-backed air strikes on foreign mercenaries used by Gaddafi against his own people.
Hafiz Ghoga, a spokesman for the council based in the rebel-held city of Benghazi, told a news conference Gaddafi was using "African mercenaries in Libyan cities" which amounted to an invasion of the oil producing North African nation.
"We call for specific attacks on strongholds of these mercenaries," he said, but added: "The presence of any foreign forces on Libyan soil is strongly opposed. There is a big difference between this and strategic air strikes."
"The call will be on the United Nations and on any organization supporting the February 17 revolution to have air strikes on the places and strongholds of the mercenaries ... used against civilians," Ghoga said.
A former Libyan justice minister, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, will be chairman of the National Libyan Council which will have 30 members and be based in Benghazi for now but would later move to Tripoli, said Ghoga.
Another coalition member said there were no plans to set up a separate eastern oil marketing unit as this would divide Libya. An official in a state owned oil company in east Libya had said that such a plan was under consideration.
Arab television and rebel officers said earlier the Libyan military operation was successful but a spokesman for the opposition coalition in Benghazi said Gaddafi forces had fled.
Anti-Gaddafi forces have been firmly in charge of eastern Libya up to Brega and some areas beyond, since shortly after anti-government protests erupted in mid-February.
"They tried to take Brega this morning, but they failed. It is back in the hands of the revolutionaries. He (Gaddafi) is trying to create all kinds of psychological warfare to keep these cities on edge," Mustafa Gheriani, a spokesman for the rebel February 17th Coalition, told Reuters.
"NAIL IN HIS COFFIN"
"We are probably going to call for foreign help, probably air strikes at strategic locations that will put the nail in his (Gaddafi's) coffin," he said.
On reports of violence in nearby Ajdabiyah, he said the town was "basically stable and our people are grouping to deal with any major assault. For now, it is still just hit and run."
Libyan state television said Gaddafi forces still controlled the airport and seaport at Brega, contradicting rebel accounts.
Coinciding with the offensive, state television broadcast images that it said showed security officers killed in the east. It showed about 10 corpses with their hands tied behind their backs and with pools of blood around their heads.
The assaults appear to have been the most significant military moves in the east by Gaddafi since the uprising began two weeks ago and set off a confrontation that Washington says could descend into a civil war unless Gaddafi steps down.
Brega residents also said the offensive had been repulsed.
"Gaddafi forces attacked the Brega oil terminal and the airport and they held them for a couple of hours. The youth of Brega heard about it on al Jazeera, organized themselves and started attacking them back," Fatma told Reuters by phone.
"They took back the oil facilities and the airport and managed to shoot down a helicopter. Gaddafi forces were pushed out six kms down the coast road west of Brega where they are still fighting them," she said, declining to give her full name.
Her account was confirmed by resident Idriss Ben Hmeid, an oil engineer.
Early reports said 14 were dead in Marsa El Brega, that random bombardment of the town was taking place and more than 500 army vehicles were involved in the operation.
"It's true. There was aerial bombardment of Brega and Gaddafi's forces have taken it," Mohamed Yousef, an officer in Ajdabiyah, 75 km (45 miles) from Brega, said earlier.
A Reuters witness said an anti-aircraft gun installation had been newly set up on the sea front in Libya's second city of Benghazi, its guns pointing out to sea. One man was also standing with a shoulder launch missile system.
Within an hour of the reported offensive, new roadblocks were erected around Benghazi.
At the courthouse on Benghazi's seafront, used to administer the city, a rebel official addressed a crowd, saying: "Brega city was attacked by Gaddafi forces, and our revolutionary forces from Ajdabiyah repulsed them and freed Brega."
"Gaddafi forces fled west. The revolutionaries killed about 10 of Gaddafi's forces and arrested many more," he told a crowd of about 2000 who chanted "God is Greatest."
Hundreds of armed volunteers amassed at the main road into Benghazi, some planned on staying to defend while others planned to go to Brega. "I'm waiting here to get to Brega, I'm ready 100 percent," said Ahmed Ali, 19, with a new semi-automatic rifle.
(Additional reporting by Mohammed Abbas in Benghazi and Maria Golovnina in Tripoli, Writing by Edmund Blair and Peter Millership; Editing by Giles Elgood)
Rebels push back Libya regime attack on oil port

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/af_libya;

BREGA, Libya – Opponents of Moammar Gadhafi repelled an attack by the Libyan leader's forces trying to retake a key coastal oil installation in a topsy-turvy battle Wednesday in which shells splashed in the Mediterranean and a warplane bombed a beach where rebel fighters were charging over the dunes. At least six people were killed in the fighting.
The assault on the Brega oil port was the first major regime counteroffensive against the opposition-held eastern half of Libya, where the population backed by mutinous army units rose up and drove out Gadhafi's rule over the past two weeks.
For the past week, pro-Gadhafi forces have been focusing on the west, securing his stronghold in the capital Tripoli and trying to take back nearby rebel-held cities with only mixed success.
But the foray east against opposition-held Brega appeared to stumble. The pro-Gadhafi forces initially recaptured the oil facilities Wednesday morning. But then a wave of opposition citizen militias drove them out again, cornering them in a nearby university campus where they battled for several hours until the approximately 200 Gadhafi loyalists fled, according to an Associated Press reporter at the scene.
In the capital, Gadhafi vowed, "We will fight until the last man and woman." He lashed out against Europe and the United States for their pressure on him to step down, warning that thousands of Libyans will die if U.S. and NATO forces intervene in the conflict.
The United States is moving naval and air forces closer to Libyan shores and is calling for Gadhafi to give up power immediately. The U.S., Britain and other NATO countries are drawing up contingency plans to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent Gadhafi's air forces from striking rebels. But the idea has been rejected by Russia, which holds a veto-wielding seat on the U.N. Security Council.
"We will not accept an intervention like that of the Italians that lasted decades," Gadhafi said, referring to Italy's colonial rule early in the 20th Century. "We will not accept a similar American intervention. This will lead to a bloody war and thousands of Libyans will die if America and NATO enter Libya."
Opposition members said they believe Gadhafi was pulling up reinforcements from bases deep in the deserts of southwestern Libya, flying them to the fronts on the coast.
Soon after sunrise Wednesday, a large force of Gadhafi loyalists in around 50 SUVS, some mounted with machine guns, descended on opposition-held Brega, 460 miles (740 kilometers) east of Tripoli along the Mediterranean. The force caught a small opposition contingent guarding the site by surprise and it fled, said Ahmed Dawas, an anti-Gadhafi fighter at a checkpoint outside the port.
The pro-Gadhafi forces seized the port, airstrip and the oil facilities where about 4,000 personnel work, as regime warplanes hit an ammunition depot on the outskirts of the nearby rebel-held city of Ajdabiya, witnesses said.
Midmorning, the opposition counterattacked. Anti-Gadhafi fighters with automatic weapons sped out of Ajdabiya in pickup trucks, heading for Brega, 40 miles away (70 kilometers) away. Dawas said they retook the oil facilities and airstrip. Other witnesses reported regime forces were surrounded by rebels. The sound of screaming warplanes and the crackle of heavy gunfire could be heard as the witnesses spoke to The Associated Press by phone.
By the afternoon, the regime fighters fled the oil facilities and holed up in a nearby university campus, where they came under siege by anti-Gadhafi fighters, according to an Associated Press reporter at the scene.
Machine gun and automatic weapons fire rattled in the air, and shells lobbed from the campus went over the anti-Gadhafi side to splash in the Mediterranean.
At one point, a warplane from Gadhafi's airforce swooped overhead and an explosion was heard. A witness said it struck an empty stretch of dunes near the battle, sending a plume of sand into the air but causing no injuries in an apparent attempt to intimidate the anti-Gadhafi side.
But opposition citizen militias poured into the battle, arriving from Ajdabiya and armed with assault rifles. They moved through the dunes along the beach against the campus next to a pristine blue-water Mediterranean beach. Those without guns picked up bottles and put wicks in them to make firebombs.
An ambulance driver who was briefly held by the pro-Gadhafi force and then released told AP they numbered about 200 fighters. The forces came to Brega from Sirte, Gadhafi's main remaining stronghold in central Libya, 200 miles (320 kilometers) west of the oil port, said the driver, Jumaa Shway.
At least six opposition fighters were killed and 18 others wounded in the fighting, their bodies covered with sand thrown up by shells bursting in the dunes, doctors at Brega hospital said. Angry crowds gathered around them at Brega's hospital, chanting, "The blood of martyrs will not go in vain."
In the late afternoon, the pro-Gadhafi force fled the campus, and opposition fighters were seen combing through the university buildings. Automatic gunfire was still heard in the distance, but it appeared the regime troops were withdrawing. The campus grounds and dunes between it and the beach were littered with casings and shells.
In Ajdabiya, people geared up to defend the city, fearing the pro-Gadhafi forces would move on them next. At the gates of the city, hundreds of residents took up positions on the road from Brega, armed with Kalashnikovs and hunting rifles, along with a few rocket-propelled grenade launchers. They set up two large rocket launchers and an anti-aircraft gun in the road. But by the evening, there was no sign of attack there.
Brega and nearby Ajdabiya are the farthest west points in the large contiguous swath of eastern Libya extending all the way to the Egyptian border that fell into opposition hands in the uprising that began Feb. 15. Ajdabiya is about 90 miles (150 kilometers) from Benghazi, Libya's second largest city and the nerve center of the opposition.
Brega is the second-largest hydrocarbon complex in OPEC-member Libya. Amid the turmoil, exports from its ports have all but stopped with no ships coming to load up with crude and natural gas. Crude production in the southeastern oil fields that feed into the facility has been scaled back because storage facilities at Brega were filling up. General Manager Fathi Eissa said last week the facility has had to scale back production dramatically from 90,000 barrels of crude a day to just 11,000.
The unrest in Libya — which ranks about 17th among world oil producers and has Africa's largest proven oil reserves — has sparked a major spike in world oil prices. Overall crude production has dropped from 1.6 million barrels per day to 850,000.
Gadhafi's regime has been left in control of Libya's northwest corner, centered on Tripoli, but even here several cities have fallen into rebel hands after residents rose up in protests, backed by mutinous army units and drove out Gadhafi loyalists.
In recent days, loyalists succeeded in regaining two of those towns — Gharyan, a strategic town in the Nafusa mountains south of Tripoli, and Sabratha, a small town west of the capital.
But opposition fighters successfully repulsed attacks by pro-Gadhafi forces on several others: the key city of Zawiya outside the capital; Misrata, Libya's third largest city east of Tripoli; and Zintan, a town further southwest in the Nafusa mountains.
The regime may be bringing in more forces from regions it still dominates in the sparsely populated deserts in the southwest.
Residents of the southwestern oasis town of Sebha — a key Gadhafi stronghold with military bases 400 miles (560 kilometers) south of Tripoli — reported heavy movement at the airport there Tuesday night, said Abdel-Bari Zwei, one of the opposition activists in Ajdabiya in touch with sympathizers in Sebha. Zwei said it is believed some of those forces were involved in the offensive against Brega.
In his speech Wednesday, Gadhafi lashed out at international moves against his regime, including the freezing of his and other Libyan assets abroad — an act he called "piracy" — and efforts by Europe to send aid to opposition-held Benghazi. He said any Libyan who accepts international aid was guilty of "high treason" because it "opens Libya to colonialism."
In a pointed message to Europe, he warned, "There will be no stability in the Mediterranean if there is no stability in Libya."
"Africans will march to Europe without anyone to stop them. The Mediterranean will become a center for piracy like Somalia," he said. Gadhafi's regime has worked closely with Italy and other European countries to stop African migrants who use Libya as a launching point to slip into Europe.
He also threatened to bring in Chinese and Indian companies to replace Western companies in Libya's oil sector if the West keeps up its pressure on him. European firms are heavily involved in Libya's oil production.
____
Michael reported from Tripoli, Libya.

Thứ Hai, 28 tháng 2, 2011

Social Media Dialogue with Dr. Ahmed Ghanim of Egypt's Masrawy.com

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/157005.htm
Interview
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
February 23, 2011




MR. GHANIM: Madam Secretary, thank you for taking the time to sit with me today.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much for having me.
MR. GHANIM: More than 6,500 – that’s the number of questions – were received in only two days from Egyptian people through Facebook, Twitter, Masrawy.com, another reminder of the power of the internet.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes.
MR. GHANIM: So many questions, actually thousands of questions, and so little time. So let’s start with the first question.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.
MR. GHANIM: Our first question was Tweeted by May Ahmed. She is a 25-year-old Egyptian woman. She asks: What is the purpose of this dialogue, actually this social media dialogue with Egyptian youth? And after you communicate with us to better understand what we are looking for, do you think that this interaction will help change the American policies toward Egypt?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, let me thank her and the more than 6,500 other Egyptians who have sent questions, the vast majority of whom are young people using social media, as you just described. The purpose of this is to communicate directly, to hear from thousands of Egyptians about what is on your minds, what you are hoping to have happen now that this incredibly inspiring extraordinary moment in history has occurred.
And the United States supports the aspirations of the Egyptian people. I have said that many times in the past. Late last year, I gave a speech in Doha where I said that the governments in the region were not listening to young people. So I want to do that, and I hope that leaders will do more of what we are doing today – listen to your people directly. That doesn’t mean we will always agree. I don't know any two people who agree on everything, let alone governments and people or between nations.
But listen, and then let’s try to figure out how we can realize the hopes and dreams that were expressed in Tahrir Square and that are so important for Egypt, such a great country that now has a chance to demonstrate what it means to be a democracy and to move forward into a better future.
MR. GHANIM: That’s great, because we have a lot of questions to listen to. Our next two back-to-back are video questions on the subject of foreign policy. Mohamed and Mahmod ask about the American stand on the Egyptian revolution in their video submission. First, we will see Mohamed’s video question.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Good.
QUESTION: [(Via translation.) My question is: Does America really support democracy? If yes indeed, why the U.S. was late in its support for the Egyptian revolution?]
MR. GHANIM: Another question came from Tahrir Square from Mahmod. Let’s see what Mahmod has to ask.
QUESTION: [(Via translation.) The attitude of the U.S. during the Egyptian revolution was to support the Egyptian regime first. Then, when the revolution turned successful, the U.S. switched sides and supported the Egyptian youth and the youth revolution, and the U.S. said that we learn from Egyptian youth. Why was such delay?]
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, to the two young men, thank you for your questions. And let me say that I would respectfully suggest that the United States supported the aspirations of the Egyptian people. And what we hoped for is what happened. There was no organized violence beyond the terrible incidents that were brought under control, thankfully, with loss of life, which is regrettable, but not the kind of military response that we have seen in other countries.
So we wanted to see no violence against the protesters, and we said that over and over again, publicly and privately. We wanted to see the aspirations of the Egyptian people, particularly young people, realized. And then we advocated from the very beginning for a reform process that would lead to an Egyptian model of democracy. So I think that we were walking a balance, because we wanted to be sure that our messages did not push anyone into doing something that we disagreed with, namely violence, which we tried to, in every way possible, prevent.
So we support democracy in Egypt. But we’re also aware, having been our own democracy for now more than 220 years, that it takes real effort to implement a democracy that is sustainable. And we are now working to try to promote that, reaching out to people who we think can play an important role going forward.
And finally, I would say that I’m sure that part of the questions or the meaning of the questions from two young men is that the United States was a partner and ally of Egypt for many years. And in those years, whether it was a Republican or a Democratic president, we consistently spoke out for democracy. We did it publicly, we did it privately. Unfortunately, the United States was not able to bring that about. But the Egyptian people were, and that is as it should be because it is the future of Egypt that should be led by the Egyptian people themselves.
MR. GHANIM: Right, thank you. Here we have another English audio question submitted to our website by Yaser Abdulfatah. He’s an Egyptian American. Let’s hear what Yaser has to say.
QUESTION: Greetings, Mrs. Clinton. My name is Yaser Abdulfatah, and I’m an American Egyptian. I spent the first half of my life in Egypt and the other half in the States. My love for both countries is equally divided. As a U.S. citizen, I believe that human rights, democracy, and protecting others who cannot protect themselves are some of our great values we enjoy in the States. I also believe that the current Administration or any previous Administration is or was fully aware of the human rights violations, corruptions of the previous Mubarak’s regime in Egypt.
My question is, over the last 30 years, why the American Administration shook hands with such oppressive regime and treated them like we treat other true democratic government? Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Yaser, it’s wonderful to hear from you and because you have experience in both Egypt and America you will be an especially important voice going forward. The United States has relations with many countries whose values we do not always agree with and whose actions we often criticize. But we do have relationships with China, with Russia, with Egypt in the past that are very complicated and which operate on several levels at once. So while we do have areas of cooperation, as we did in keeping peace between Israel and Egypt for 30 years, which I think saved lives which I think was important. We also continued to criticize and did so publicly and privately.
I personally, because I was honored to be first lady and my husband was president, and now serving as Secretary of State in this capacity – I personally know how strongly the United States did speak out on behalf of reforms, ending corruption, ending human rights abuses. We were not successful. I mean, I will be very honest with you. Our efforts, whether they were in public or in private, did not change the regime. And as we do with other countries, such as China – which we just had a visit from President Hu Jintao – we disagree completely with their human rights policy. We say so over and over again. But we also try to maintain relationships; that’s what we did with Egypt for 30 years.
But we are very excited, inspired, and hopeful that the Egyptian people themselves – thanks in large measure to young people who know what democracy looks like, what economic opportunity looks like – have been able to bring about this change.
And the final point I would make is, as Yaser pointed out, democracy is not just an election. We have seen elections. We saw one in Iran which did not lead to freedom or respect for human rights for the Iranian people. So what Egypt is now grappling with is how to have a sustainable, enduring democracy, where yes, the rights of minorities are protected, the rights of women are protected, you have an independent judiciary, an independent and free media, including social media, where the economic shackles are thrown off so that young people can start businesses without having to pay off bribes to government officials. There’s so much now to be done, and the United States stands ready to assist in every way possible.
MR. GHANIM: Yeah, that brings me to a lot of questions received through our website, that a lot of people saying or thinking that when the United States talks about minority rights or women rights in Egypt, that’s at some kind of interference with the Egyptian affairs.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I hope that’s not how it’s perceived because we do believe human rights are universal rights. I went to China 16 years ago and said, “Women’s rights are human rights.” The United States believes that. Now, it took us time to get to the point where we are today. But we know that if a country doesn’t recognize minority rights and human rights, including women’s rights, you will not have the kind of stability and prosperity that is possible. So we hope that as Egypt looks at its own future that it takes advantage of all of the people’s talents.
What was so immensely moving to me as I followed closely everything happening in Tahrir Square – and you were there, as you told me – is that it was Muslims and Copts. It was men and women. It was every Egyptian who is a human being created by God, our Creator, who was there saying I deserve respect, my dignity deserves to be given what my government has denied me – the right to be a full human being.
And I personally believe that it is the position of the United States that seeing that outpouring on behalf of all Egyptians, that those who would want to say, oh, no, we can’t respect the minorities of our Copt Christian brothers and sisters – oh, no, the women who were in Tahrir Square do not deserve to have their rights recognized either – I believe that would be a step backwards.
MR. GHANIM: But the Christians of Egypt themselves, they refuse to be called a minority.
SECRETARY CLINTON: I agree with that. I agree with that. They are fully Egyptian and they should be integrated into the entire society, as they historically have been. But I don’t think it’s a surprise to some of your viewers and listeners that there are those who do not see women and do not see their Christian community as being fully Egyptian in that way, as your question implied. And my point is that I hope that as this revolution moves forward into the hard work of creating and keeping a democracy, that everyone will have a place at the table.
MR. GHANIM: Sure. You were mentioning a few minutes ago the effort that made by the United States to advance the democracy in Egypt, which brings me to a question posted on Facebook by Abdul Aziz – he’s a 17-year-old male from Cairo Egypt – asks: “Were there any connections or meetings between the United States Administration and the youth of Egypt that called for the revolution supporting their effort before, during, or even after the revolution?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as many people know, the United States supported civil society inside Egypt. We gave grants that the government did not like to support union organizing, to support organizing on behalf of political opposition to the regime. That goes back many years. And we tried to give support where we could, despite government rejection, so that people would get access to information and training. But the United States had nothing to do with the uprising, the revolution that we are now witnessing in Egypt. That was led by, organized by, run by Egyptians themselves, starting with young people. And in fact, I’ve heard from older Egyptians who were activists, who were opponents, who were human rights defenders in Egypt; they didn’t even know that it was happening until it was happening.
So it wasn’t only the United States, but many Egyptians themselves who were watching with great admiration as young people stood up for themselves. And we have, of course, provided many of the tools. I mean, Facebook and Twitter, even the internet, are American inventions, and we are proud that these American inventions are helping to connect people up around democracy and human rights and freedom and an agenda that will lead to a better life in Egypt.
MR. GHANIM: That’s great. And now we have another question regarding Tahrir Square. May Hasannen – she’s a 24-year-old young woman from Alexandria – posted on Masrawy.com asking: Do you think that the scenes from Tahrir Square of the young Middle Easterns protesting in peace will help change the stereotype of Muslims and Arabs in America?
SECRETARY CLINTON: That is a great question, and I think the answer is absolutely yes. We all live with stereotypes, and I admit and accept that many Americans have stereotypes of Egyptians or of Muslims, and I believe that many Egyptians and Muslims have stereotypes about the United States. I mean, one of the reasons President Obama went to Cairo to deliver his very important historic speech in June of 2009 is that he wanted to speak directly to Muslims everywhere, and he wanted to do it in the capital of the most important Arab nation, and he wanted to send a message to the Mubarak government, all at the same time.
So yes, I do think that the fact that the demonstrations in Tahrir Square were well organized, they were peaceful, they had everyone basically promoting the outcome which we have now celebrated, sent a very positive message. It also repudiates the message of extremists like al-Qaida. Al-Qaida’s position is there is no such thing as peaceful protest; there is no such thing as democracy. Well, I hope they were watching on television as Egyptian young people proved them wrong on both of those points.
MR. GHANIM: Okay. Do you think there is also political stereotypes from the American officials to the Middle Eastern states in general?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I think that there are often stereotypes between individual people and between governments and nations. And I think part of what social media is doing is breaking down stereotypes. The fact that somebody in Tahrir Square sends out a message by Twitter means that everybody in the world who wishes to can access that. And all of the sudden, people are saying, boy, I can connect with that young man or that young women; I’m reading from a tweet in Tahrir Square; I’m looking at a Facebook page from a young Egyptian university graduate who is saying he wants a good job because he’s worked hard all of his life and he wants to get ahead in his country. I feel the same way in America, some young person can say.
So I think that the connectivity of social media may be one of the great tools, not just for organizing protests, as we saw in Tahrir Square, as we saw even before that in Tunisia, but I think it’s also a way for people to break down stereotypes and divisions between them. Whatever differences we have, by ethnicity or religion or race or anything else by which we define ourselves, 99.8 percent of who we are as human beings is the same. So I think it’s a very good thing that those stereotypes are slowly being broken down.
MR. GHANIM: But after 30 years of dealing with a dictator like Mubarak, 25 years with Ben Ali, 42 years with Qadhafi, I’m sure that a lot of political stereotypes creating inside – created inside the American Administration when it deals with Egypt or Tunisia or Libya. Now you’re facing a new reality that you have to break the stereotype and deal with the revolution, deal with people that they don’t take bribes; they told the people that they look for their country first before looking for themselves. Do you think, from your side as an American official, it will be easy to break this stereotype, political stereotype?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, it’s a stereotype I’m very glad we have broken, because, as I was saying earlier, we have to deal with the world as it is. The days when the United States would say, well, we’re not going to deal with this country because we don’t agree with them on whatever the basis was, those days are over. We try to deal with everybody, with very few exceptions. And some governments we’re in agreement with and some governments we’re not. But what we believe is that democracy done right – not aborted, not hijacked, which can happen in young democracies – democracy done right is the best for the people and it’s the best for the United States. That doesn’t mean we will always agree. We didn’t always agree with the undemocratic regimes that are now moving off the stage of history. But we want to have a relationship and we want to have an ability to interact and, where appropriate, to assist.
But I think it’s also important, as we look at the future, to recognize that this is a new world we’re all in together. Even in our country, political movements are coming up from the grassroots. So all of us are going to have to get used to a different kind of political relationship. I think it will be easier for young people, young people around the world, because you’re going to be so much more used to doing it than the older generation of which I am a part, obviously. But I think we all should be extremely excited and happy to have broken through some of the obstacles that stood in the way of democracy taking root and flowering in the Arab world. And my hope is that it does not get hijacked, either by a return to dictatorship or by an imposition of extremism or any other reason in between.
The final point I wanted to make about the previous 30-year relationship is that it was very good that – I know that time seems like it was very long, but it was very good that in a relatively short period of time, there was a peaceful transition. And because we had in our government a relationship with people in the former Egyptian Government, we could send messages like do not use violence, stop those who are using violence, let this peaceful protest go on, it is time to make a change and a transition – we had a relationship. And we could then send in messages, and I think some of those messages had an impact. It was behind the scenes, but it was part of our effort to see a peaceful outcome here. So there was something that we could rely on coming from the past that I think was important in the moment of the demonstrations.
MR. GHANIM: All righty. And regarding the upcoming change in Egypt, Amr Allam, a 36-year-old male from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, posted a video question, Arabic video question, about the upcoming changes in Egypt. Let’s see what Amr has to say in his Arabic video question.
QUESTION: [(Via translation.) Does the U.S. Administration prefer to see the presence of a true democratic system in Egypt capable of ensuring stability and peace in the region, or does it prefer to see only a partial appeasement that put on the face of a democracy but only to serve its own interests over those of the people of other nations?]
SECRETARY CLINTON: We are looking for a true democracy. And we know that getting to a strong, stable, enduring democracy will take time. And we know that it’s important to reform the constitution, to pass new laws, to set up real political parties, to hold elections. But that’s just the beginning, because then the people who are elected need to stay true to democracy. And very often in new democracies, there become points where those who have been elected say, “Well, I know everything, and my way is the right way.” And all of a sudden you see the democracy being taken away.
We want to see a true democracy, where people have the right to express themselves, to debate, to dialog, to have opposing viewpoints, but then they come together to reach compromise and a consensus about how to move forward. And from our long experience with democracy, it is not easy. I’ll be very honest with our viewers and our listeners. This is hard. I disagree strongly with people on the opposite side of the political spectrum from me. I have supported candidates who have won, and I have supported candidates who have lost. I ran for President against Barack Obama and I lost.
But now I’m working with him, because in a democracy you have to get beyond the elections, and you have to keep working for the common good of all the people, and you have to have strong laws against corruption. You have to have an open economic system. All of this will take some time. But I am absolutely convinced that given the intelligence, the energy, the determination that I have seen from young Egyptians in the last month, I have no doubt in my mind that this can be done as long as people do not get exhausted, frustrated, give up too soon, because the process is sometimes very hard to deal with. And you keep thinking it needs to go faster, particularly when you’re young. We need to get there more quickly.
Be patient, persistent, stay committed to the goal of democracy, work to build the institutions that will be necessary for true Egyptian democracy. The United States wants to have a relationship with a democratic Egypt. Will we always agree? No. But we don’t always agree with some of the democratic countries we’ve been dealing with for centuries, we don’t always agree. So we are firmly behind a democratic Egypt.
MR. GHANIM: Okay, and actually regarding the democracy and the shape of democracy, Ahmed Ali is a 29-year-old male from Cairo posted on Masrawy.com asking: What would be the reaction of the United States if Muslim Brotherhood gained power in Egypt through a true democratic election?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, let me say that it’s up to the Egyptian people who they decide to elect and what the rules are for political parties running for elections, that is up to the Egyptian people. And I think that any party that is committed to nonviolence, committed to democracy, committed to the rights of all Egyptians, whoever they are, should have the opportunity to compete for Egyptian votes.
So the United States supports a process. We don’t pick winners or losers, but we do have some experience from having worked with many new democracies over many decades now. And so if a political party, whoever they are, believes in democracy and doesn’t just believe it’s one election one time and then we take over because we know best for every Egyptian, then that’s up to the Egyptian people.
But we don’t want to see any political party or any ideology try to hijack the process. So I think there need to be safeguards built in within the constitution and the laws of Egypt to make sure that it’s a true democracy and that one election will be followed by another election which will be followed by another election and that there will be term limits. Because too often, when people get elected, they think of themselves as being the only person who can serve a country and they then never want to have another election. They try to change the constitution and change the laws. So there’s a lot of built-in safeguards, but then it’s up to the Egyptian people to chart their own democratic future.
MR. GHANIM: Okay, hundreds of questions were asked about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One question came to us from Ahmed Khatab. He’s a 21-year-old male from Cairo. His question is: Don’t you think that the latest American veto was just a clear reminder that the United States loses any credibility as a fair and honest partner in the Middle East peace process?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I hope not. And here’s why: The United States has spent a great deal of time and effort in, first, helping to bring about peace between Israel and Egypt, which I think was in the best interest of both countries; bringing about peace between Israel and Jordan, which, again, I think was good for both countries. And we are absolutely committed to peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
And we believe the only way that’s going to happen is through direct negotiations. Somebody from the outside cannot dictate it and have either side agree to it. They have to decide themselves as to how they’re going to resolve all these difficult issues, end the conflict between them. And I am absolutely determined, as my husband was before me, as President Obama is today, to do everything we can to bring that about. That is why it doesn’t belong in the United Nations because the United Nations cannot make it happen. It can only happen if the two decide they’re going to make it happen. So we are determined to do everything we can.
And I happen to believe that right now, it is in both the Israeli and the Palestinian interests to redouble their efforts to reach a peace agreement. The work that has been going on by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank for economic opportunity to reform their institutions is very positive and is laying the groundwork for a state. I want to see the Palestinian people with their own democratic state. Israel understandably wants to make sure it has security. I want to see that for the Israeli people. There is a way here that we can come to a deal, but the two sides have to want it. The United States, Egypt, nobody can want it more than they can. They have to make it happen.
MR. GHANIM: Okay. Our final question: If you can send one message to the Egyptian youth, what would you – what it would be?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, that I am very proud of what Egyptian young people have done. You have set such an extraordinary example of nonviolent, peaceful protest. We have a history of that in our own country. That’s how African Americans got the right to vote because of Dr. Martin Luther King and what we believed in. We saw it in India, which became the world’s largest democracy because of Gandhi and nonviolence. I have always believed that nonviolent protest, well-organized and disciplined as I saw in Egypt, will bring down dictators, will change laws, will change the future.
So I begin with an expression of great pride in what I’ve seen in the young people of Egypt. I would follow that by saying that I hope you will stay engaged and involved. And I hope you will understand that having brought down a regime and having made it clear you will settle for nothing other than democracy, that you understand it’s going to take commitment and determination to translate the energy and the spirit of Tahrir Square into the day-to-day work of building a democracy.
And your country needs you. Your country needs you more than ever. And we will stand with you. We want to be your partners. We are inspired by you and we believe in you. And the United States is ready to assist in any way that would be appropriate.
MR. GHANIM: Thank you. We have – still have thousands of questions, but we are out of time.
SECRETARY CLINTON: (Laughter.)
MR. GHANIM: So on behalf of thousands of young Egyptian people, also made it or shared in this dialogue, thank you very much for your time and thank you for your support.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much, and good luck and God’s blessings to you all.
MR. GHANIM: Thank you.



PRN: 2011/267
NEW YORK – How does a country recover from 40 years of destruction by an unchallenged tyrant? Many groups will demand accountability and representation, in a situation more reminiscent of the Balkans than Egypt, Dirk Vandewalle writes in this week’s Newsweek.
• Libya will begin afresh after Gaddafi, in a comprehensive reconstruction of everything civic, political, legal, and moral that makes up a society and its government. • Getting Libya back on its feet will be an unwieldy, and probably fractious, process in which many scores are settled against those who once supported the Gaddafi regime. • The blueprint for a dramatic restructuring of Libya contained in Gaddafi’s ‘Green Book' has been calamitous for the country. • Muammar Gaddafi never envisioned that his rule would come to an end. “The Revolution Everlasting” was inscribed everywhere, from bridges to water bottles • As the confrontation between Gaddafi's old revolution and the new, popular one intensified, the question of what a post-Gaddafi Libya look like assumed great urgency.
Libya was on the brink of tectonic change as NEWSWEEK went to press, with the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in a state of dramatic fulmination and ruin. As we watch that country become a patchwork of liberated zones and violently defended redoubts of the regime, we should be concerned about what a post-Gaddafi transition will mean, given the fact that the man has hollowed-out the Libyan state, eviscerated all opposition in Libyan society, and, in effect, created a political tabula rasa on which a newly free people will now have to scratch out a future.
Libya will begin afresh after Gaddafi, in a comprehensive reconstruction of everything civic, political, legal, and moral that makes up a society and its government. But it remains dauntingly unclear where new leadership will come from. Perhaps some of the tribal chieftains will unite behind one of their own; perhaps some of the regime's overseas opposition figures will return, not so much as saviors but as masons who might lay a new foundation over the rubble. Or perhaps some younger Libyans, with overseas degrees under their belt, or young entrepreneurs, will rise to the occasion. There are even rumors that the heir to the country's monarchy may want to throw his hat in the ring.
Events in the eastern city of Benghazi, where the local population has spontaneously started to clean up the debris left by recent battles, give one hope that this traumatized country can still pull together while avoiding worse bloodshed. Getting Libya back on its feet will be an unwieldy, and probably fractious, process in which many scores are settled against those who once supported the Gaddafi regime. But the problem is, of course, that much like in the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, virtually everyone at one point or another had to deal with the regime to survive. Unless political authority can be restored quickly, the sorting out of claims will undoubtedly be a bloody affair in light of the pent-up frustration that is now being released. Libya has no fireproof options, and comparisons with Tunisia and Egypt—whose uprisings so energized the Libyan people—offer no road map to a Libyan civic reconstruction. Libya is truly a case apart. But how did Libya get to this state? How did its people come to be so shorn of political structure and experience? All answers, it would seem, begin and end with Gaddafi.

It was seemingly lost on the pundits that Saif al-Islam, the apostle of change, possessed no real credentials beyond being the son of Gaddafi and the author of a couple of execrable books on economic development.
There was, for all the usual showmanship, something touching about Gaddafi's last visit to Italy a few months ago. Dressed in his singular combination of Arab cloak and Western-style white business suit, he had pinned a grainy black-and-white picture to his lapel—which Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi studiously avoided looking at. The picture was of a shackled Omar al-Mukhtar, a Cyrenaican tribal leader and Libya's national hero, who was taken prisoner in 1931 after resisting the Italian colonial invasion for several years. He was hanged by the Italians before an assembly of Libyan prisoners—his cloak and glasses remain a central exhibit in Libya's national museum on Green Square in Tripoli.
It was Gaddafi's way of paying homage to a man he believed represents the ideal of a true Libyan: a tribal warrior, brave, uncompromising, willing to take on insurmountable odds. Gaddafi wanted to remind Berlusconi of the horrors of the Italian occupation—during which as much as half the population of Cyrenaica, Libya's eastern province, may have died. It was no surprise that Gaddafi, in his first speech after the uprising against him spread across Libya, invoked these same qualities to explain that he would fight to the end and was willing to die as a (self-proclaimed) martyr.
History, particularly the disastrous Italian legacy in Libya, has been a constant element in Gaddafi's speeches since he took power in a bloodless coup in 1969. He was barely 27 years old at the time, inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser, neighboring Egypt's president, whose ideas of Arab nationalism and of the possibility of restoring glory to the Arab world, would fuel the first decade of Gaddafi's revolution. And while it was also clear from the start that he was unimpressed with the niceties of international diplomacy, no one could have predicted in 1969 how confrontational his path would be, both to his own citizens and to the world.
With a zeal that bordered on obsession, Gaddafi set about reforming Libya, trying to confect a tribal community writ large in a country that had been ruled since its independence in 1951 by a lackluster monarchy with close ties to the West. What Gaddafi wanted to institute was what he called a Jamahiriya, a political system that is run directly by tribesmen without the intermediation of state institutions—a sort of grand conclave akin, on a national scale, to the Afghan loya jirga. When it turned out that Libya, which was still a decentralized society in 1969, had little appetite for his centralizing political vision and remained largely indifferent to his proposals, the young idealist quickly turned activist.
In the Green Book, a set of slim volumes published in the mid-1970s that contain Gaddafi's political philosophy, a blueprint is offered for a dramatic restructuring of Libya's economy, politics, and society. In principle, Libya would become an experiment in democracy. In reality, it became a police state where every move of its citizens was carefully watched by a growing number of security apparatuses and revolutionary committees that owed loyalty directly to Gaddafi. And a darker element now started to appear in his speeches, harking back once more to the colonial period: the notion that a group of Libyan traitors inside Cyrenaica had made the capture of Omar al-Mukhtar and the defeat of the Libyan mujahedin possible. This notion of a fifth column that would allow Libya's enemies--the United States, Islamic radicals, and, conveniently, internal opposition--to infiltrate the Jamahiriya became a justification to destroy anyone who stood in Gaddafi's path. Even those who had left Libya and gone into exile were not safe, pursued by hit squads tasked to shoot down what Gaddafi called “stray dogs.” In an ugly echo, those fighting in the streets against his revolution were also labeled dogs (and cockroaches)--fit only, Gaddafi thundered, for obliteration.
The impact on Libya of the Green Book's directives was calamitous. Having crushed all opposition by the mid-1970s, the regime systematically snuffed out any group that could potentially oppose it--any activity that could be construed as political opposition was punishable by death, which is one reason why a post-Gaddafi Libya, unlike a post-Mubarak Egypt, can have no ready-made opposition in a position to fill the vacuum. Nowhere was Gaddafi's inclination to root out opposition more tested than in his dance with the country's tribes. The tribes—the Warfalla, the Awlad Busayf, the Magharha, the Zuwaya, the Barasa, and the smallest of them all, the Gadafa, to which he belonged—offered a natural form of political affiliation, a tribal ethos that could be tapped into for support. And perhaps, in the aftermath of Gaddafi, they could serve as a nucleus around which to build a new political system.
For this quality—this institutional potential—Gaddafi feared they might coalesce into groups opposing his rule. So, during the first two decades after the 1969 coup, he tried to erase their influence, arguing that they were an archaic element in a modern society. But as their power proved enduring, and as the challenges to his rule grew in the 1980s and '90s, he gradually and willy-nilly brought them back into his fold. In a brilliant move that co-opted tribal elders, many of whom were also military commanders, he created the Social Leadership People's Committee, through which he could simultaneously control the tribes and segments of the country's military.
The late 1970s and '80s were the period of Gaddafi's rule imprinted most vividly in people's minds: the terrorist incidents; the confrontation with President Reagan, who bombed Libya in April 1986; and the growing isolation of Libya as international sanctions were imposed. Lockerbie was the logical endpoint for a regime that had lost all international legitimacy. In the aftermath of the bombing, Gaddafi attempted to rally Libyans into massive demonstrations, but they had become largely apathetic--neutered by their own predicament--and none rose to the call for another wave of political activism. The revolution was dying rapidly, and the Libyan ruler, surrounded, as all dictators are, by sycophants who ward off any contrary advice, simply went on as if nothing had changed.
But the sanctions bit fiercely, and while the regime still had the coercive power to put down any uprisings that took place in the 1990s, it became clear to Gaddafi's closest advisers that the potential for unrest had reached unprecedented levels. The way out was to come to an agreement with the West that would end the sanctions, allow Libya to refurbish an aging oil infrastructure, and provide a safety valve by permitting Libyans to travel abroad once more.
When Libya announced its intent to renounce weapons of mass destruction in December 2003—after a long process of behind-the-scenes diplomacy initially spearheaded by Britain—Libyans hoped that it would mark the reintegration of their country with a world from which they had so long been shut out. Their hope came, in part, to be focused on Saif al-Islam, one of Gaddafi's sons who, as a self-styled reformer, pontificated on the need to open up Libya's political system. Always impeccably dressed in Western suits (in contrast to his father's outlandish wrap-arounds), Saif—with a shaved head and coruscating smile—embodied the new Libya everyone wanted to see.
Saif also became, almost overnight, the darling of the Western press, enthralled by the spectacle of a young modernist with a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics bringing reform to his father's foul dictatorship. It was seemingly lost on the pundits that this apostle of reform possessed no real credentials beyond being the son of Gaddafi and the author of a couple of execrable books on economic development. The pundits, crucially, also failed to detect the potential severity of the opposition to him inside Libya.
Libya's love affair with Saif al-Islam and his reformist ideas ended very abruptly after the uprising against the Gaddafi regime, when he went on Libyan national television in a last-ditch attempt to assuage the demonstrators. Under his father, Libyans had become inured to rambling, incoherent speeches that made Fidel Castro seem like Cicero. But even by those standards, the son's speech was surreal and Orwellian: surreal because Saif, much like his father, seemed unable to grasp what the revolt in Benghazi and Cyrenaica meant for the regime; also surreal because the suggestion he made to start a national dialogue in the wake of the extensive killing and violence was no longer even remotely realistic; and Orwellian because the once likely heir apparent to the Libyan regime used precisely the kind of apocalyptic language his father had used for 40 years to justify his rule.
Muammar Gaddafi never envisioned that his rule would come to an end. “The Revolution Everlasting” was one of the enduring slogans of his Libya, inscribed everywhere from bridges to water bottles. But the uprising in Benghazi was fueled with enough political energy and uncorked fury to spread across the eastern part of the country--a spontaneous defiance of a regime that had, for four decades, mismanaged the country's economy and humiliated its citizens. Within a few days the country was split in half, with eastern Cyrenaica and its main city Benghazi effectively independent--a demonstration of the kind of people's power Gaddafi had always advocated. Reality, in effect, outgrew the caricature. Undoubtedly the irony was lost on Gaddafi and his supporters, who fought on with rabid ferocity and utter disregard for life in Tripolitania, the northwestern part of the country.
As the confrontation between Gaddafi's old revolution and the new, popular one intensified, a question that had hovered over the country in recent years assumed great urgency: what would a post-Gaddafi Libya look like? For all those long years of his rule, Gaddafi had ruthlessly used a set of divide-and-rule policies that not only kept his opponents sundered from each other, but had also completely enfeebled any social or political institution in the country.
Beyond Gaddafi, there exists only a great political emptiness, a void that Libya somehow will need to fill. What will now be required of Libya will be something Gaddafi deliberately avoided for 42 years: the creation of a modern state where Libyans become true citizens, with all the rights and duties this entails. The obstacles will be formidable. After systematically destroying local society, after using the tribes to cancel each other out, after aborting methodically the emergence of a younger generation that could take over Libya's political life--all compounded by the general incoherence of the country's administrative and bureaucratic institutions--Gaddafi will have left a new Libya with severe and longstanding challenges. It is not yet clear where new leadership will come from, and how institutions can rapidly be built to prevent groups from pursuing their self-interest at the expense of what will remain a very weak state for a considerable amount of time.
A characteristic of many oil exporters is that because their revenues flow straight into state coffers, where they can be used without accountability by those in power, they produce regimes that pay scant attention to issues of political representation. Regimes can use oil revenues strategically to provide patronage that effectively keeps them in power. Nowhere has this been orchestrated better than in Libya under Gaddafi. After him, Libya's new rulers will need to find ways to bring together a large number of groups throughout society that until now have shared very little except the oil riches of the country and whose interests were deliberately played off against each other by the divide-and-rule tactics of the regime. Unfortunately, there are very few models for Libya to follow, except perhaps those outside the region. The likelihood of a number of disparate groups demanding greater accountability and representation as the country finds its way suggests the Balkans rather than neighboring Egypt or Tunisia as likely precursors for state building in Libya. And as with the Balkans, the international community could have a large and positive role to play by providing expertise and, temporarily, security forces.
For all his buffoonery, if Gaddafi understood one thing clearly about Libya, it was that its history could be a powerful force, and could be harnessed—as he did in his invocations of Omar al-Mukhtar and the resistance against colonialism—for a remorseless political project. That project, in fact, devastated Libya at every level. Whoever Libya's new rulers turn out to be, their challenge will be to learn from the lessons of its recent sad history, and then to move resolutely forward with compromise and wisdom—qualities that the Gaddafi regime came to lack so abjectly.
Dirk Vandewalle, a professor at Dartmouth College, is the author of A History of Modern Libya, published by Cambridge University Press.
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